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Introduction
The incompatibility between the asymmetrical second law of thermody-
namics and the symmetry of the underlying statistical mechanical dynamics
is one of the long-standing problems in the foundations of statistical mechan-
ics and it is usually referred to as “the irreversibility problem”. A common
solution to this problem posits that thermodynamic evolutions are the result
of an initially low-entropy state of the system. The so called intervention-
ists (Blatt, 1959, [9]; Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998, [82]; Hemmo & Shenker,
2005, [55]), by contrast, believe that this low-entropy initial condition is not
sufficient to account for the thermodynamic behavior. They propose an al-
ternative (or an additional) solution to the irreversibility problem. In their
view, the thermodynamic approach to equilibrium is ultimately produced by
the environmental perturbations acting upon the system.
Soon after the interventionist approach was first proposed (in the 1950’s)
a specific kind of experiments, known as the spin-echo experiments, became
a case of great interest in the debate about interventionism for two reasons.
Firstly, in the spin-echo experiments it appears that the relevant system is
completely isolated, and thus it approaches equilibrium without any influence
of the environment. If that is the case, interventionism would not be able to
account for the behaviour of the system in this experiment. Secondly, the
entropy of the system appears to increase and decrease several times over
the course of the experiment. In other words, the evolution of the system
apparently violates the second law of thermodynamics. For both reasons
the spin-echo experiments have been fertile ground for debates regarding
the irreversibility problem, and constitute a particularly challenging case for
interventionism.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze and compare several interventionist ex-
planations of the spin-echo experiments. Both classical and quantum-based
interventionist explanations are assessed by means of James Woodward’s
manipulability theory of causal explanation (Woodward, 2003, [106]). The
application of the manipulability theory is not only relevant for understand-
ing in detail the irreversible process that takes place during the spin-echo
experiments, but also for clarifying the difficulties that a satisfactory version
of the interventionist approach must overcome. The analysis additionally
reveals some interesting features of the manipulability theory.
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Based on the results of the analysis developed in this thesis, I will ar-
gue that the correlation between the causes postulated by interventionists,
renders their explanations ‘shallow’ in accordance with the criteria of the
manipulability theory. I will argue that this lack of ‘explanatory depth’,
rather than reveling a disadvantage of interventionism, points to a weakness
of Woodward’s manipulability theory of causal explanation.
The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 1 the irreversibility problem
is explained and distinguished from other problems that are commonly re-
lated to it. In chapter 2 statistical mechanical interventionism is introduced
and the spin-echo experiments are described in detail. Three philosophically
relevant questions about the experiments are then answered from the inter-
ventionist perspective. The main objections to such answers are discussed in
chapter 3. This discussion motivates the application of the manipulability
theory to various explanations of the spin-echo experiments. The manipula-
bility theory itself is presented in chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 develop the
full analysis of various explanations of the spin-echo experiments in terms
of the manipulability theory. This is the main original contribution of the
thesis since the manipulability theory has never been applied to statistical
mechanical interventionism before. The results of this analysis are discussed
at the end of chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 contains the overall conclusions
of the thesis.
2
Chapter 1
The Irreversibility Problem
In this chapter we introduce the irreversibility problem. Some central notions
in foundations of statistical mechanics must be previously defined. As we
will see, the second law of thermodynamics and the notion of entropy can be
formulated in several different ways. Also the notions of ‘time asymmetry’,
‘time reversal invariance’, ‘irreversibility’ and ‘the arrow of time’ have diverse
uses in the literature and the relations that are said to hold among them
depend on the philosophical view we adopt. We must define each of these
notions carefully.
The first part of this chapter is devoted to such definitions. In the second
part of the chapter the irreversibility problem is defined and it is distin-
guished form the problem of justifying the second law of thermodynamics
more generally. Section 1.5 particularly stresses the distinction between ‘the
problem of the arrow of time’ and ‘the irreversibility problem’.
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1.1 Statistical Mechanics
Statistical Mechanics (SM) is a theory that was born from modifications of
the kinetic theory of gases, and constitutes the physical framework in which
the irreversibility problem emerged. In the kinetic theory (fist formulated by
Daniel Bernoulli in 1738, then by Nicolas Carnot (early 19th century) and
afterwards (mid 19 century) developed by Rudolf Clausius, William Thom-
son Kelvin, James Clerk Maxwell and Ludwig Boltzmann) it is assumed that
gases constituted by molecules and the properties of the system are deter-
mined by the mechanical properties of such molecules. For example, in order
to compute the pressure exerted upon the walls of a container full of gas, the
kinetic model assumes that all the molecules have the same speed, one-third
of them moving parallel to each one of the three edges of the container. The
pressure is then computed by attaching probabilities to the states of motion
of the molecules (see Ehrenfests, 1912, [37]:4). The statistical mechanical
twist arrives when probabilities, previously predicated of the state of motion
of a molecule, become a property of the state of the entire gas system. The
principal consequence of this change is that the mechanical and statistical
concepts, previously entangled in the kinetic theory, separate for the very
first time in SM (see Uffink, 2006, [95]:932-933).
SM evolved in such a way that it eventually split in two essentially differ-
ent traditions. The tradition represented by Ludwig Boltzmann, on the one
hand, and the tradition represented by Josiah Willard Gibbs on the other.
Although it is possible nowadays to identify within the scientific community
defenders of each tradition, the most common scientific attitude is using one
or the other depending on the feature that results more convenient for the
problem that one is willing to solve. For our purposes it is important to clar-
ify the differences between the Boltzmannian and the Gibbsian approaches to
SM, mainly because each of them defines the concept of entropy – closely re-
lated to the irreversibility problem– in a different way. I turn now to explain
(in sections 1.2 and 1.3) the main differences between these two traditions.
4
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1.2 Boltzmann and Gibbs: two approaches to
Statistical Mechanics
A ‘dynamical system’ is a mathematical representation of any evolution func-
tion describing the trajectory of one point –or a set of points– across time
in an abstract space known as state space or phase space. How the phase
space is defined and what the physical meaning of the evolution function is
depends on the particular application.
In SM the systems are constituted by a very large number of elements
(≈ 1023), with a finite number of degrees of freedom. The phase space Γ
for a system of n particles is normally defined as a 2n-dimensional space
in which a point x ∈ Γ represents the state of the system at any time.
So x specifies the total position-momentum and is given by x = (qi, pi) =
(q1, q2, q3, . . . qn, p1, p2, p3, . . . pn) where qi are the generalized space coordi-
nates and pi the conjugated momentum. The multidimensional volume asso-
ciated to any set A in Γ is then measured in units of position ⊗ momentum.
Lebesgue and Liouville are common measures and they are usually normal-
ized (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1). For most applications the system’s evolution is described
by the Hamiltonian equations. The evolution function φt is called “flow”
when t ∈ R , and that is the case in SM as t=time. The flow is measure
preserving on Γ, meaning that for all t and for every measurable set A ⊆ Γ,
the volume of A equals the volume of φt(A). In short, in what follows we
will deal with dynamical systems defined as a tuple (Γ, φt, µ) where:
(a) The phase space Γ.
(b)The Hamiltonian flow φt; Γ −→ Γ, t ∈ R such that for every subset A ⊆ Γ
φ0(A) = 0
φt+s(A) = φs(φt(A))
φ−t(A) = φt
−1
(c)The measure µ normalized and invariant under the flow,
i.e. for any measurable set A ⊆ Γ, µ(φt(A)) = µ(A)
It is worth noting that the system may be constrained into some hyper-
surface of Γ. If the system is energetically isolated, for example, the system
will be confined to configurations of position and momentum with the same
energy as the initial condition. The states of the system will lie within the
constant energy hypersurface ΓE ⊆ Γ. The so called microcanonical measure
µ(x) is the uniform measure over the energy hypersurface.
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Within the Boltzmannian approach, the instantaneous microstate of a
statistical mechanical system is represented by a single point in the phase
space Γ. The value of a thermodynamical observable (i.e. a property, e.g.
pressure), is related to that state point in the phase space by a phase function
f(x); f : Γ −→ R (where x ⊆ Γ). That is to say, phase functions f(x)
associate phase space points to values of a given physical quantity. Given a
Lebesgue-integrable phase function f(x) defined on ΓE, the phase average of
f(x) is defined as:
< f(x) >:=
∫
ΓE
f(x)dµ(x)
where dµ(x) = 1
ω(E)
δ(H(x)− E)dx
δ is the Dirac delta function, H(x) is the Hamiltonian, E the energy param-
eter and ω(E) is the area of the energy hypersurface given by:
ω(E) =
∫
ΓE
δ(H(x)− E)dx
In the Gibbsian approach, by contrast, the object of study is not a single
system but an ensemble of several identically prepared systems. The state of
each of the systems belonging to the ensemble ε is represented by one point
in Γ. Thus, the situation of the ensemble as a whole is represented by a set of
points in the phase space. When the number of systems is very high we have
a positive density distribution ρ(x) of representative points over the phase
space. This density distribution ρ provides information about the probability
that a representative point lies in some region of the phase space.
The integral of ρ(qi, pi) over the phase space region delimited by [qa, qb]⊗
[pc, pd], (a, b, c, d ≤ n) with respect to the measure ν gives the amount of
states that satisfy qi ∈ [qa, qb] and pi ∈ [pc, pd]. If the system is confined to
the constant energy hypersurface ΓE the integral is computed over ΓE and
the ensemble is called microcanonical ensemble.
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The average of any phase function over the ensemble ε is then computed
by:
< f(x) >=
∫
ε
f(x)ρ(x)dν
where ν is the measure with respect to the density distribution ρ. The Gibb-
sian approach postulates that this average of the phase function < f(x) >
serves to compute the value of the thermodynamic observable (e.g. the pres-
sure) associated to the phase function (see Frigg, 2007, [41]:138). This is the
so called Gibbsian average method, and it has shown to be an extremely suc-
cessful method for predicting values that coincide with the values obtained
by means of experimental measurements.
1.3 The Second Law of Thermodynamics
1.3.1 The second law and phase space regions
Consider a container full of gas. Let us define the macrostate M as the state
in which all the gas molecules are concentrated in the left hand side of the
container. There is a region in the phase space Γ that corresponds to this
macrostateM . Such a region contains all (and only) the points in Γ such that
they are macroscopically manifested by M . Each point inside that region is
however unique in the sense that it represents a particular microstate in which
the positions and momenta of the gas molecules are different. So, roughly
speaking, regardless the specific position and velocity of the molecules, if the
state of the system lies in the region associated to M , we will always observe
the same macroscopic state in the laboratory, namely, the gas confined in the
left hand side of the container.
Suppose that we divide the phase space Γ in several regions of this kind.
Under such a division of the phase space, the region corresponding to the
equilibrium (regularly corresponding to the macrostate in which the gas is
spread out all over the container) will occupy the greatest volume of the
phase space (see Fig.1), while the region corresponding to rare macrostates
(for instance, all gas molecules perfectly aligned forming a cube in the middle
of the container), will have, by contrast, a very reduced volume.1 This is
1It is worth noting that entropy is not necessary opposite to order. For more details
see Landsberg (1984, [66]).
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due to the fact that there are not that many possible micro-configurations
associated to that rare macrostate.
The intuition behind the second law of thermodynamics (illustrated in
Fig.1) is that an isolated system with an initial state lying in a small region
of the phase space, will evolve naturally in such a way that the succession of
states will cross through regions of increasingly greater volume until it finally
reaches the equilibrium region with the greatest volume.
Fig.1. Evolution towards equilibrium.2
If we define a quantity proportional to the volume of the different regions
of the phase space Γ we can then claim that, according to the second law
of thermodynamics, such a quantity increases during the natural evolution
of the system. Entropy is one such quantity. Given the huge differences
between the volumes of the regions in Γ for systems with a large number
of particles, the entropy is conveniently associated to the logarithm of the
volume rather than to the volume of the region. Entropy is then defined as
S = kB lnΩ, where kB is the Boltzmann constant, and Ω is the number of
microstates that correspond to the same macrostate (see Penrose, 1989, [78]:
400-406). Intuitively, the second law of thermodynamics states that isolated
systems evolve in such a way that the entropy S either increases or remains
equal, but it never decreases.
2Figure taken from Penrose, 1989, [78]:402, and then modified.
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1.3.2 Three considerations about the second law
The formulation of the second law presented in the previous section leads
to three interesting considerations (i, ii and iii). The first consideration (i)
concerns how great the equilibrium region is compared with the rest of the
regions in the phase space. Imagine, for instance, a rather simple system
such that the number of different possible micro configurations compatible
with a given macrostate is not very small compared with the number of
micro states compatible with the equilibrium. In that case the union of all
of the non-equilibrium regions may be larger in volume than the equilibrium
region alone. How can we be sure then that the system will evolve into the
equilibrium region?
A different issue (ii) concerns the domain of the law. What kind of systems
behave in accordance with the law? Is behavior in accordance with the
second law manifest only in isolated systems and not in open systems? Are
we talking about an empirical and merely descriptive principle or, are we
dealing with a normative statement that is supposed to hold universally?
And a third and delicate question (iii) concerns the meaning of ‘entropy’
and whether this meaning changes if we translate the situation to the Gibb-
sian framework. Within the Boltzmannian framework the initial state of the
system is represented by a single point in the phase space. Within the Gibb-
sian framework, by contrast, the initial states of the systems in the ensemble
are represented by a initial distribution ρ(x). One may ask then whether
“entropy’ is a property of an individual system or a property of the ensemble.
How do we define entropy within this framework, and what does its value
depend on?
A common response to consideration (i) is to claim that statistical me-
chanics studies systems of a high number of degrees of freedom. If the system
has a high number of degrees of freedom the volume of the equilibrium region
is overwhelmingly greater than the volume of other regions together and the
problem (i) is resolved.
To answer questions (ii) and (iii) we may consider different formulations of
the second law of thermodynamics.3 Probably the most empirically grounded
3Lieb-Yngvason, Carathéodory, Fourirer, Prigogine, Reichenbach and some other au-
thors have been excluded because it is not my intention to provide an exhaustive review of
every formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. For a scrupulous historical and
philosophical analysis see Jos Uffink (2001, [94]). Formal and historical details of classical
9
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formulations can be traced back to the very first works of Carnot, Kelvin and
Clausius. Those formulations might be seen as the “the seeds of the law”, since
the concept of entropy was not yet explicitly involved. Clausius’ general idea4
was that in any machine unaided by external sources of energy, no transfer
of heat from a body to another at a higher temperature is possible. Kelvin’s
principle, in turn, was that “a transformation whose sole final thermodynamic
result is to transform into mechanical energy heat extracted from a source
which is at the same temperature throughout is impossible” (see Adkins,
1987, [1]:104). These two principles were shown to be equivalent and are now
known as prohibitions of the perpetuum mobile of the second kind5. Isolated
systems performing cyclic processes (i.e. processes where the final state of
the system is equal to the initial state) comprise the domain of Clausius’ and
Kelvin’s principles. Since the kinetic theory had a very practical dimension
related with heat engines it is not surprising that, in these early principles,
no intention of describing the behaviour of the entire universe is explicitly
manifest.
Later formulations by Clausius himself differ on just this point. In 1862
he extends the principle to no-cyclic processes and soon after he formulates
the law as applying to the universe as a whole:
There is “a generally prevailing tendency in Nature towards changes
in a definite sense. If one applies this to the universe in total,
one reaches a remarkable conclusion.[...]Namely, if, in the uni-
verse, heat always shows the endeavour to change its distribution
in such a way that existing temperature differences are thereby
smoothened, then the universe must continually get closer and
closer to the state, where the forces cannot produce any new
motions, and no further temperature differences exist.” (Claus-
sius,1864, quoted in Uffink [94]:36)
In 1879 Clausius proposes ‘The Entropy Principle’ according to which
‘The entropy of the universe tends to a maximum’. Here the concept of
entropy appears for the very first time in a formulation of the second law. In
thermodynamics can be found in James Serrin’s (1979, [87]).
4For the original formulations see Jesudason (2003, [60]), Jaynes (1984, [59]) or Albert
(2000, [4]:28-30).
5The prohibition of perpetuum mobile of the first kind corresponds to violations of the
conservation of energy. For more details see Fink (2009, [39]:306).
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the same year Max Planck proposes a formulation of the second law also in
terms of entropy: “For all processes in the universe, the total entropy of the
systems involved never decreases, and therefore all processes are irreversible”
(Plank quoted in Uffink [94]:92).
The famous ‘Minimum Theorem’, published in 1872 by Boltzmann and
now known as the H-theorem, was another attempt to solve the myster-
ies behind previous formulations of the second law and the phenomenon of
irreversibility. Boltzmann analyzed the case of a dilute gas, constituted by
spherical molecules inside a container with elastic walls. The theorem proves
that, if such a system is energetically isolated over infinite time, it will spend
the overwhelming part of the time in microstates near the equilibrium. And
the equilibrium microstate is to be uniquely described by the Maxwell dis-
tribution (for more details see Sklar, 1993, [91]:177 and Brown, Myrvold and
Uffink, 2009, [14]:175).
Boltzmann’s H-theorem was criticized for relying on an unjustified proba-
bilistic assumption (Stosszahlansatz ) about the number of collisions between
molecules as well as for the incompatibility between the theorem and the un-
derlying dynamics6. In response to his critics, Boltzmann reformulated his
conception of the second law of thermodynamics and proposed that “corre-
sponding to any description of the gas in terms of its ‘macroscopic’ observable
properties, there are many possible ‘microstates’ –many possible configura-
tions of molecules which all give the same macrostate.” (Boltzmann quoted
in Price (2004, [80]:222-225)). Under this renewed Boltzmannian concep-
tion, also described at the beginning of this section, entropy is defined as
S = kBlnµ(M) and the second law may be formulated as follows:
Second Law of Thermodynamics (2LTD): The entropy of an isolated
system tends to increase over time, approaching a maximum value at the
equilibrium state.
This statement has become in many contexts the standard formulation
of the second law of thermodynamics.
Sometimes this law is also articulated in terms of probabilities. In order
to do so probabilities are associated to the measure µ operating over the
phase space Γ. Intuitively this means that the greater the volume of a region
in Γ is, the higher is the probability that a state point x lies in that region.
6This deserves to be treated in detail so the following section will focus on it.
11
Chapter 1. The Irreversibility Problem
This idea has been formulated more precisely in the following principle:
Proportionality principle: If M is the macro-state of a system at time
t, the probability at that time that the micro state of the system lies in a
subset A of ΓM is µ(A)/µ(ΓM) where µ is the standard Lebesgue measure.
If this principle holds, the microstates of a given region in Γ that corre-
spond to the same macrostate M (see Fig.1 in page 8) can also be defined as
equally likely micro states. Using this terms yet another alternative formula-
tion of the second law of thermodynamics is possible:
Second Law assuming the Proportionality Principle (2L-PP):
Isolated systems evolve form unlikely to likely states.
We may now provide a conclusion regarding consideration (ii) concerning
the domain of the law. The above presented discussion of different versions
of the second law of thermodynamics shows how the domain of that law has
changed across its history. It was firstly conformed by cyclic processes and
was later extended to non-cyclic processes; in ‘The Entropy Principle’ the
domain is the entire universe; and in Planck’s formulation the domain in-
cludes all kinds of physical processes. Finally in the currently most widely
accepted version of the law (2LTD) the domain of the law are energetically
isolated systems. And –recalling the solution to issue (i)– it is also com-
monly assumed that those isolated systems have a high number of degrees of
freedom.
Let us turn now to our third and last issue (iii) concerning whether or not
the meaning of the entropy changes in the Gibbsian approach. Is it possible
to describe the evolution of an ensemble of systems in non-equilibrium states
toward an ensemble of systems in states of equilibrium? To put it slightly
different, can the law be stated as 2LTD –or as an equivalent statement– also
in the Gibbsian approach? To answer these questions let us inquire into how
the Gibbsian entropy is defined and whether it increases in accordance with
the second law.
The fine-grained Gibbsian entropy is denoted by SG and is defined as:
SG(ρ) := −kB
∫
Γ
ρ log(ρ)dΓ
Where kB is the Boltzmann constant and ρ(qi, pi, t) is the (positive) fine-
grained density distribution of the states of the ensemble.
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Our question is whether this fine-grained entropy increases when a system
approaches equilibrium, i.e., whether the non-equilibrium distribution of the
system ρ approaches the microcanonical distribution –which characterizes
equilibrium systems in the Gibbsian formalism. And the answer is that
such a change in the distribution is impossible. The systems conforming the
Gibbsian ensemble evolve in accordance with Liouville’s theorem which
states that the derivative of the density function equals zero:
dρ
dt
= 0
By definition, a distribution ρ is called ‘stationary’ iff Lioville’s theo-
rem holds (and thus measure-preservation holds) for all times t. A direct
consequence of the theorem is that the measure µ is invariant under the
Hamiltonian flow φt.
Intuitively Liouville’s theorem means that, just alike an incompressible
fluid, a density distribution in the phase space may change its shape but
never its volume (see Fig.2 below). As a direct consequence, the fine-grained
entropy, which is defined in terms of the density distribution, cannot increase.
Non-stationary distributions always remain non-stationary and stationary
distributions always remain stationary. This constitutes a serious problem
because it is in conflict with the second law of thermodynamics.7.
Fig.2. Ilustration of Liouville’s Theorem.8
In the attempt to solve and explain the situation, Gibbs (1902) defined
another kind of entropy called coarse-grained entropy. If the phase space is
divided in disjointed cells ωj (j = 1, 2, 3, ...m) the so-called coarse-grained
entropy is defined by:9
7For more details see Frigg (2007, [41]:138), Lombardi (2003, [68]: 17) or appendix A
8Taken from Lombardi, 2003, [68]:17.
9The definitions of entropy presented in this section follow Frigg (2007, [41]:151-153).
Gibbs original book is (1902, [44]).
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Sω(ρ) = SG(ρω) := −kB
∫
Γ
ρ log(ρ)dΓ
where ρω is the uniform density in each cell, taking the average value of the
density ρ in that cell i to:
ρω(qi, pi, t) :=
1
δω
∫
ω(qi,pi)
c(q′i, p
′
i, t)dΓ
′
The following figures illustrate the conceptual difference between ρ and ρω.
Both figures represent an equilibrium state: Fig.3 shows the picture of the
fine-grained density distribution already spread along the phase space, while
Fig.4 shows a different picture of exactly the same situation, but seen from
the coarse-grained perspective. The difference between the two figures shows
how coarse-grained takes the average value of the fine-grained distribution
in each cell, disregarding the precise distribution inside it. Note that the
density is evenly distributed across each cell -hence the tone of grey in Fig.4.
Fig.3.Fine-grained distribution Fig.4.Coarse-grained distribution
If the evolution of the system is such that the initial fine-grained dis-
tribution ρ(qi, pi, t0) spreads over more and more cells ωj as time increases,
then, the coarse-grained entropy will also increase. Figures 2 and 3 represent
14
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the system at a time t1(t1 > t0) close to the relaxation time, i.e., when the
system has almost reached equilibrium.
The advantage of the coarse-grained entropy is that the uniform density
ρω) is not governed by Liouville’s equations (Frigg, 2007, [41]:152) and so,
it is not as restricted as the fine-grained entropy. In accordance with the
second law of thermodynamics, the coarse-grained entropy increases while
the system approaches equilibrium. This is also referred as the Gibbsian
explanation of the irreversibility of the density distribution.
It is worth stressing, however, that full mixing –and subsequently full
ergodicity– is a necessary condition for the desired increment of coarse-
grained entropy.10
At least two other comments are in order regarding the Gibbsian descrip-
tion of the approach to equilibrium. Firstly, if the coarse grained entropy
tends to its maximum value only as time tends to infinity then, it cannot
be appropriate for describing real systems with finite relaxing times. (see
Ehrenfests, 1912, [37]). Secondly, the consequence of defining both Gibbsian
entropies in terms of the probability distribution ρ is that they become prop-
erties of an ensemble rather than an individual system. 11 Thus, “they are
not properly speaking properties of individual systems which depend upon
their changes in microstate at all. The Gibbsian entropies of a system are
fixed by the constraints upon it, not by the actual state the gas takes on
while so constrained.” (Sklar, 1974, [90]:405-406).
This affects how the second law is to be conceived, because entropy is no
longer considered as a property of an individual system. For instance, the
statement ‘the state of the system lies in the equilibrium region’ not longer
makes sense within the Gibbsian approach.12 One could think that it is only
a matter of changing from a Boltzmannian ‘point state’ to a Gibbsian density
distribution ρ over the phase space, but the problem is not that simple. The
main difficulty is how entropy is defined for non-equilibrium states – and this
is precisely the essence of question (iii).
10Some arguments for mixing as necessary condition for the increment of coarse-grained
entropy are based upon the geometrical interpretation of mixing and the convergence
theorem. For more details see Frigg (2007, [41]:153) or Labarca (2005, [65]:60).
11This is the main difference between Boltzmann’s and Gibb’s approaches
12“This ‘ensemble character’ carries over to other physical quantities, most notably tem-
perature, which are also properties of an ensemble and not of an individual system.” (Frigg,
2007, [41]:170).
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For example, in a box full of gas where a barrier is removed at t1 (allowing
the gas, previously trapped in the left half of the box, to expand over the
whole volume of the box) the entropy will be defined for t1 and also for
t2 when the gas is uniformly expanded all over the box. But whether the
entropy of the intermediate non-equilibrium stages can be uniquely defined
is not completely clear (see Uffink, 2001, [94]:94). In that sense, the following
formulation of the second law seems more appropriate than 2LTD and 2L-PP:
Refined 2LTD (R-2LTD): If an isolated system evolves from a macrostate
M1 with entropy S1 to the equilibrium macrostate M2 with entropy S2, then
S2 ≥ S1.
This refined version of the law is an improvement on previous formulations
in at least two different respects. On the one hand, unlike 2L-PP, it makes
no commitment to any relation between probabilities and entropy. This is
an advantage because how probabilities are to be interpreted in SM is still a
matter of debate. On the other hand the refined R-2LTD says nothing about
the value of the entropy at intermediate stages during the evolution of the
system. The idea underlying 2LTD is that the system evolves form a non-
equilibrium state toward an equilibrium state, describing a sort of continuum
evolution. The refined version R-2LTD, by contrast, only claims that the en-
tropy of the final state is never less than the entropy of the initial state. And
this move makes R-2LTD equally compatible both with the Boltzmannian
and the Gibbsian definitions of entropy.
1.4 Loschmidt’s and Zermelo’s Objections
There are two particularly important objections that emerged as reactions to
Bolztmann’s formulation of the H-theorem. They are known as Loschmidt’s
Reversibility Objection and Zermelo’s Recurrence Objection respectively.
Both of them point to the incompatibility between the asymmetry built into
the H-theorem and the symmetrical underlying dynamics of classical me-
chanics. In order to explain these objections let me first define the notion of
‘time-reversal invariance’.
Definition of time-reversal invariance: Let T be the time-reversal
operator that transforms t into −t. A dynamical equation (or a law-like
statement) is said to be time-reversal invariant iff it is invariant under the
application of T.13
13See Castagnino et al (2005, [23]:3), or alternative definitions in Earman (1974, [33]:25
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Using this definition the reversibility objection (Loschmidt, 1876, trans-
lated in Brush [16]) can be formulated as follows. Hamiltonian micro-dynamics
are time-reversal invariant. Hence, for any SM dynamical system the se-
quence of states Seq = x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn is just as likely as the reverse se-
quence T(Seq)xn, xn−1, . . . , x3, X2, x1. An evolution from a low-entropy ini-
tial state to a high-entropy final state is, therefore, just as likely as the reverse
evolution.
The recurrence objection (Zermelo, 1896, translated in Brush [16]), raised
some years later, is based on Poincaré’s recurrence theorem. According to
that theorem “any classical mechanical system, with a bounded phase space,
returns to a state arbitrarily closely to its initial state, and indeed repeat this
infinitely often” (Uffink, 2006, [95]:64). Zermelo noted that, as a consequence
of Poincaré’s theorem, for any dynamical system confined to a finite region of
the phase space (for example, the hypersurfice ΓE), it is impossible to define
a continuous function such that it always increases for all initial states. In
other words, this objection argues that the irreversible processes described
in the H-theorem are impossible to obtain.
So both objections show, in short, that nothing in the dynamics governing
the components of the statistical mechanical systems can account for the
asymmetry displayed by thermodynamic behaviour.14
If these objections are true, it follows that, according to the dynamics in
SM, every non-maximal entropy state represents a local entropy minimum of
the possible trajectories coming from states with higher entropy. This means
that, at any arbitrary intermediate state during the evolution of a system,
one can retrodict by means of the SM formalism that the system had a
higher entropy in the past (see Fig.5). But this is incompatible with the
unidirectionality of the second law of thermodynamics, according to which
entropy cannot ever decrease.
and 2002, [35]:246).
14For a detailed analysis of these objections see Brown et al, 2009, [14].
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Fig.5. Thermodynamically abnormal retrodictions follow from SM dynamics.
The incompatibility between Hamiltonian SM and thermodynamics pointed
by these objections is commonly defeated by postulating that the system’s
evolution depends upon its low-entropy initial condition. From this perspec-
tive, it is true that both thermodynamically normal and abnormal evolutions
are possible according to SM, but, the matter of fact low-entropy initial con-
ditions have been such that they lead to evolutions that obey the second law
of thermodynamics. For example, if we observe a glass with water and some
small ice-cubes inside it, SM dynamics tell us that past states where ‘the
ice-cubes were bigger’ are equally likely as past states where ‘ice-cubes were
melted’. However, as a matter of fact, it has always been the case that initial
states of ‘glasses with water and ice-cubes’ are such that ice-cubes liquefy
and not solidify in water.
This solution, however, seems to simply ‘displace’ the problem from the
present to some other state in the past (namely, the initial state). For what-
ever the election of the arbitrary initial state is, it will turn out (again)
that many possible trajectories compatible with that state will come from
higher entropies (see Fig.5 above). To avoid this prevalence of the anti-
thermodynamical possible past, one posits that the low-entropy state holds
at the very beginning of the universe (in some sense, at a moment “without
past”). This is the so called past hypothesis and has been defended, among
others, by Boltzmann (1895), David Albert (2000) and Huw Price (2004).
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Many efforts have been devoted to make sense of the past hypothesis
within modern cosmology models. These efforts appeal to several different
features of the universe to explain the past hypothesis: inflation (P. Davies,
1983, critically analyzed by D. Page, 1983, and by H. Price 1996, 2002, 2003,
2004), black and white holes (S. Hawking, 1942), or the Weyl tensor (R.
Penrose, 1989,2006).
Some philosophers of science, nonetheless, refuse to accept the idea that
the initial conditions are sufficient to explain the approach to equilibrium. So
they work in a different direction. They believe that some additional causal
mechanism must be taken into account to provide an entirely satisfactory
explanation of thermodynamic behaviour. Interventionism is one of those
approaches that postulate some additional causal mechanism (and will be
reviewed in chapter 2).
And yet another group of authors not only question the sufficiency of
the past hypothesis (as interventionists do), but also question its necessity.
Castagnino, Lombari and Lara (2003, [22]), for instance, propose to explain
the temporal asymmetric behaviour of the universe without appealing to the
past hypothesis – or to any other entropic consideration.
The main concern shared by many philosophers regarding the past hy-
pothesis (among them Earman 2006, Winsberg 2004, and Callender 2010) is
that, even if an acceptable definition of entropy could be proposed for the
early universe (a goal that has not been reached), is not clear at all that
the entropic behaviour of the universe as a whole is enough to justify the
behaviour of small local systems.
1.5 Definition of the Irreversibility Problem
In the previous sections we have been using indistinctively the terms “ir-
reversibility”, “time-asymmetry”, “direction of time” and “temporal reversal
non-invariance”. For the sake of clarity, it is now convenient to make explicit
some assumptions regarding the differences and the relations among these
concepts.15
15I’m very grateful with Olimpia Lombardi for clarifying the differences between these
concepts both in conversations and her papers (2003, [68]; 2005, [23] and 2005, [65].
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As mentioned before time reversal invariance (or ‘t-invariance’ for
short) is predicated of an equation or a law iff it remains invariant under
the transformation T, which replaces the variable t with the variable −t (see
definition on p.16).
The terms ‘reversibility’ and ‘irreversibility’, by contrast, are not applied
to equations or laws but only to physical processes. Reversible processes
are governed by t-invariant laws. And a physical process is said to be re-
versible if its initial state can be completely restored. The paradigmatic
example of reversibility is a very slow process in which the system always re-
mains in states close to equilibrium. But a system’s evolution may be more
‘violent’, beginning in a non-equilibrium state, and it may remain possible to
restore the initial state by some auxiliary mechanism in such a way that the
inverse sequence of states will take place. Reversible processes are temporally
symmetric.
Irreversible processes, by contrast, are governed by non-t-invariant
laws. A process is called irreversible if the sequence of events that make
up the process occurs in only one temporal sequence and never in the inverse
sequence. Irreversible processes are temporally asymmetric.
As a matter of fact there exist in nature many processes in which re-
versibility is impossible: gases expand, ice-cubes melt, and waves in lakes
always propagate away from the point were a stone has generated the wave.
Maybe because of this, irreversible processes have often been considered as
the source of our intuitions about the flow of time. This brings about at least
three philosophical problems that must be carefully distinguished:
(P-I) The problem of “the subjective arrow of time” concerns the
psychological perception of a time flow.
(P-II) The problem of the arrow of time explores wether a distinction
between past and future can be drawn. It aims at defining and justifying
time’s direction.
(P-III) The Irreversibility Problem concerns how to account for the
de facto irreversible physical processes despite the fact that the underlying
mechanics are t-invariant.
In this thesis P-I and P-II are not addressed. Only P-III will be examined
in detail. More precisely, we will focus on a particular approach to P-III
known as interventionism which will be explained in the following chapter.
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Statistical Mechanical
Interventionism
In this chapter the interventionist approach to statistical mechanics is intro-
duced. After describing the main features of this approach (in section 2.1)
I will discuss the spin echo experiments and explain why are they relevant
in the context of the irreversibility problem (in section 2.2). In section 2.3 I
will explain the classical interventionist models, particularly Ridderbos and
Redhead’s model, in relation with the spin-echo experiments. At the end of
this chapter (in section 2.4) I will explain a recent version of interventionism
which is based on quantum mechanics.
2.1 Distinctive features of interventionism
The approach to statistical mechanics called ‘interventionism’ was originally
advanced as a solution to both the problem of the arrow of time (P-II) and
the irreversibility problem (P-III). It is however nowadays accepted that in-
terventionism is not able to define a preferred direction of time; hence it does
not solve P-II. For this reason interventionism is only considered in this thesis
as an attempt to solve exclusively P-III. In other words, I understand inter-
ventionism as an approach such that, once the direction of time is defined,
attempts to explain the irreversible behaviour of thermodynamic processes
given that the underlying laws are t-invariant.1
The behaviour of thermodynamic systems is asymmetric. So it is natu-
ral to think that an appropriate explanation of such behaviour requires the
1Another relevant attempt to solve P-III is the ergodic theory. For some details about
ergodic theory see appendix B.
21
Chapter 2. Statistical Mechanical Interventionism
presence of an asymmetry in the explanans. The most widely accepted view
is that this asymmetry in the explanans is precisely the low entropy initial
condition. However, interventionists do not accept that this initial condition
explains irreversible processes. Whence they propose introducing a second
asymmetry in the explanans, viz., a causal mechanism that ensures that en-
tropy will not decrease (see Price, 2004, [80]:section 3). It is important to
stress, however, that interventionism never suggests replacing the first asym-
metry (low-entropy initial condition asymmetry) with the second one (causal
asymmetry) but rather it is meant to supplement it.
According to interventionism, the random influence of the external envi-
ronment acts as a source of perturbation over the system. And it is precisely
this environmental disturbance that causes the irreversible increment of en-
tropy. Hence, the essential idea posit by interventionism is that real systems
are never isolated from their surrounding environment; On the contrary, they
are in constant interaction with it. Isolation, if possible, is only achievable
for finite and very short times. For any larger time range, for most physical
systems, the interaction with the environment becomes crucial.
One may think that this kind of causal mechanism appeared for the first
time in Boltzmann’s H-theorem. After all, the H-theorem suggests that the
entropy increment is caused by collisions between the gas particles and takes
into account the causal interaction with the walls of the container. How-
ever, Boltzmann’s reformulations of the H-theorem diverged importantly
from what we call today ‘interventionism’. More specifically, in his last ver-
sion of the theorem there is no appeal to any causal mechanism but only
to initial conditions. Therefore Boltzmann should not be considered ‘the
founder’ of interventionism.
It is more appropriate to trace back the origins of interventionism to the
mid 20th century, more precisely, to Peter Bergmann and Joel Lebowitz’s
paper ‘New Approach to Nonequilibrium Processes’ (1955, [7]) and to Re-
ichenbach’s book The Direction of Time (1956, [83]). Also the model that
J.M. Blatt put forward a few years later (1959, [9]) is one of the pioneer
interventionist proposals. These early interventionists of the 1950’s were fol-
lowed some decades later by Michael L.G Redhead and T.M. Ridderbros
(1998, [82]). From now on I will refer to all these authors as "the classical
interventionists". More recently, Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker (2003, [54]
and 2005, [55]) have put forward an explanation of irreversibility based on
quantum decoherence for open systems. Despite the fact that Hemmo and
Shenker’s approach importantly differs from the classical interventionist ef-
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forts in the sense that it appeals to quantum mechanics, the authors name
themselves interventionists because the interaction between the system and
the environment plays a crucial role in their explanation. We can fairly say
that this is the list of the most relevant interventionist proposals.
The above mentioned interventionists appeal to different interacting ele-
ments to explain the irreversibility. The particles that make up the system
may interact with the walls, with external particles or with themselves. In
Bergmann’s and Lebowitz’s model (1955, [7]; and 1959, [64]), for instance,
the particles interact with the container in which the gas is confined. The
authors refer to the container as a ‘driving reservoir’ and impose on it a set
of theoretical conditions. They assume that the reservoir has a fixed tem-
perature and infinite heat capacity. Another remarkable condition assumed
in this model is that the reservoir is composed out of an infinite number of
parts and, each part of the reservoir interacts only once with the system:
“If the reservoir interacts for brief spans of time only, by then
strongly, it may be assumed that the net effect of such impulsive
interaction will be to move the representative point in system’s
phase space a finite distance, that depends both on its original
location and on the state of the reservoir just prior to interaction.
If we further simplify the reservoir by assuming that it consist
of a sensibly infinite number of disconnected and similar parts,
that each such part interacts with the system but once, and that
prior to interaction there is statistical independence between that
reservoir component and the system, then we can average over the
possible states of the reservoir.”(Bergmann and Lebowitz, 1995,
[7]:579)
Bergmann and Lebowitz impose such a condition (to divide the container
in infinite parts) in order to make the mathematical model work.2 The
evolution of the joint system (system of particles + driving reservoir) is then
described by a differential equation in the phase space. As shown below,
the equation derived is equivalent to Liouville’s equation but with an extra
stochastic term in the right hand side. Liouville’s original equation is:
2It is worth mentioning that interventionist models reject the idealization of considering
‘completely isolated’ systems. And they also reject other idealizations. For example, they
criticise the ergodic program for using mixing properties because they require infinite
times for systems to reach equilibrium. However, someone may argue, Bergmann and
Lebowitz idealize the features of the reservoir by assuming that it has an infinite number
of parts. Thus interventionism, at least this particular interventionist model, is not free
of idealizations.
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dρ
dt
+ {ρ,H} = 0
where H is the Hamiltonian and {. , .} is the Poisson bracket.
The modification on Liouville’s equation proposed by classical intervention-
ists is the following
dρ
dt
+ {ρ,H} =
∫
x′
K(x, x′)ρ(x′)−K(x′, x)ρ(x)dx′
where K(x, x′) is the probability that state x is displaced to state x′ in Γ
(see Fig.6 below)
Fig.6. Displacement of the system from state x to state x’.
Modifying Liouville’s equation is essential to Bergman and Lebowitz’s
proposal because, as the original formulation of Liouville’s equation no longer
holds, fine-grained entropy is no longer constant through the system evolu-
tion. Consequently, the approach to equilibrium can be now associated with
the increment of fine-grained entropy without appealing to Gibbs’ coarse-
grained method.3 It is shown that, for any arbitrary initial ensemble dis-
tribution, Bergmann and Lebowitz’s model implies that the ensemble will
approach equilibrium (to the microcanonical distribution) in the presence of
a single reservoir.
Blatt’s model (1959,[9]), in turn, explains the approach to equilibrium by
appealing to the collisions between the molecules surrounding the system and
3Gibbs’ coarse-grained method is explained above, see Fig.3 and Fig.4 on page 14.
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the external side of the container. The interactions generate perturbations
over the system that must be described in stochastic terms. The random or
stochastic nature of these interactions is not ontological but, rather, it is due
to our limited knowledge of the specific collisions. That is to say, the colli-
sions are in principle deterministic, but we describe them as being stochastic
because this is the only option available given our epistemic limitations. A
peculiarity of Blatt’s model is that the number of particles within the sys-
tem, and the corresponding degrees of freedom, is irrelevant and need not
be extremely large. This is interesting because, as mentioned before (1.3)
the second law of thermodynamics was formulated for describing thermody-
namic systems made up of a high number of particles. And, accordingly, the
formulations of the law (either 2LTD, PP-2L or R-2LTD) assume that the
system under cosideration has a high number of degrees os freedom. Hence
it may be convenient to understand Blatt’s model as an attempt to explain
the matter of fact irreversibility of physical processes rather than an attempt
to explain the second law of thermodynamics.
Just as Bergmann and Lebowitz, Blatt argues against the coarse-graining
method proposed by Gibbs. In Blatt’s view this method “ignores” the corre-
lational information contained in the system. In other words, as the coarse
graining method takes the average over the phase space cells, some informa-
tion about the particular distribution in each cell is unavoidably lost. As
a consequence, from the coarse-graining perspective we do not really know
if the system is genuinely approaching to equilibrium or if, by contrast, it
has kept a ’hidden order’. This makes coarse-graining, according to Blatt, a
useless strategy for explaining a system’s approach to equilibrium.
The same argument against the coarse-graining method is later defended
(in 1998) by Ridderbos and Redhead. They suggested giving up coarse-
graining in non-equilibrium SM and adopting more appropriate strategies
instead (Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998, [82]:1273). Ridderbos and Redhead
argue that the degrees of freedom of the system are entangled with the more
numerous and sometimes unobservable degrees of freedom of the environ-
ment. This entanglement allows the authors to model the interaction between
system and environment introducing a stochastic term, generating again a
modified Liouville equation (different of Bergmann and Lebowitz because the
walls of the container play no role here). Once Liouville’s equation is mod-
ified, the increment of Gibbsian entropy is possible. In this way, assuming
the stochastic interactions enable interventionist to derive the asymmetrical
thermodynamic behaviour.
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In sum, all the classical interventionist models mentioned above share a
common two-step plan to solve the irreversibility problem. In a first step
they reject Gibb’s coarse-graining method. In a second step they propose
a modification in the dynamics. More specifically, they replace Liouville’s
equation with a new equation of a stochastic nature.
To expand on the interventionist position we need to first consider the
spin-echo experiments which constitute a case of particular relevance for our
philosophical discussion. In the next section (2.2) I will describe those exper-
iments and explain why are they relevant for interventionism. In section 2.3
I will explain the main features of classical interventionism focusing on the
interventionist models of the spin-echo experiments. Section 2.4 addresses
the quantum version of interventionism.
26
The Spin-Echo Experiments
2.2 The Spin-Echo Experiments
In the so-called Spin-Echo Experiments (“SE experiments” from now on) a
system of spins suffers several changes due to magnetic alterations. These
experiments possess two interesting features relevant to the philosophical
debate regarding the irreversibility problem. Firstly, during the experiment it
is actually possible to control some of the microscopic variables of the system–
something usually impossible for thermodynamic systems. And secondly,
isolation from the external influence is highly controlled. This combination
of features is rarely found in a single experimental device. Additionally, the
SE experiments represent a challenge particularly for interventionists because
the system of spins fluctuates from a state of high entropy to a state of low
entropy (and vice versa) and the environment seems to play no role at all
during the whole process. For this reason, studying the SE experiments in
some detail will be useful for understanding the advantages and disadvantages
of interventionist approaches.
The underlying mechanism of the SE experiments can be understood us-
ing an analogy offered by Erwin Hahn (Hahn, 1953, [50]: 5) who first carried
out the experiment in the 1950’s. The analogy consists of an imaginary
Olympic race. The relevant system is the group of runners in this race. The
runners are aligned along the starting line marked on the track (a very ordered
state). The race takes place and when it finishes some runners are ahead of
others so the positions of the runners are not longer aligned (representing
a disordered state of the system). Now let us imagine that the runners are
standing in their final positions and we ask them to turn around and start
running back. Assuming (for the sake of the adequacy of the metaphor) that
every runner will equal the velocity she had during the first phase of the race,
the runners will reach their original positions at the starting line and recover
the ordered alignment they had at the start of the race. If the duration of
the original race is τ the runners will regain their original positions after a
total time of 2τ .
In an SE experiment we have a set of nuclear spins (normally belonging to
protons in a sample of glycerine) placed in a strong magnetic field. Through
the application of a first radio-frequency pulse, the spins are initially aligned.
In other words, the initial positions of the spins configure an ordered initial
state. Let us say, for example, that the direction of the magnetic field is
in the z-axis while the superposed spins lie over the xy-plane and they are
all pointing in the same direction (as shown in Fig.7 below). Due to the
presence of the magnetic field all the spins are initially precessing with the
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same frequency and this produces the emission of an electromagnetic signal
(represented in Fig.7 as the arrow). The spins are then left to evolve for a
while and the discontinuities in the magnetic field cause slight differences in
the precession rates of the spins (Fig.8). The precession rate of each spin is
more or less affected depending on the strength of the field at each point.
The evolution of the spins’ system during this stage is analogous to the fist
‘race’ among the runners.
After an interval of time (τ), the spins reach a disordered state, in which
they are not pointing in the same direction anymore and the electromagnetic
macroscopic signal completely disappears (Fig.9).
Fig.7. Initial signal Fig.8. Defocusing Fig.9. Total defocus
In a second part of the experiment (which corresponds to the runners
running back) a reversal is induced by another radio-frequency pulse. After
an interval of time (2τ) the spins are realigned and this causes the re-emission
of the electromagnetic signal, which demonstrates that the spin’s system has
returned to an ordered state equal to its original state4
The repetition of the signal is the phenomenon that gives the name to the
experiments. The evolution of the spin’s system after the second r-f pulse
would correspond to going from Fig.9, passing through Fig.8, and finally
arriving, in Fig.7, to the original state and the emission of the echo-signal.
In that moment the intensity of the electromagnetic signal reaches again a
maximum point.
During the second part of the experiment it seems that “the spins go
from an intuitively high entropy state to an intuitively low entropy state”
(Ainsworth, 2005, [2]: 622). Refrigerators also produce this kind of anti-
thermodynamic evolutions, but in that case an injection of energy explains
4Now it will be in the xz-plane instead of xy-plane but that is not relevant for our pur-
poses. Other descriptions of spin-echo experiments can be found in Ridderbos & Redhead
1998 [82]; Albert 2000 [4]; Shenker 2001 [89]; Lavis 2003 [67] and Ainsworth 2005,[2].
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the condensation of ice-cubes. In an SE experiment, by contrast, the echo
system is supposedly in perfect isolation. So a natural question to ask is: Are
the SE experiments a couter-example to the second law of thermodynamics?
We may of course repeat the procedure again on the system any number
of times. We can control the radio-frequency pulses in such a way that we
successively produce and destroy the alignment of the spins. As a result,
every time that the spins are in phase the electromagnetic signal is emitted;
and every time the spins are out of phase the signal disappears. So we have
here a succession of signals in time. However, not all the echo signals are
identical. Precisely as in an echo, the maximum intensity of the electro-
magnetic signals always decreases until the signal eventually disappears (see
Fig.10.)
Fig.10. Echo-signal decay. 5
This gives rise to a second question: Why does the intensity of the echo
signals decrease?
As we mentioned before the SE experiments represent a challenge for
interventionists. The reason is that the entropy apparently increases and
decreases during the experiments, and the environment seems to play no role
at all during the whole process. So, to summarize, at least three relevant
questions have emerged from the SE experiments:
Q1: Is the second law of thermodynamics violated in a SE experiment?
Q2: How can we explain the decay and disappearance of the echo signal in
successive repetitions of the radio-frequency pulses?
Q3: How do interventionist approaches account for the evolution of the spin’s
system?
5Image taken from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology website:
http://ocw.mit.edu.
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2.3 Classical Interventionism and the SE ex-
periments
As regards question Q1 interventionists believe that the SE experiments do
not violate the second law of thermodynamics. Let us assume that the vio-
lation of the second law requires a decrease of entropy to occur in a closed
system evolving spontaneously. Then, in order to deny that the second law of
thermodynamics is violated in the SE experiments, interventionists may fol-
low three different strategies (or combinations thereof): They can deny that
there is entropy decrease during the SE experiments; Alternatively, they can
argue that in the SE experiments the system of spins is not closed; Or, finally,
they can argue that the evolution of the spin’s system in the SE experiments
is not spontaneous but controlled. Let us consider these three strategies in
turn.
2.3.1 Entropy in the spin-echo experiments
The first strategy has been adopted, for instance, by Blatt (1959, [9]) and
Ridderbos and Redhead (1998, [82]). These classical interventionists argue
that whether or not the second law of thermodynamics is violated by the in
the SE experiments depends on our interpretation of the concept of entropy.
If one interprets ‘entropy’ as the Gibbsian coarse-grained entropy one cer-
tainly arrives to the conclusion that entropy increases during the first part of
the in the SE experiments, after the first pulse of radio-frequency is applied;
and decreases after the second radio-frequency pulse is applied. However, one
may adopt instead an “interpretation of entropy captured by the approach of
counting on a logarithmic scale the number of accessible states of a system”
(Ridderbos and Redhead, 1998,[82]:1237; see also Fig.1 on p.8). And, ac-
cording to interventionists, interpreting entropy in this ‘objective’ way, one
arrives to the correct conclusion that the spin system evolves in perfect ac-
cordance with the second law, i.e., that entropy in the SE experiments never
decreases. Ridderbos and Redhead’s reason for considering inadequate the
description of the in the SE experiments provided by coarse-grained is that
“...it [the coarse-graining method] amounts to ignoring the cor-
relations which are built up in the system under dynamical evo-
lution. [Thus,] the apparent anti-thermodynamic behaviour of
the spin system according to the coarse graining approach arises
precisely because this approach ignores the fact that the original
order of the system is spread out into correlational information,
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transforming the order into a kind of ‘hidden order’.” (Ridderbos
and Redhead, 1998,[82]:1251-1252).
This means that, although from the macroscopic point of view the system
of spins seems to reach a state of equilibrium when the spins are out of phase,
in fact the correlational information about the initial order is still contained in
the system. That is the reason why the system of spins is still able to recover
its initial order. Such a state, in which the spins ‘remember’ the information
about their initial state, corresponds to what Blatt (1959, [9]:749) called a
state of quasi-equilibrium. However, the state of true equilibrium, is only
reached when the correlational information has been dissipated and, once a
system arrives to such a state of true equilibrium it stays there forever.
It is worth noting that the concept of irreversibility itself is redefined by
classical interventionists. Namely, they call a process ‘irreversible’ if and only
if at the end of that process the system reaches a state of true equilibrium.
Once the system is in this state of true equilibrium, the initial state of the
system cannot be restored anymore because the correlational information
has vanished on the microscopic level. (Ridderbos and Redhead 1998, [82]:
1256). In other words, when a system under study is in a quasi equilibrium
state the order has disappeared at the macroscopical level, but it is still
‘hidden’ at the microscopic level in the form of correlational information. In
states of true equilibrium, by contrast, there is no such a ‘hidden order’. If
the nuclear spins were in a state of true equilibrium, they would not be able
to get back in phase again.
Thus, the argument shared by Blatt and Ridderbos-Redhead can be sum-
marized as follows: The system of spins neither evolves toward true equilib-
rium after the first r-f pulse, nor does it evolve away from true equilibrium
after the second r-f pulse. In the interval of time [0, 2τ ] the system of spins
only fluctuates from states closer or farther to quasi-equilibrium. The coarse
graining method yields an incorrect interpretation of the concept of entropy.
And this coarse-graning method leads us to the wrong impression that the
second law of thermodynamics is violated in the SE experiments. However,
the relevant question is not ‘why does entropy decreases during the second
part of the in the SE experiments? (which is, according to classical inter-
ventionists, a question based on a wrong concept of entropy) but rather how
the usual descriptions of entropy in SM (in particular the coarse graining
method) should be modified or replaced in order to correctly describe the
thermodynamically normal evolution of the system of spins in the SE exper-
iments.
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Blatt additionally comments that the SE experiments provide a good
reason to defend the fine-graining interpretation of entropy. He drives our
attention to the fact that the concept of coarse-grained entropy is often pre-
ferred to the concept of fine-grained entropy because a macroscopic observer
is supposed to be limited to “coarse-grained” experiments. In fact, the con-
cept of fine-grained entropy is sometimes considered meaningless appealing
to the fact that the detailed information about fine-grained entropy is im-
possible to obtain by experimental means. However, in Blatt’s view, the SE
experiments proof that information about fine-grained entropy can actually
be obtained via the intensity of the electromagnetic signal. Therefore, the
SE experiments render irrelevant this particular reason to prefer the coarse-
grained concept of entropy (see Blatt, 1959, [9]:745-746).
Rejecting the concept of coarse-grained entropy, in any case, is not an
easy decision to take. Let us remember that Gibbs introduced the coarse-
grained method precisely in order to account for the increase in entropy;
an increase that was impossible for fine-grained entropy. According to Li-
ouville’s theorem the volume of the distribution probability ρ is preserved
all along the system’s evolution and, as a direct consequence, fine-grained
entropy6 SG remains constant too. So, in addition to the arguments against
coarse-graining presented above, Ridderbos and Redhead need to provide an
argument for fine-grained entropy that overcomes the difficulty related with
Liouville’s theorem. The difficulty generated by Liouville’s theorem is solved
by interventionists by means of the second strategy, which will be discussed
in the next section.
2.3.2 The system of spins is open
The second strategy consists in denying that the system of spins is closed
during a SE experiment. Since this strategy offers an explanation of the echo
signal decay, it provides an answer to question Q2 (on p.29).
As a matter of fact, the intensity of the echo signal decreases and even-
tually disappears, even if the r-f pulses are still repeatedly applied on the
spin-echo system.7 Interventionism can explain this fact by appealing to the
interaction between the system of nuclear spins and its environment. This
is an advantage of interventionism compared with other approaches to the
6Defined in section 1.3.
7In the case we are assessing in this thesis, i.e. in glycerine samples, the decay is
exponential.
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irreversibility problem that fail to explain this aspect of the spin-echo exper-
iments.
Let us see how exactly the system of spins is said to interact with the
environment. We are hence looking for a progressive dissipation effect in the
SE experiments that, in terms of the race analogy, helps us explain why not
all the runners went back to the starting line (or at least not as fast as they
had run in the original race). Then, what we need is a physical process that
makes spins ‘lose their memory of their initial state’, or some kind of energy
dissipation that affects the spin’s frequency of precession, preventing them
from regaining the spin-alignment.
Magnetic energy is exchanged during the experiment in several different
ways. Sometimes the nuclear spins transfer their magnetic energy of preces-
sion to the sample molecules in the form of kinetic energy.8 The magnetic
energy of precession is some other times transferred to the neighboring spins9.
Additionally, the system is affected by the Brownian motion of the glycerine
molecules and the fluctuations in the local magnetic fields due to neighbour-
ing moments. These two latter phenomena may drive the momentum of
some molecules from the static magnetic field (chosen by the experimenter
and controlled with the r-f pulses) into another randomly differing magnetic
field (Hahn, 1953, [50]:6). As a consequence, the spins’ frequency of preces-
sion is perturbed.
The presence of these effects is used by classical interventionists to defend
that, during the SE experiments, the spins change their frequency, not only
as a result of their interaction with the experimental set up (static magnetic
field plus r-f pulses) but also because they transmit magnetic energy to the
environment. The spins that relax their energy and are not in phase with
the rest of the spins will not contribute to the next echo-signal. Due to this
constant disturbance from the environment, the number of out-of-phase spins
increases during the experiment and this explains why the intensity of the
echo-signals is progressively reduced.
In Blatt’s terminology (on p.31), completely isolated systems never reach
true equilibrium, instead they always stay in a state of quasi-equilibrium. In
this state the velocities of the system can still be reverted showing that the
8The time that it takes for this effect to occur is denoted by T1 and is known as
“spin-lattice relaxation time”.
9The time that it takes this second effect to occur is denoted by T2 and is known as
“spin-spin relaxation time”.
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system ‘remembers’ the information about its initial state. This is the case for
the system of spins at t = τ (i.e. when the spins are out of phase for the first
time). However, once the r-f pulses are applied many times the echo-signal
eventually disappears. The system of spins has then reached a state of true
equilibrium and the process is not longer reversible. According to classical
interventionists, the gradual decay in the intensity of the echo-signal proofs
that the correlational information dissipates into the environment, and this
only makes sense if we conceive the system of spins as an open system.
Before proceeding to discuss the third strategy, let me just remark that
the compatibility between Liouville’s theorem and the above mentioned in-
terventionist description of the SE experiments is no longer problematic once
we recognize that the system of spins is not closed. When the environmental
degrees of freedom come into the picture in interventionist models, Liouville’s
equation is modified and the theorem no longer holds.
Let us sum up the evolution of fine-grained entropy during a SE exper-
iment. In the first part of the experiment the effect of the environment
is almost imperceptible and fine-grained entropy is conserved. Liouville’s
theorem approximately holds and, from the interventionist point of view,
appealing to coarse-grained entropy is unnecessary. In the second part of
the experiment, and during the consecutive r-f pulses and echo-signals, the
environment increasingly affects the system, diffusing its correlational infor-
mation. Then, the stochastic term becomes more important and Liouville’s
modified equation holds instead of Liouville’s theorem.10
2.3.3 Controlled versus free or spontaneous evolutions
So far, we have said nothing about the third strategy to deny the violation
of the second law of thermodynamics. This strategy consists in denying that
the evolution away from equilibrium manifested in the spin-echo experiments
is free or spontaneous. In other words, it is argued that the second law only
applies to closed systems that evolve “on their own”, i.e., free of external influ-
ences. A decrease of entropy in a system evolving under such circumstances
would genuinely represent a violation of the second law. However, the evolu-
tion of the system of spins in an SE experiment, far from spontaneous, may
be rather considered as a highly controlled evolution.
10See Liouville’s equation and the interventionists’ modified equation on p.24.
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This strategy, however, is problematic in the sense that classifying evo-
lutions as ‘controlled’ or ‘spontaneous’ seems to depend on our election of
the relevant system under study (see Shenker, 2001, [89]). For example, if in
the SE experiments we only take the system to be the set of nuclear spins, it
seems that the evolution has been induced and controlled from the outside
world (via the r-f pulses). By contrast, if the environment is taken to be a
part of the system itself the evolution seems spontaneous.
A similar point holds for what we classify as ‘open’ or ‘closed’ system.
If an ice-cube placed on the table in a warm room is melting, should we
consider the whole room as the system of study? If so, we should also take
into account the warm air interacting with the system through the windows
and this depends on the weather which depends in turn on the atmospheric
pressure, and so on. Should we consider the whole planet as the relevant
system then? Or should we consider the whole universe to be the only really
closed system? We will return to this issue in the next chapter. All we
need to stress now is that the interventionist strategies may be controversial.
And that, particularly the third strategy, presupposes a well-defined notion
of ‘closed’ system and concomitantly ‘spontaneous’ or ‘free’ evolution of such
system.
We have so far explicitly addressed questions Q1 and Q2 . However
question Q3 has been addressed implicitly too in the previous sections. As
mentioned, classical interventionism accounts for the SE experiments by ap-
pealing to the distinction between quasi and true equilibrium; redefining the
notion of irreversibility; and rejecting Gibb’s definition of coarse-grained en-
tropy. We may turn now to a discussion of two quantum based approaches to
the irreversibility problem, and how these approaches explain the evolution
of the spin echo system.
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2.4 Quantum-based approaches to the irreversibil-
ity problem
Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker (2001,[53]; 2003,[54]; 2005,[55]) proposed
an explanation of the irreversible thermodynamic behaviour based on the
underlying quantum mechanical dynamics. The base of reduction is different
in nature in this new proposal. Hemmo and Shenker’s only predecessor in
this enterprise is David Albert (2000, [4]).
The most relevant difference between Albert’s and Hemmo-Shenker’s ap-
proaches is that, while the former is based on the GRW theory of the quantum
collapse of the wave function (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, 1986, [45]), the
latter is developed within no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
More specifically, Hemmo and Shenker appeal to quantum mechanical mod-
els of environmental decoherence (Zurek and Paz, 1994, [109]) to account
for the interaction between the system and its environment at the quantum
level. This interaction, combined with the stochastic nature of the quantum
dynamics, leads to the irreversible increase of entropy (more details below).
The environment and its influence on the system, by contrast, are completely
irrelevant in Albert’s proposal.
Classical interventionism aims to reduce thermodynamic processes to SM
or, more precisely, to a modified version of SM –because Liouville’s equation is
replaced. Instead, the quantum-based approaches (both the GRW-based and
decoherence-based approaches) propose solving the irreversibility problem by
reducing thermodynamic processes using a different reduction base, namely,
quantum mechanics. I turn now to explain the quantum-based approaches
in detail.
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2.4.1 GRW-based approach
Let me review the basic idea involved in Albert’s theory, which is related to
the following argument:11
The initial macrocondition M of a given system is compatible with a
collection {L} of both normal and abnormal microconditions mc12 and there
happens to be a breathtaking straightforward measure on the set {L} of a
system which has the following characteristics: (1) The measure counts the
collection of normal points in {L} as vastly larger than the collection of
abnormal points in {L}; And (2) the measure is preserved13 by the equations
of motion (Albert, 2000, [4]:151).
The characteristics (1) and (2) imply that, under small perturbations of
the system, the property of being a normal mc is stable, while the property
of being an abnormal mc is extraordinarily unstable. In such circumstances,
if the system was frequently, microscopically and randomly perturbed, the
evolution of the system would tend to equilibrium independently of which
particular microcondition mc in {L} initially obtained.
Albert then suggests that the quantum collapses postulated by GRW
theory “turn out to be just the sort of perturbations we need” (Albert 2000,
[4]:151). Therefore, in Albert’s view, the thermodynamic behaviour (i.e.,
the fact that every single mc in {L} will be overwhelmingly likely to evolve
towards equilibrium) is a consequence of the GRW dynamics. There is no
need to postulate any other process to account for irreversibility.
Note that, in contrast with the external mechanism that introduces ran-
domness in the classical interventionist approaches, GRW collapses in Al-
bert’s theory act as an internal source of perturbation.
11The original argument is in Albert, 2000, [4]:151-158.
12Note that a microcondition mc ∈ {L} is considered normal if it belongs to a normal
thermodynamic trajectory, and it is considered abnormal if it does not. Since these terms
are defined relative to a trajectory, they do not concern only a specific moment but all the
future and past states of the system. A consequence of defining (ab)normality in this way
is the following: One cannot associate an abnormal mc with an ordered arrangement of
particles Mo (gas in the corner of a box) and normal mc with a disordered arrangement of
particles Md (gas dispersed all around the box volume). In other words, in Albert’s argu-
ment normality is not ascribed to particular states, but rather to trajectories conformed
by a large succesion of states.
13Preservation in accordance to Liouville’s theorem or to its quantum mechanical cor-
relate, the Principle of Unitarity.
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Let us apply Albert’s model to describe the process of a gas spreading out.
The wave function of such a system will evolve in accordance with the GRW
dynamics. According to GRW, there is a high probability for a collapse to
occur in a temporal interval which is reasonably short in the thermodynamic
scale, but long enough in the quantum scale. This is guaranteed because
in GRW the parameters of the dynamics are chosen in such a way that
the quantum predictions for microscopic systems remain fully valid while
the macroscopic superposition in measurement-like situations is suppressed
in very short times. In fact, GRW dynamics are also referred as unified
dynamics because GRW introduced a unique formalism for describing both
microscopic and macroscopic systems. After choosing the most convenient
parameters, it was computed that a collapse should occur for a microscopic
system, on average, every hundred million years, while for a macroscopic
one it should occur every 10−7 seconds.14 Thus, in the gas example we are
considering here, it is reasonable to suposse that a GRW collapse will occur
in the experiment and the wave function of the gas will collapse into a specific
state.
While the gas is spreading several collapses occur giving place to a se-
quence of states that conform a trajectory in the state space (see Hemmo
& Shenker, 2003,[54]: 338-340). The crucial question is whether or not the
trajectory of states traced over the state space is a thermodynamic trajec-
tory, i.e., a trajectory obeying the laws of thermodynamics. To answer this
question Albert proposes the following dynamical hypothesis :
“The GRW dynamics are such that the probabilities for the collapse tran-
sitions reproduce the probabilities of the trajectories calculated from the
standard statistical mechanics measure for any given macrostate of the sys-
tem.” (Albert, 2000, [4]: 151-152)
Two direct consequences follow from Albert’s dynamical hypothesis:
(a) The set of the thermodynamic abnormal evolutions has measure zero
(b) In every microscopic neighbourhood the thermodynamically abnormal
states are uniformly distributed among the thermodynamically normal states.
14Commonly a microscopic system is taken to be of atomic dimensions or smaller, while
a macroscopic system is large enough to be visible in the ordinary sense. A more exact
definition relies on the number of particles in the system. Let us call N the number of
particles. Then macroscopic systems are such that N−1/2 << 1. This definition is useful
to determine that a system must contain at least about ten thousand particles in order
for statistical arguments apply to reasonable accuracy (see Fitzpatrick, 2006, [40]).
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The following image may be helpful to illustrate Albert’s arguments.
Fig.11. Normal and abnormal trajectories.
In every region of the phase space there are many states that belong to
a “well behaved” trajectory, i.e., to a trajectory obeying the second law of
thermodynamics. Let us call them the ‘good’ states. There are also a few
states (a set of measure zero) that will evolve anti-thermodynamically and
hence belong to abnormal trajectories. Those are the ‘bad’ states. Since both
the “good” and “bad” states belong to the same region in the phase space, we
are not able to distinguish them at the macroscopic level. What the GRW
dynamics guarantee, so Albert’s argument goes, is that the number of good
states in each region is overwhelmingly larger than the number of bad states.
So much larger in fact, that the white regions in Fig.10 would comprise good
states, and the bad states would be hardly perceptible.
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2.4.2 Decoherence-based interventionism
A different way to underpin thermodynamic regularities in quantum mechan-
ical grounds has been proposed by Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker (2001, [53];
2003, [54]; 2005, [55]). According to their approach, quantum decoherence is
the mechanism that “brings about an approach to equilibrium in the classical
sense of, for example, an evolution towards the most probable macrostate.”
(Hemmo & Shenker, 2003, [54]: 348).
Even though some features of theories of decoherence are not completely
recovered by Hemmo and Shenker, it is clear that some central ideas in their
approach rely on those theories, particularly on results by Zurek and Paz
(1994, [109]) and Joos and Zeh (1985, [61]). For instance, the interaction
with the environment is used by Zurek and Paz to account for the increase
in von Neumann’s entropy. Hemmo and Shenker refer to this result and also
consider the environment as key but they do not need to make use of von
Neumann’s entropy.15
In the stochastic no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics some
additional dynamical laws are introduced in the quantum description of the
system. These laws are said to produce the so-called effective collapses, which
in contrast with the usual collapses of the quantum state, are not considered
as real collapses. Hemmo and Shenker built their answer to the irreversibility
problem on such no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, assum-
ing that “when macro-systems undergo decoherence interactions with their
environment the extra dynamics results in effective collapses onto coherent
states corresponding to what [the authors] have called quantum mechanically
normal states.” (Hemmo & Shenker, 2005, [55]: 632, original emphasis).16
From this perspective, the total quantum state does not evolve in accor-
dance with GRW dynamics as Albert proposed, but evolves in accordance
with the Schrödinger equation. Due to the decoherence, effective collapses
of the quantum state will bring about transitions from one effective state to
another one. In other words, the system seems to jump from one Schrödinger
15The relation between von Neumann’s entropy and thermodynamic entropy is very
intricate. Hemmo and Shenker carefully discuss this topic in [54] and [55]) but we will
not detail that discussion here for two reasons: The first one is that, according to Hemmo
and Shenker’s proposal, it is possible to recover the thermodynamic regularities without
appealing to von Neumann’s entropy. The second is that, although Zurek and Paz’s results
give support to their decoherence-approach, the authors mention that the approach would
stand even without those results.
16In particular, “decoherence ensures effective collapses onto the coherent states given
by Gaussians in both position and momentum.” (Hemmo & Shenker, 2005, [55]: 632).
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trajectory to another one. This is the so-called effective collapse.
A system’s effective state is not uniquely determined by its previous effec-
tive state. On the contrary, “transitions between effective states are genuinely
stochastic [and] on this assumption the result is that the effective state of
the thermodynamic system changes in a stochastic way in the course of de-
coherence” (Hemmo & Shenker, 2003, [54]:351). In this way, the stochastic
nature of the system’s evolution, according to this approach, is the result of
decoherence together with the stochastic extra dynamic laws.
In order to recover the predictions of classical statistical mechanics, Hemmo
and Shenker also need to postulate the following dynamical hypothesis; which
is analogous to Albert’s dynamical hypothesis.
“The quantum mechanical probabilities [produced by the extra dynamical
laws] reproduce the quantitative predictions of classical statistical mechanics”
(Hemmo & Shenker, 2003, [54]:633)
Although the authors recognize that they cannot provide a proof of their
own version of the dynamical hypothesis, they argue that its plausibility
can be defended on the basis of the characteristics of spontaneous effective
collapses. More precisely, they argue that effective collapses are extremely
frequent in macroscopic systems experimenting decoherence. And these col-
lapses induce extremely small changes in position comparable with changes
in position at statistical mechanical scales.
In sum, the irreversibility problem is solved in the decoherence-approach
by offering a mechanism, viz., effective collapses in decoherence situations,
which guarantee that the evolution of a macroscopic system has a high prob-
ability of being thermodynamically ‘normal’. Let us see now how this applies
specifically to the case of the spin-echo experiments.
According to decoherence-based approach, the system is not only affected
by the external interaction with the environment (as in classical intervention-
ist approaches) but it is also affected internally by the stochastic dynamics,
i.e., by the effective collapses. This is also manifested in the double role
played by decoherence in the SE experiments: On the one hand decoher-
ence directly affects the spins through the influence of the environment. On
the other hand, a diffusing effect is generated by the interaction between
spins themselves, which influences their states. Let us call these decoherence
processes external and internal decoherence respectively.
The internal decoherence, i.e. the interaction between spins, leads in turn
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to the echo-signal decay by a process that possesses two different stages. In a
first stage the spin-spin interaction induces stochastic effective collapses. In
the second stage, each collapse of a spin produces a kind of “holistic” diffusing
effect in the spin states of other particles. A direct consequence of this is
that, if a decoherence based approach is correct, an experiment in which the
spin-spin interaction is reduced (for example, by diluting the sample in the
glycerine) should slow-down the decay of signal intensity. This opens the
way to possible experimental tests for the decoherence-based approach to
the problem of irreversibility.
2.4.3 Final remarks about quantum-based approaches
Another feature of GRW-based and decoherence-based approaches is worth
commenting on since it distinguishes them from previous interventionist ap-
proaches. In both quantum approaches there is no need to appeal to the
low entropy initial condition of the system in order to derive the thermo-
dynamic regularities. The derivation of thermodynamic regularities from
the underlying GRW dynamics in Albert’s case, and from decoherence in
Hemmo-Shenker’s case, is said to be independent of the particular thermo-
dynamic initial state. In other words, they solve the irreversibility problem
by making the thermodynamic normality of the trajectories fully accountable
for by the internal quantum dynamics.
It does not follow from this that Albert’s and Hemmo-Shenker’s quantum-
based approaches are incompatible with a low entropy initial restriction.
Each approach may be combined with the past hypothesis (i.e. with the low-
entropy initial condition of the universe). The role that such hypothesis may
play is setting the direction of time from past to future. Namely, the past
direction is defined towards the low-entropy initial condition. But once the
time direction is defined, the quantum-based approaches would leave the past
hypothesis aside and appeal only to their respective dynamical hypotheses
together with (either real or effective) collapses to recover the thermodynamic
behaviour of the specific system under study. So although the quantum
approaches are consistent with the past hypothesis, they do not require it to
solve the irreversibility problem.
The weak point of these approaches may be their reliance upon their
dynamical hypotheses. These hypotheses in essence express an intimate link
between quantum dynamics and thermodynamics, which may be as hard to
substantiate as the irreversibility problem itself.
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Objections to Interventionism
It has been claimed that interventionism cannot explain the increment of
entropy in the universe as a whole – since this system lacks an environment.
There are also philosophical debates about whether the randomness of the
interaction between environment and system is genuine or simply related to
our ignorance. And probably the most relevant question is this: is interven-
tionism able to avoid the undesirable consequence that the system tends to
equilibrium not only towards the future but also towards the past? (Davies,
1974, [30]; Sklar, 1993, [91]; Price, 1996 [79]; Callender, 1999, [17]). Rid-
derbos and Redhead attempted to provide some answers to these objections
from the interventionist point of view. Nevertheless, new arguments have
been recently raised against interventionism (Price, 2004, [80]; Callender,
2004, [18]; Ainsworth, 2005, [2]; Uffink, 2006, [95]). In this chapter I review
some of these criticisms. In section 3.1 the “parity of reasoning problem” will
be explained. In section 3.2 the problem regarding the ontological or epis-
temological nature of randomness will be discussed. Both (sections 3.1 and
3.2) include the counterarguments that interventionist have raised in retort
to the objections. Section 3.3 adds a brief comment on idealizations.
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3.1 The Parity of Reasoning Problem
Interventionists’ arguments explaining how environmental perturbations lead
the system to equilibrium toward the future can also apply, by parity of
reasoning, toward the past. For example, if we observe a system at some
arbitrary time t during its evolution we could say (using interventionist ar-
guments) that, given that the system interacted with its environment in the
past, it was then randomly perturbed. Hence, the previous states were more
disordered and “closer to true equilibrium” than the present state. Hence,
the system has been evolving from higher to lower entropy states. But this
conclusion is in conflict with our empirical experience. And it is not what
interventionists aim to defend. This problem is known as the “parity of rea-
soning problem” or the “double standard fallacy” and is frequently associated
with interventionism in the literature (Sklar, 1993, [91]:254; Callender, 1999,
[17]:363; Price, 1996, [79]:68 or 2004 [80]:223).
The parity of reasoning problem is, in some way, inherited by interven-
tionism from older causal proposals. The mechanism of molecular interac-
tion, proposed in Boltzmann’s H-theorem to explain irreversibility, for exam-
ple, faced the same difficulty as shown by Loschmidt’s so-called reversibility
objection (in section 1.4). For this reason, in criticisms to a wider set of
proposals, it has been claimed (see Callender, 1999, [17] and Price, 2004,
[80]) that the applicability of arguments in both temporal directions is a
problem shared by all approaches that attempt to explain irreversibility by
postulating causal mechanisms: “The point [interventionists need] to keep in
mind is that, as in all such causal approaches, the mechanism needs to be
time-asymmetric, if it is not to force entropy to be non-decreasing in both
directions.”(Price, 2004, [80]:223).
There are at least two possible reactions one may have to the parity
of reasoning problem. One attempts to provide reasons for thinking that
the statistical arguments do not apply with equal force in both temporal
directions. I will refer to this option as “the optimistic reaction” as it still tries
to save interventionism. The alternative is to acknowledge the difficulty and
allege that tracing a preferred temporal direction (i.e. solving the problem of
the arrow of time P-II) is out of the scope of interventionism. I will call it the
“pessimistic reaction” because it marks a limit in the scope of interventionism.
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3.1.1 The Optimistic Reaction
An example of the optimistic reaction is Ridderbos and Redhead’s defence of
the Bergmann-Lobowitz model against Sklar’s parity of reasoning objection.
Let us explain Ridderbos and Redhead’s argument ([82]:1261) by applying
it to the common example of a gas spreading. We consider a gas in a box
divided in two halves. The gas is initially all contained in one half. Once we
remove the barrier between both halves the gas spreads out.
Imagine that the system is in a non-equilibrium state at some point dur-
ing its evolution. Interventionism tells us that the correlational information
dissipates during the evolution. More precisely, after interacting with the sys-
tem, every part of the reservoir interacts in turn with its own environment.
Consequently, the information flows away from the system (it is exported)
and any later interaction between the reservoir and the system is statisti-
cally independent from its past interactions. In other words, it is reasonable
to assume statistical independence between the interactions because, even if
some specific part of the reservoir interacted again with the system, the in-
formation produced in the first interaction would already be missing. Hence
it makes sense to suppose that this part of the reservoir and system are
interacting for the very first time.
However, if we invert the time direction and study the interaction be-
tween the system and its environment in reversed evolution, we find that the
part of the system (e.g. a gas particle) that has interacted with the reser-
voir at a given time has no way to dissipate the information produced in
that interaction. The gas particle containing the information of the collision
does not interact with the external environment (as parts of the reservoir
do). Therefore, the next interaction between that specific particle and the
reservoir will be correlated with the previous one.
Thus, in contrast with the normal time-directed case, in the reversed
case we cannot claim that interactions are statistically independent from each
other. Therefore, Ridderbos and Redhead’s conclusion is that interventionist
arguments do not apply equally in either direction of time.
In the spin-echo experiments this idea can be expressed as follows. The
glycerine molecules are able to dissipate the energy, for example, in the form
of thermal energy. Let us imagine that we have filmed the experiment and
now we are looking at the movie backwards. Although the spins can “absorb”
the thermal energy from the molecules, they are unable to dissipate that
energy. They can only keep it and use it to precess.
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Let us now consider some objections to Ridderbos and Redhead’s solu-
tion to the parity of reasoning argument. It has first been suggested that
attempts like this to solve the parity of reasoning problem simply shift it
rather than resolve it. The temporal asymmetry is presupposed rather than
explained again and, therefore, the argument begs the question (Price, 1996,
[79]:68). For instance, Ridderbos and Redhead assume that the exchange of
energy towards the future dissipates the correlational information, but back-
ward energetic exchange does not. Proving this assumption is tantamount
to proving that entropy tends to increase and never decreases.
In retort, one could argue that Ridderbos and Redhead do not just pos-
tulate the asymmetric behaviour but they also provide us with a reason to
believe that the past-future symmetry is broken. They do this by appealing
to differences between the system (with no degrees of freedom to dissipate
information) and the environment (with plenty of degrees of freedom to dis-
sipate information).
One may then object that reliance on differences between system and
environment may be compromised by the fact that a new system composed by
the original system plus its environment can always be considered as our new
system of study. For example, Ridderbos and Redhead’s argument not only
serves to explain why the fine-grained entropy of the gas has increased due to
the dissipation of correlational information produced by the interaction with
the box. It also serves to explain the entropic behaviour of the laboratory
where the box is located; or even the entropy of the whole building. This
reasoning can be applied to a chain of systems that ends with the system
consisting of the universe as a whole.
However, the universe as a whole is a system that has no environment to
interact with. So how can we explain the entropy increase of such a system
from an interventionist point of view? Or are we to accept that the universe’s
entropy is constant? Ridderbos and Redhead explicitly accept this view when
they claim that fine-grained entropy remains constant for the universe as a
whole, but it increases for any of its subsystems (see Ridderbos & Redhead,
1998, [82]:1261-1262). They argue that this does not contradict the usual
idea in cosmology that universal entropy grows, because cosmologists base
their concept of entropy on the distribution of matter in the universe, which
is best understood as a coarse-grained entropy rather than a fine-grainied
entropy.
It is not hard to show that an increase in coarse-grained entropy is con-
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sistent with constant fine-grained entropy. After all this was precisely the
reason why Gibbs introduced the coarse-grained method aiming to explain
the second law of thermodynamics (see p.13). It is harder to justify that
the fine-grained entropy of every subsystem of the universe may be growing,
while the fine-grained entropy of the universe as a whole remains constant.
In other words, if the entropy of the universe is constant then where in the
universe is entropy decreasing in order to compensate the fact that every
subsystem of the universe has equal or growing but never decreasing en-
tropy? This consideration may lead critics of interventionism to claim that
the interventionists’ optimistic reaction to the parity of reasoning problem is
inconsistent.
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the classical interventionist approach,
both Albert’s and Hemmo and Shenker’s quantum-based approaches assume
that the perturbations are (at least partially) generated inside the system.
This enables both quantum approaches to account for the behaviour of the
universe as a whole in the same way they account for that of any of the
universe’s subsystems. Classical interventionism, by contrast, is committed
to all perturbations to the system coming from its interaction with the envi-
ronment and therefore cannot apply this reasoning.
3.1.2 The Pessimistic Reaction
There are in fact many diverse pessimistic reactions to the parity of reasoning
argument. What all of them have in common is their claim that perturbations
exerted by the environment over the system are time-directed and, with it,
they acknowledge that interventionism simply does not solve the problem of
the arrow of time.1
Perhaps the first example of pessimistic reaction is the one Sklar himself
mentions immediately after discussing the parity of reasoning problem:
“I can only imagine one way in which the interventionist can block
this argument from parity of reasoning. It would be to argue that
the intervention from the outside is itself time-directed. Because
intervention is causation, and because causation is from past to
future, the intervention can only modify the ensemble toward the
1This is the reason why in this thesis we take interventionism as a solution to the
irreversibility problem (P-III) but not as a solution to the problem of the arrow of time
(P-II). Both P-II and P-III have been defined in section 1.5, on p.20.
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future direction of time. But without some deeper understanding
of what is being used here, some understanding of how causa-
tion is playing some role over and above lawlike correlation of
states, this sounds more like an a priori restrictive instruction on
when to use statistical mechanics and when not to.” (Sklar, 1993,
[91]:254).
In this quote Sklar suggests that the only possible way out is to relate
the time-directed environmental interventions to causality. We may then
consider that perturbations of the environment cause entropy to rise. The
past-future asymmetry is then broken by appealing to the temporally asym-
metric relation between causes and effects. This reaction is pessimistic about
interventionism being able to underpin temporal directionality, in the sense
that the asymmetry is not really brought about by the environmental pertur-
bations, but by the asymmetry built into causality. And there is no appeal (at
least not explicitly) to this causal asymmetry in the interventionists’ original
models.
Another pessimistic reaction is due to Orly Shenker2(Shenker, 2001, [89]:
sections 2 and 3) who accepts the double standard problem in mathematical
terms, but then offers an epistemological argument to defend interventionism:
“Interventionism uses the environment to predict the unknown
future, not to explain the known past (...) Awareness of the
distinction between explanation and prediction prevents us from
committing Price’s (1996) double standard fallacy, for we con-
sciously put in a time asymmetry originating in our experience,
by hand, without claiming that this experience reflects a funda-
mental asymmetry in nature.” (see Shenker, 2001, [89]:2-10)
So, basing her argument on the difference between ‘explanation of the
past’ and ‘prediction of the future’, Shenker suggests that interventionism
works only in one temporal direction (not for physical or mathematical rea-
sons but) simply because of the way it is built.
The critics of interventionism (e.g. Callender 1999, [17]:363-364; Davies,
1974, [30]:74; Price, 2004, [80]:225; Uffink, 2006, [95]:sec 7.5.2) claim that as
far as interventionism is applicable in both temporal directions, it is not able
2In fact, Shenker is optimistic about interventionism but not about interventionism
being capable to provide answers to the problem of the arrow of time, because, form her
point of view, that is not even a goal of interventionism.
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to solve any problem related with time-asymmetries. Rather interventionism
introduces asymmetry by hand just in order to solve the problem. And this
is moreover a problem that has already been solved by the initial condition
asymmetry –which, by the way, serves to solve both the arrow of time and
the irreversibility problem. From their point of view, there is no satisfactory
way out to the problem of parity of reasoning. Optimistic reactions (as the
one defended by Ridderbos and Redhead) are problematic since they base
explanations of irreversibility upon a “unwarranted temporally asymmetric
assumption, analogous to Boltzmann’s Stosszahalansatz [...that] merely ends
up pushing the question back a step” (see Callender, 1999, [17]:363). Pes-
simistic reactions, on the other hand, lead to recognize that the interven-
tionist approach “is wrong half of the time” (see Callender, 1999, [17]:364).
Namely, interventionism is right when it is applied toward the future, and
wrong when it is applied toward the past.
3.2 Is Randomness Ontological or Epistemo-
logical?
In order to guarantee the approach to equilibrium, interventionism assumes
that the environmental perturbations are random. However, the notion of
randomness itself is a philosophically intricate notion.
3
It is worth asking, then, whether this randomness is ontological or episte-
mological. Interpreting randomness ontologically entails considering it as a
real and genuine feature of the environment itself; while interpreting random-
ness epistemologically entails considering it a consequence of our ignorance.
If randomness is interpreted as an ontological feature of the environment,
it seems that the laws governing the environment are essentially different
from the Hamiltonian deterministic laws that hold inside the system. Hence,
the ontological view of randomness seems to commit classical interventionism
3Randomness is an enormously important topic in the philosophy of science. This
section focuses on a particular criticism that has been raised against interventionism on
grounds related to randomness. However, it is worth pointing out (as stressed to me by
me internal examiner, Miklos Rédei) that a number of proposals have been put forward
lately to shed light onto the concept of randomness and its role in statistical mechanics.
Berkovitz, Frigg & Kronz (2006, [8]) and Uffink (2006, [95]:sec 7.5) are examples of this.
For a more general review of the fundamental problems in the concept of randomness see
Coffa (1974, [26]: part III), Bennet (2011, [6]), Eagle (2011, [32]) and references thereby.
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to a patchwork understanding of laws. However it can be argued that, as
the environment is constituted by the same kind of particles than the proper
system under study (atoms, molecules, etc.) both system and environment
should be treated in the same way (see Albert, 1994, [3]:672; Callender, 1999,
[17]:363; Hagar, 2005, [48]:474; Ainsworth, 2005, [2]:628; or Frigg, 2007,
[41]:161). Additionally, as mentioned before, the division between system
and environment is often arbitrary.
Maybe for these reasons classical interventionists usually choose the other
option, namely, interpreting randomness epistemologically. The epistemo-
logical interpretation is usually identified with a Laplacian picture of the
world, according to which, matter interacts in a purely deterministic way
but randomness is introduced in our descriptions merely as expression of our
ignorance. This seems to be the interventionists’ position. For example, ac-
cording to Blatt, the interactions between the system and its environment
are considered random only as a result of our limited knowledge (see Blatt,
1959, [9]). So the components of the environment are governed by exactly
the same laws as the system. It is the complexity of the environment and
its high number of degrees of freedom that forces interventionists to build
stochastic models.
A direct consequence of this epistemological interpretation, pointed by
Peter Ainsworth (2005, [2]), is that the increase of entropy or, more pre-
cisely, the increase in the volume of the probability distributionρ 4 due to
environmental interactions “can only represent a diminution of what we know
about the location of the system in phase space” (Ainsworth, 2005, [2]: 628-
629). Ainsworth also claims that, as a consequence of the epistemological
interpretation, real and quasi equilibriums are ontologically equivalent. But
I believe that this later claim is objectionable, as quasi and true equilibrium
seem to have objective physical differences.5
Let us imagine that someone gets into the laboratory when a spin-echo
experiment is taking place. This “ignorant observer” arrives when the spins
are out of phase for the very first time (that is to say, when t = τ). I believe
that Ainsworth correctly points at the fact that this ignorant observer would
be unable to tell us if the system is in a quasi-equilibrium or a real-equilibrium
state.6
4See last paragraph in section 2.3.1.
5See definitions of quasi equilibrium and true equilibrium on p.31.
6I thank Orly Shenler for proposing a similar example in a personal conversation.
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Let us refer as “the demon” to the experimenter that has been inside
the laboratory from the beginning of the experiment. This demon, unlike
the ignorant observer, knows exactly which radio-frequency pulses must be
applied to the system in order to bring the spins back to an ordered state.
After the dacay of the echo-sginal, however, even the demon is unable
to reverse the spins to their original state, despite the fact s/he possess
all the required knowledge required to do it. This, I believe, shows that
an objective physical difference exists between what intrventionists call a
quasi-equilibrium state and what they call a “true-equilibrium” sate. And
this difference is independent of what the observer knows about the system.
According to interventionism, as I understand it, ignorance plays no role in
the actual systemÕs approach to equilibrium, but only in our descriptions of
such approach.
3.3 Idealizations
Although interventionists reject ideal assumptions – such as the system being
isolated or the system approaching to equilibrium when time tends to infinite
– interventionist models themselves are not free of idealizations. Quite the
contrary, classical interventionists introduced highly idealised models of the
environment to account for irreversible processes (see Shenker 2001, [89]:7;
or van Lith, 2001, [98]:168-169). Of course idealizations are not per se un-
desirable. The point to stress here is that interventionism aims to describe
systems as we find them in Nature. It was put forward by their proponents
as an alternative to other approaches that impose ideal conditions on the
systems (e.g. the ergodic programme). Yet, it is hard to conceive the clas-
sical interventionist models as straightforwardly applicable to systems as we
find them in Nature.
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Chapter 4
The Manipulability Theory of
Causal Explanation
The concept of intervention is conspicuous in the interventionist solution to
the irreversibility problem that we have considered. As we saw Sklar even
explicitly links the concept of intervention to causation. Hence, it makes
sense to analyze the credentials of interventionism from the point of view of
a philosophical theory of causation. Among the diverse theories and mod-
els available in the literature, the manipulability account of explanation and
causation (as presented in Woodward, 2003, [106], and referred from now
on as m-theory) provides the most convenient elements to analyse the ap-
proaches to irreversibility studied in this thesis. Interventionists explain the
SE experiments by postulating causes and the m-theory is a theory of causal
explanations. Besides, the m-theory is closely related to controlling causal
factors and this perspective fits very well with the experimental context of the
SE experiments. The m-theory provides us with a tool suitable to evaluate
and compare different causal explanations of these experiments. Moreover,
the concept of intervention itself is prominent and central to the m-theory.1
For these reasons the m-theory is the right philosophical framework for this
analysis. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the central ideas of the m-
theory and formally define its key notions, including different types of causes
in addition to the central notions of intervention, invariance and depth. All
these notions are complex and the picture presented does not intend to be
exhaustive.
1In statistical mechanics an intervention is an environmental disturbance exerted upon
the system. In the m-theory, in turn, an intervention is a procedure that changes the
value of a putative cause to test if the value of the putative effect correspondingly changes
too (this concept will be formally defined in section 4.3.1). Depending on the context it
will be clear when we are using one or the other.
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4.1 The basic elements of the m-theory
In order to provide the m-theory of causal explanations, Woodward appeals
to a conception of causation associated to the idea of manipulability. This
conception lies within a group of approaches developed by several philoso-
phers such as Collingwood (1940), Gasking (1955), von Wright (1971), Men-
zies and Price (1993) and Pearl (2000)2. Some differences between Wood-
ward’s m-theory and the other manipulability approaches will become clear
throughout this chapter. Let us first compare and distinguish the m-theory
in general from some well-known (no-manipulability based) accounts of ex-
planation.
According to the Deductive-Nomological model of explanation (DN) that
Hempel and Oppenheim proposed in 1948 [56], explanations are deductive
arguments including at least one law of nature among its premises. The
conclusion in the argument is called explanandum and it describes the phe-
nomenon to be explained. The premises are called explanans and they must
be true in order to account for the phenomenon.
In the m-theory, by contrast, only some explanations are deductive ar-
guments of this kind, but not all of them. As it has been pointed out in the
literature, there are commonly accepted explanations that do not appeal to
laws of nature (see Salmon, 1989, [86]:46). Woodward argues that these are
genuinely explanatory in spite of not agreeing with the DN-model. Accord-
ingly, he proposes to “begin with a more general notion of causal explanation,
understood in terms of manipulability, and then attempt to understand ex-
planations that appeal to explicit chains of deductive reasoning and laws of
nature as one specific variety within this genus” (Woodward, 2003, [106]: 20).
Thus the m-theory considers laws but also a broader spectrum of general-
izations as candidates to appear in the explanans of any causal explanation.
Then, in addition to Coulomb’s law or ‘F=ma’, other generalizations like
‘Contraceptive pills avoid pregnancy’; ‘Monopolies that take over a formerly
competitive industry will raise prices’ are perfectly apt causal regularities
that can explain phenomena. ‘This medicine caused Andrew’s recovery’;
‘Bad news about candidates in the press have negative repercussions for
them in electoral results’, or (referring to the famous example) ‘Ink spills
stain carpets’ may play the relevant explanatory role that in other accounts
is assigned exclusively to laws3.
2See Woodward, 2003, [106], sections 1.1 and 1.6
3The status that Woodward assigns to laws in the m-theory will be discussed in section
4.6.2 of the present chapter.
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The m-theory is also different from Philip Kitcher’s Unificationist ac-
count of explanation (1989, [63]) and from Wesley Salmon’s Causal Mechan-
ical Model of explanations (1984, [85]). In Kitcher’s unificationist view a
scientific explanation must provide a unified account for a range of different
phenomena. The fewer the facts needed to derive many phenomena, the more
stringent the pattern of derivation and the more unified our explanation. The
paradigmatic example of this sort of explanation is Newton’s theory of grav-
itation which is able to account for terrestrial and celestial phenomena. In
Salmon’s model, in turn, a causal explanation consist in tracing the causal
process that leads to the explained event; where causal process has a very
specific definition. Namely, a process is characterized as causal if a mark is
transmitted in a continuous way. A mark is an alteration in some feature of
the process at some given stage in its evolution. A mark may be, for example,
a physical deformation or an amount of energy transmitted from one to an-
other billiard ball in a collision. And we say that such a mark is transmitted
in a continuous way if, once the mark is introduced, it persists throughout
later stages of the process. According to Salmon’s account, a causal inter-
action involves a spatio-temporal intersection between two causal processes
which modifies the structure of both – each process comes to have features it
would not have had in the absence of the interaction (see Woodward, 2010,
[108]: section 4.1). According to the m-theory neither unification (as con-
ceived by Kitcher) nor spatio-temporal continuity (as conceived by Salmon)
are necessary features in a satisfactory explanation.
The essence of a causal explanation, according to the m-theory, consists
in “exhibiting a pattern of counterfactual dependence between explanans and
explanandum –a pattern of counterfactual dependence of the special sort as-
sociated with relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of
manipulation and control.” (Woodward, 2003, [106]:13,16). In other words,
according to the manipulability account, behind each causal explanation
there is a practical component or payoff directly related with the aim of
controlling what is being explained.
Thus, a basic idea of the m-theory is that causal explanations offered in
natural and social sciences, do not aim simply at satisfying our intellectual
curiosity, but are often guided by the goal of finding information potentially
relevant for the manipulation and control of the explained events.
It is important to note that the notions of control and manipulation are
understood counterfactually. Roughly it does not matter so much what is
in fact manipulated as what would have been manipulated under the right
conditions. Otherwise the m-theory would not be adequate for describing
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explanations of cosmological phenomena, past events, or any other event
beyond actual manipulations routinely carried out in practice.
In satisfactory causal explanations, the patterns of dependence between
causes and effects (or generalizations) are invariant under a set of interven-
tions. This claim contains the main notions of the m-theory that will be
defined and explained in subsequent sections. Just as an illustration of the
general idea let us consider an explanation of the trajectories of the plan-
ets. According to the m-theory, the explanation should provide information
about what would happen if we change, manipulate or intervene upon those
trajectories. In this case an intervention could be carried out by placing a
massive planet between Earth and Mars and studying how this affects their
trajectories. Clearly this is a hypothetical and not an actual manipulation.
If the explanation in question is good enough, the generalization G postu-
lated by the explanation (say Newton’s universal law of gravitation) should
hold under an intervention. Newton’s theory of the planetary motion should
provide an answer to what would happen under this particular situation
intervention (which leads to a situation different to the actual one). If New-
ton’s theory provides an answer, according to the m-theory, it has shown to
be explanatorily relevant.
So, according to the m-theory, the import of a given explanation relies on
its capacity to provide answers to counterfactual questions or what-if-things-
had-been-different questions (from now on w-questions). In our example the
w-question that the explanation is capable of answering is: “How would the
planet’s trajectories be affected by the insertion of another planet between
Earth and Mars”. As we will see in section 4.5 the wider the range of w-
questions answered the deeper the explanation is, in Woodward’s sense of
‘depth’.
4.2 Causes
The very notion of cause in the m-theory is linked to manipulation. It
is defined as follows: “C is a genuine cause of E if, given the appropri-
ate background conditions, there is a possible manipulation of the cause C
such that this is also a way of manipulating or changing the effect E” (see
Woodward[106]: section 2.2, or Woodward [107]: section 1). In other words,
causal relations entail some changes upon the values of E whenever the val-
ues of C are modified.4 According to the m-theory, the manipulations carried
4A difference between Woodward’s account and Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is
that counterfactuals in the m-theory are always considered with reference to the effect
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out over C must be reproducible in the sense that responses to the effect E
must be in some way repetitive or systematic.
A set of counterfactuals is associated with every causal relationship.
When C is a deterministic cause of E, the associated counterfactuals will
be of the following kind: “If C were manipulated by the intervention I, then
E would experiment such and such changes”. Otherwise, i.e., if C is an in-
deterministic or probabilistic cause, the associated counterfactuals will refer
to ρ(E), i.e. to a probability density over the outcomes of E.
Following the terminology of many other authors in the literature (among
them Judea Pearl, 2000, [77]), Woodward makes use in his m-theory of di-
rected graphs and equations to express causal relationships. Causes and ef-
fects are then represented as variables. The set comprised of those variables
is denoted by V . And the causal relationships are represented by arrows as
shown in the directed graph 1.5
C1 // E1
C2
88ppppppppppppp
E2
C3 //
88ppppppppppppp
E3
Directed Graph 1. Causal links between
variables in V = {C1, C2, C3, E1, E2, E3}.
In the m-theory equations like E1 = f(C1, C2, ), E2 = 5C3, etc., and
the directed graphs associated with them are understood as applied to the
level of the particular values of those variables. That is to say, the equation
En = f(Cn) must not be understood as the average response of the value of
En to various average values of Cn in some population. But rather as how
the value of En possessed by a particular individual (or object) changes in
response to Cn taking the particular values c1, c2, ..., cm (see Woodward, 2003,
E.In Lewis’ theory, by contrast, counterfactuals about what would have happened if C
had not occurred in the closest possible world do not necessarily make reference to E.
For more on the differences between these two theories see section 3.6 in Woodward 2003
[106].
5In this thesis we use the term representation in an ordinary way. It receives no
particular philosophical interpretation.
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[106]:52). An advantage of equations over directed graphs is that they enable
us to represent quantitative information about the causal relationships, while
directed graphs can only describe a relationship qualitatively.
Woodward classifies causes into several different kinds depending on the
causal connections between the variables. It is beyond the purposes of this
thesis to present and analyse them all in detail. However, we will now present
the formal definitions of four kinds of causes, which are indispensable to
understand the m-theory. It is worth mentioning that the different kind of
causes are defined in the m-theory in terms of interventions. And the notion
of intervention is in turn defined in terms of causes. This is how the m-
theory is builded and cannot be avoided here. The question as to whether
this circularity is vicious or not will be addressed in section 4.3.1.
4.2.1 Total Cause
The notion of total cause is the most generic one. It captures the idea of a
‘manipulable’ cause in general: “C is a total cause of E if and only if there
is a possible intervention I on C that will change E or ρ(E).”( Woodward,
2003, [106]: 51).
4.2.2 Direct Cause
C is a direct cause of E if and only if C’s influence upon E is not mediated
by any other variables in the system of interest V . And “a necessary and
sufficient condition for C to be a direct cause of E with respect to some
variable set V is that there is a possible intervention I on C that will change
E or ρ(E) when all other variables in V besides C and E are held fixed at
some value by interventions” (Woodward, 2003, [106]: 55).
The directed graphs 2 and 3 (below) show how this necessary condition
for direct causes would be violated if there were one or more intermediate
variables between C and E. In both graphs C is a total cause of E because
changes in the values of C would entail corresponding changes in the values
of E. However C is only a direct cause in graph 2 –it fails to satisfy the
conditions for a direct cause in graph 3. This is because for C to be a direct
cause, when an intervention is performed on the system, the values of all
the variables except C and E must be held fixed. This guarantees that the
resultant change in E is not being produced by alterations in the value of
any other intermediate variable. In the directed graph 2 fixing Z1 and Z2
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does not imply that the value of E ceases to change as a response to changes
in the value of C. By contrast, in the directed graph 3, fixing Z1, Z2 and Z3
would block all the paths and hence would make it impossible to influence
the value of E through manipulations of C.
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Directed Graph 2. Directed Graph 3.
C is a direct cause of E with C is not a direct cause of E with
respect to V = {C,E,Z1, Z2}. respect to V = {C,E,Z1, Z2, Z3}.
4.2.3 Contributing Cause
According to the m-theory, if C is a contributing cause of E with respect to
the variable set V , then:
(CC-i)
There is a directed path from C to E such that each link in this
path is a direct causal relationship. That is, the intermediate
variables along this path Z1, Z2, Z3, . . . , Zn, are such that C is a
direct cause of Z1, which is a direct cause of Z2, . . . , Zn−1, which is
a direct cause of Zn, which is a direct cause of E (see Woodward,
2003, [106]:57).
(CC-ii)
And there is an intervention I on C that changes the value of E
when all other variables in V that are not on this path, if any, are
fixed at some value. If there is only one path from C to E, then C
is a contributing cause of E as long as there is some intervention
I on C that will change the value of E, for some values of the
other variables in V (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:59).
As the directed graph 3 shows, C and Z3 are contributing causes of E.
Besides, every contributing cause is in turn a directed cause of the interme-
diate variables in the path (C directly causes Z3, and Z3 directly causes E).
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4.2.4 Actual Cause
Both the notions of direct cause and contributing cause are type level causes.
Woodward complements the m-theory by defining the following notion of
actual cause, which applies to token level causes.
C = c is an actual cause of E = e if and only if two conditions are
satisfied:
(AC-i) The actual value of C = c and the actual value of E = e
(AC-ii) There is at least one route from C to E for which an intervention
on C will change the value of E, given that other direct causes of Zi of E
that are not on this route have been fixed at their actual values (Woodward,
2003, [106]:77).
As the following directed graph shows, the main difference between the
notion of actual cause, and the other notions of causes defined above, is that
the definition of actual cause makes reference to the specific values actually
taken by each variable.
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Directed Graph 4.C=c is an actual cause of E=e
when the actual values of Z1 and Z2 are z1 and z2.
The above-presented definitions (4.2.1-4.2.4) tell us, in sum, that accord-
ing to the m-theory, causal claims and hence causal explanations entail coun-
terfactuals about what would happen under interventions. For that reason
we turn now to assessment of the notion of intervention.
4.3 Interventions
I will discuss some general features of the notion of intervention before for-
mally defining it. In the m-theory interventions are understood as ”exogenous
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causal processes that change the value of the putative cause C in such a way
that if any change occurs in the effect E, it occurs only in virtue of E’s re-
lationship to C and not in any other way” (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:47).
This allows us to determine whether or not E is caused by C. As mentioned
before, interventions are taken as performable in principle or hypothetically.
They intend to capture the ideal experimental conditions that should be ful-
filed to change the value of C and so study its causal link with E. The notion
of intervention proposed in the m-theory aims to provide the maximum plau-
sibility for the notions of total, contributing and actual causes. Keeping this
in mind, let us consider the conditions that interventions should meet.
Firstly, we would like the intervention I to absolutely control C, in the
sense that changes in C’s values are not generated by the influence of any
factor other than I. This means that I must “break” or ”switch off”, in the
sense of making ineffective, the causal links between C and any other of its
causes (see directed graph 5).
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Directed Graph 5. Intervention I
switching off alternative causes of C
Secondly, E must not be affected by the process that brings about the
intervention I (see directed graph 6).
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Directed Graph 6. The process Z1 generating I must
not affect E through alternative causal routes.
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Thirdly, the intervention I must not be a direct cause of E, but can only
affect it through C. In other words, all causal paths from I to E must pass
though C. A direct consequence of this condition is that I and C cannot
both be causes of E (see directed graph 7).
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Directed Graph 7. The intervention I
must not directly affect E.
Finally, the changes in E should be the result of the intervention I acting
on C and nothing else. This turns interventions into relational variables.
Namely, an intervention I upon C is always defined with respect to the effect
variable E.
For example, we would not like the change in E to be a consequence of
alterations in any other variable Zi through an alternative causal route. That
is to say, we want the intervention to act only through the path connecting
C and E. One way to avoid this is to fix the values of all the variables
Zi causally connected with E except those in the path from C to E. (see
directed graph 8).
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Directed Graph 8. Intervention I must
not affect E through an alternative route.
Taking all these conditions into account interventions can be defined. It
must be clear that, as Woodward notes (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:114), the
conditions for a manipulation of C to count as an intervention are proposed in
the m-theory as regulative ideals rather than absolutely necessary conditions
to obtain any knowledge about causal links. In other words, the failure of
any of these conditions does not mean that nothing can be inferred about
the causal relationship between C and E.
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4.3.1 Formal definition of intervention
The notion of intervention is formally defined in the m-theory as follows
(Woodward, 2010, [108]: section 5; and Woodward, 2003, [106]: 98) .
(IN)I’s assuming some value I=zi is an intervention on C with respect to
E if and only if I=zi is an actual cause of the value taken by C, and I meets
the following conditions:
(IN-i) I must be the only cause of C; i.e., the intervention must completely
disrupt the causal relationship between C and its previous causes so that the
value of C is set entirely by I.
(IN-ii) I should not itself be caused by any cause that affects E via a route
that does not go through C.
(IN-iii) I must not directly cause E via a route that doesn’t go through C.
(IN-iv)I leaves the values taken by any causes of E except those that are
on the directed path from I to C to E (should this exist) unchanged.
It should be pointed out that the conditions (IN i-iv) define interventions
in causal terms. However, the m-theory also defines causes in terms of in-
terventions (see definitions of total, direct, contributing and actual causes in
section 4.2). Therefore, the m-theory is not an analysis of causation that re-
duces causal to non-causal claims. However, Woodward argues (Woodward,
2003, [106]:22) that his theory is not viciously circular since the elucidation
of whether a particular cause C causes an effect E does not presuppose in-
formation about whether there is a causal relationship between C and E but
rather information about other causal relationships, in particular the one
between the intervention I and the values of the variable C.
It is also worth noting two features of the definition (IN) that go in line
with our comments in the previous section. Firstly, human agency, limita-
tions or capacities are not mentioned at all, meaning that interventions may
perfectly be natural or hypothetical. And secondly, interventions are defined
not only in relation to the causal variable C but in relation to the effect
variable E too. So what counts as an intervention is entirely given by the
relationship that objectively obtains between the variables. These two fea-
tures distinguish Woodward’s m-theory from other manipulabilitist accounts
as von Wright’s (1971,[103]) or Menzies-Price’s (1993,[71]).
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4.3.2 Intervening: Some Illustrations
Now that interventions have been defined, some comments are in order re-
garding which variables are suitable for intervention. As mentioned before,
in the m-theory interventions are understood as changes in the values of the
putative causes that fulfil certain conditions. Nevertheless, there may be
cases in which the very meaning of ’changing the value’ of one variable is ill
defined. As an example of this Woodward proposes the following claim:
(GL): “No physical object can travel at a velocity greater than light”
(Woodward, 2003, [106]:122).
(GL) represents a recognized scientific claim. What is not clear is whether
it represents a causal claim in the m-theory terms. The set of relevant vari-
ables in this case is V = {O,C} where O=physical object, C=velocity of
light; and the causal relationship in (GL), if any, links O and C. The problem
is that changing the values of variable O trough an intervention I makes no
sense, as it seems odd to prevent an object from ‘being a physical object’.
Therefore, according to the m- theory, (GL) cannot count as a causal claim.
In some other cases, changing the values of variables does not have a clear
meaning in the original claim. Nevertheless, a simple reformulation of the
claim and the right election of variables solves the difficulty. As an example
of this let us analyse the following claim in terms of the m-theory:
(GG): “Being female causes one to be discriminated against in salary”
(Woodward, 2003, [106]:115).
This claim can be expressed as the causal relationship X −→ D where
V = {X,D}; D=discrimination against in salary, and there are at least two
possible causes X1 and X2. X1 is the worker’s gender, and an intervention
I on X1 would be a change of sex. X2 is the employer’s beliefs about the
worker’s gender, and an intervention in this case would simply consist in
changing those beliefs.
Now let us consider the range of possible interventions. Literally changing
someone’s gender in order to study the causal relationship in (GG) seems
impracticable. Even if worker’s gender may be a cause of salary differentials,
we cannot assess the causal claim containing X1 by means of the m-theory.
So the first possible cause X1 may be tagged as inconvenient. It is much more
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reasonable, for example, to consider interventions on the employer’s beliefs
about gender by manipulating the information in job applications. There
is a well defined intervention acting on X2 and, if indeed changes in values
of X2 are correlated with changes in values of D, then there is, according
to the m-theory, a genuine causal relationship. Hence, the directed graph
X2 → D correctly describes a causal relationship in (GG) in accordance with
the m-theory.
What is remarkable about this example, is that “it matters a great deal
to the interpretation and truth conditions of the causal claim which hypo-
thetical manipulation we have in mind” (Woodward, 2003, [106]: 117). In
other words, the outcome of the manipulabilist analysis of a given causal re-
lationship may change depending on the interventions we take into account.
In this example of gender discrimination it is quite clear that X2 is preferable
to X1. Interpreting X as X2 is convenient both because it offers more plau-
sible interventions and because it goes along with the original intention of
the claim (GG). However, analysing more complex claims of actual scientific
explanations the election between alternative interpretations X1, X2, X3 or
Xi and alternative interventions I1, I2, I3 or Ii may not be so obvious.6
Yet, consider a different case. Suppose the intervention I is so strong that
it affects the very relationship between the putative cause and effect. Let us
imagine for example that we hang only extremely heavy weights on a string
exceeding its resistance. Then we could conclude that the causal relationship
expressed by Hook’s law (F = −kx) does not hold. This is because every
time we hang a weight the string literally breaks and the law is not fulfiled.
But this false conclusion is obtained from interventions in the wrong range
that brought about exceptions to the causal relationship.
Conversely, it may be the case that the intervention I fails to change
the values of the variable that it is supposedly affecting. As an illustration,
imagine a switch on a 360◦ that turns on a radio when we turn it beyond 90◦.
The set of relevant variables is V = {A,R} where A= angle (0◦ - 360◦) and
R=radio (0=off, 1=on). If interventions are performed to change the value
of A up to 60◦, we may wrongly conclude that A is not causally related to R.
Indeed, one would observe exactly the same results if the radio was broken.
But this is only due to the fact that the interventions are setting the values
of I within the wrong range of C’s values.
6This will be crucial in our philosophical analysis of some particular causal explanations
in chapters 5 and 6.
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These third and fourth examples serve to point out that causal relation-
ships only hold under a valid range of interventions.
The morals of all these examples can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
if for a given claim “C causes E” there are no well defined interventions that
would change the value of C, then according to the m-theory the claim is not
genuinely causal. Secondly, how variables are chosen and how we interpret
them may affect our results about the causal relationships expressed in a
given claim. And finally, causal relationships are not necessarily invariant
under any possible intervention. Quite the contrary, they are typically in-
variant only under some restricted set of interventions, as well as restricted
range of values of such interventions.
If analysing a putative causal relationship C → E we find out that every
single proposed intervention Ii disrupts the causal relationship of C and E,
even after all kinds of variations in the range of interventions (that is, even
hanging on the string small weights and/or turning the switch all the way
from A = 0◦ to A = 180◦) then, according to the m-theory (see Woodward,
2003, [106]:110), the causal relationship is not genuine.
All these examples together illustrate how the notion of intervention is
associated with a set of background conditions. So it is essential, in the
m-theory, to spell out these conditions and the valid range of possible inter-
ventions every time that a causal relationship is postulated.
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4.3.3 Possible Interventions
Let me turn now to an assessment of whether interventions are possible in
some other relevant senses. It may be the case, for example, that interven-
tions conflict with other interventions. Imagine that an intervention is phys-
ically possible, but there is no way of “switching off” an alternative cause of
C (i.e., it is not possible to fulfil IN-i). As an illustration suppose we study
the effect of the Moon over the oceanic tides. In order to inquire into the
causal relationship between Moon and tides we intervene on our system by
hypothetically introducing a second satellite and observing the change in the
tides produced by this intervention. So far, everything fits perfectly with the
m-theory. Nevertheless, the introduction of the second satellite also affects
the trajectories of the Moon and the Earth. And those are in turn causal
factors acting on the tides as well.
Here is another example which questions the possibility of performing
interventions. According to the definition IN, interventions I must be them-
selves causes acting on the putative cause C. Thus, a particularly interesting
challenge for m-theory is posted by cases in which the alleged cause C does
not itself have any causes – and therefore has no possible interventions.
In other words the m-theory requires that in order for C to be causally
associated with an effect E, it must also have itself a set of associated causes
Ii such that Ii → C → E (see directed graph 9). But, intuitively, this should
not be relevant to the problem of whether C causes E.
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Directed Graph 9.
The challenge, in terms of the directed graph 9, is whether the m-theory
is capable of telling us something about the causal link between C and E
when there are no such causal factors I1, I2, I3, . . . In.
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In order to face both examples (the “second moon” example, and the
“non-causal C” example) Woodward drives our attention to the fact that
two conditions –indeed two original motivations for introducing the notion
of intervention– are met in each of these examples. Firstly, “there is a basis
for claims about what will happen to E under an intervention on C; i.e. we
can associate some well-defined notion of change with C, and we have some
grounds for saying what the effect, if any, on E would be of changing just
C and nothing else. [Secondly] “there is a way of disentangling the effect on
E of changing just C from the effects on E of changes in other potentially
confounding variables” (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:131). Furthermore, in the
second example (in which C itself has no causes), there is an advantage in
comparison with many other cases. Namely, we do not even have to worry
about possible causal processes of C that, in violation of requirement IN-iii,
are also directly affecting E. In Woodward’s view, all these considerations
give us a purchase on whether the counterfactual “if C were to be changed
by an intervention I, then E would change” is true or false (see Woodward,
2003, [106]:132).
The essence of Woodward’s response to the two examples may be sum-
marized as follows. It is a fact that for both of the examples it is physically
impossible to perform interventions. This physical impossibility is not the
usual impossibility related to practical limits, but a stronger impossibility
related to the fact that every intervention I upon C would violate condition
IN-i. Even in those cases in which interventions are physically impossi-
ble in this strong sense, Woodward believes that we can legitimately use
counterfactuals to elucidate causal claims along the lines suggested in the
manipulability theory [m-theory]. (See Woodward, 2003, [106]:132).
Taking into account all the examples discussed in this chapter we may
conclude that there are so far only a few rare cases in which m-theory declares
that the putative causal claim is not genuine. In one of these cases the
causal link between C and E is broken by every single intervention on C,
independently of the range of values taken by those interventions. In another,
changing the values of the variable C has no meaning, even reformulating the
claim or proposing several interpretations of the causal variables involved in
the directed graph, as it happens in the “physical object” example.
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4.4 Invariance
The notions of causation, explanation and invariance are closely intertwined
in the m-theory. According to this theory, a generalization G –i.e. a relation-
ship expressing a putative causal connection between two variables– counts
as causal or explanatory if and only if it is invariant under some appropriate
set interventions (see Woodward 2003, [106]:15 and 239). Like the notion
of intervention, the notion of invariance is modal in the sense that it tells
us whether a putative causal relationship would remain stable if, perhaps
contrary to fact, certain changes or interventions were to occur.
Accordingly, defining the set of relevant variables V and the relations
among them provides in Woodward’s view no more than an incomplete de-
scription of the content of a given causal claim. In order to complete the
description it is also necessary to specify the background conditions and the
range of interventions under which the postulated relations are preserved.
Analogously, one cannot assert that a directed graph correctly represents a
system of causal relationships unless one shows that those causal relation-
ships are invariant under intervention.
The following example may serve to introduce the notion of invariance.
Suppose that the generalization G figures in a given explanation and G cor-
rectly describes the pattern of correlation between a cause and its effect. For
example, let G be Hook’s law F = −kx (where V = {F, x} and the force
F is the cause of the elongation x). In the m-theory a testing intervention
is defined as an intervention I that changes the value of F (from f to f ∗)
in such a way that f 6= f ∗ and hence G(f) = x 6= G(f ∗) = x∗ (Woodward,
2003, [106]:250) –remember that we are assuming that G is the correct de-
scription of the causal connection between F and x. So, in our example, the
testing intervention may consist in hanging different weights exerting forces
of different magnitudes upon the string. Under these circumstances we can
say that G is invariant under the intervention I if and only if G correctly
predicts the change in the value of the elongation x (from x to x∗) given the
change in the value of F brought about by the intervention I. In other words,
according to the m-theory Hook’s law is invariant if and only if it correctly
predicts the elongations corresponding to the different forces experimentally
applied upon the spring. So, the general definition of invariance may be
stated as follows.
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4.4.1 Definition of invariant generalization
A generalization G relating changes in the cause C (from c to c∗) to changes
in the effect E (from e to e∗) is invariant under a testing intervention I if and
only if it correctly describes what the new value of E, e∗, would be under this
change; that is, if and only if it remains true that G(c∗) = e∗ (see Woodward,
2003, [106] section 6.2).
It is worth emphasising that the notion of invariance so defined is relative
to interventions. And, given that interventions are so essential to define
whether a given generalization G is invariant or not, some remarks are in
order regarding what kind of interventions we can work with.
We should not identify invariance and interventions in general. For, on
the one hand, G may turn out to be invariant under a manipulation that
is not an intervention (i.e. a manipulation that fails to meet at least one of
the conditions INi-iv). On the other hand, we may find the converse case
in which G turns out to be non-invariant under an intervention. Let us
consider these two cases in turn.
If a given generalizationG is invariant under a non-intervention, according
to the m-theory, this fact must simply be considered irrelevant as far as G’s
explanatory relevance is concerned. In the m-theory, only manipulations
corresponding to interventions are considered relevant to test the explanatory
import of generalizations that figure in explanations. In this sense, among all
possible manipulations that may change the value of C, only those meeting
the conditions INi-iv, namely, only interventions, play a privileged role.
In the other case, i.e., if G turns out to be non-invariant under a given
intervention I, we should not conclude from this fact that G is not invariant
and not causal at all. G may “break down” under this particular intervention
I but may, nevertheless, have some explanatory import if it is invariant under
other interventions. As mentioned in previous examples (section 4.3.2), in
order to consider a generalization G explanatorily relevant it is not necessary
for G to be invariant under all possible interventions, but only under a set
of some interventions.
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4.4.2 Degrees of invariance
Probably the most important consequence of Woodward’s relativization of
the notion is that invariance becomes a matter of degree.
We may associate a generalization G with the set of interventions under
which it remains invariant. Some generalizations are invariant under one
single intervention (let us call the set containing that intervention S1), others
are invariant under a few interventions (call the set of those interventions
S2), and yet some others are invariant under a set containing numerous and
diverse interventions (call the set of those interventions Sn).7
Let us imagine that a given generalization G1 is invariant under a set of
the interventions S1, and another generalization G2 is invariant under a set of
interventions S2. If S2 has more elements than S1, then one may be tempted
to conclude that G2 is more invariant than G1. However, this conclusion is
not straightforwardly true. If, for example, S1 is a proper subset of S2 (i.e, if
S1 ⊂ S2) then it is true that G2 is more invariant than G1. But it may also
happen, in a different case, that although G1 and G2 are supposed to explain
the same phenomenon, S1 and S2 have no common elements. For example, if
G1 is Newton’s law of Gravitation and G2 is Einstein’s relativistic expression
for the planetary orbits, the interventions in the corresponding sets S1 and S2
may be all different. Therefore we cannot decide whetherG2 is more invariant
than G1 by simply appealing to the number of elements (interventions) in S1
and S2.
In addition, one must be aware that operations mathematically valid for
sets may lead to the wrong conclusions regarding invariance. For instance,
the invariance of generalizations is not an additive property, in the sense
that the conjunction of the two generalizations (G1 ∧ G2) is not necessarily
invariant under the union of the sets of interventions under which each set
remains invariant (S1 ∪S2). Similarly, we can not extract logical conclusions
from the relations between sets of interventions. For example, from the fact
that S1 is a proper subset of S2 (S1 ⊂ S2) we cannot infer that G2 is logically
derivable from G1.
The m-theory tells us that, once we are aware of all these considerations,
we can legitimately speak of some generalizations as more invariant than oth-
ers in the sense that they are invariant under a larger or more important set
of interventions (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:257, my emphasis). And in order
to make clear whether one set of interventions is larger or more important
7The sub-index does not correspond to the number of elements in each set.
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than another, one needs to know in detail the background conditions, what
each of the interventions consist in, and the range of values under which each
intervention is performed.
4.5 Explanatory Depth
4.5.1 The notion of explanatory depth
According to the m-theory, generalizations that are invariant under a larger
and more important set of interventions can be used to provide better expla-
nations. Hence the degree of invariance is directly related to the notion of
explanatory depth. This notion is introduced in the m-theory using the fol-
lowing example (formulated by Haavelmo, 1944, [47]: 27-28). Suppose that
two different explanations are offered about how to increase and decrease the
speed of an automobile. The simplest explanation relates the speed to the
distance of the gas pedal from the bottom of the car. And a second and more
elaborated explanation details the whole inner mechanism of the car, tell us
how the motor and the carburetor work and so on.
Both explanations are successful in terms of providing sufficient infor-
mation to operate the vehicle. Besides, both explanations are valid under
the criteria of the m-theory because they identify patterns of counterfactual
dependence that enable to control the speed of the automobile. In the first
case, the postulated relation between speed and the gas pedal remains in-
variant under some interventions, for example, under changes in the values
of the pedal inclination. However, this relation postulated by the simplest
explanation fails if the car runs out of petrol, or if any element inside the
car does not work properly. The second explanation, in contrast, is invariant
under interventions on any part of the mechanism. And thus it answers a
larger number of w-questions (questions about what would happen under
circumstances different to the actual ones). Among other things, it explains
why the car does not accelerate if the gas tank is empty. We then say that,
in m-theory terms, the second explanation is deeper than the first one.
The notion of explanatory depth is not properly defined in the m-theory
in the sense that the theory does not provide us with a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for this notion. Nevertheless one may identify three
criteria that the m-theory takes into account in order to assess explanatory
depth. I turn now to specify those three criteria.
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4.5.2 Three criteria of explanatory depth
Criterion 1. A causal explanation is explanatorily deep if the generalization
figuring in the explanation is invariant under a wide range of interventions.
(see Woodward, 2003, [106]: 311).
Let me illustrate criterion 1 in terms of a variation of the car’s exam-
ple. Suppose we define the variables that figure in the first explanation as
V={P,A}; where P=pressing the pedal, and A= acceleration. Let us say
that these are two-valued variables. That is, if the pedal is pressed then
P=1, and if the pedal is not pressed P=0. Similarly, A=1 if the car ac-
celerates and A=0 if the velocity of the car is constant. And suppose we
have an alternative explanation (let us call it the third explanation) that
also appeals to the causal relation between P and A but, instead of defining
P and A as two-valued variables, it defines them as multi-valued variables.
In the third explanation P can take any real value in the possible range
of the pedal’s inclination, and A can take any real value between 1m/s2
and 1000m/s2. Criterion 1 would then tell us that the third explanation
appealing to multi-valued variables is deeper than the explanation appeal-
ing to two-valued variables. The reason is that the third explanation shows
“how any one of a great number of changes in their explanans variables will
lead to one of many possible changes in their explanandum variables. In
other words, [it] gives us information about a much more detailed and fine-
grained quantitative pattern of counterfactual dependence than the “binary”
pattern”.(Woodward, 2003, [106]:206). This means that the third explana-
tion allows us to perform more interventions upon P for interventions are
changes in the values of P , and there are many more ways to intervene upon
the multi-valued variable P than upon the two-valuated P .8
Criterion 2. A causal explanation is explanatorily deep if the generaliza-
tion figuring in the explanation is invariant, not only under a wide range of
interventions (criterion 1), but also under a wide variety of different kinds of
interventions (see Woodward, 2003, [106]: 211, 215).
Criterion 2 may be illustrated with the original example of the car. In
fact, Woodward (2003, [106]:259-260) uses this example to illustrate that the
second and elaborated explanation is deeper than the simple one because the
generalizations figuring in the elaborated explanation are invariant under a
wider variety of different interventions. In addition to being able to inter-
8For more details see Woodward’s example of retrolental flbroplasia in[106]:120 and
206.
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vene upon the pedal in many ways, the elaborated explanation allows us to
perform many new interventions (upon the motor, the carburetor, the petrol
tank, etc.) that were not considered in the first and simple explanation.
Therefore, according to the m-theory, it is a deeper causal explanation of the
car’s acceleration.
This invariance under a variety of kinds of interventions is reflected, in
turn, in the diverse and complex counterfactuals associated to that expla-
nation. According to the m-theory in order “to elucidate certain kinds of
causal claims, including claims about direct causal relationships and singular
causal claims, one must appeal to counterfactuals with complex antecedents
–counterfactuals that describe what will happen under combinations of ma-
nipulations or interventions, rather than under single manipulations” (see
Woodward, 2003, [106]: 21).9
Criterion 3. A causal explanation is explanatorily deep if it is able to answer
a wide range of counterfactual questions about the conditions under which
the explananda would have been different (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:191).
In other words, the deeper the explanation, the wider the range of of what-if-
things-had-been-different questions it answers (see Woodward[106]:311).
Again our original example of the car illustrates how the second expla-
nation is deeper than the fist one. The second explanation is able to answer
what would happen if the carburetor breaks, if the petrol does not flow from
the tank to the motor and so on. Whereas the first explanation is able to
answer one single w-question, namely, what would happen if the pedal is not
pressed.
In the m-theory these three criteria seem to come along together. For ex-
ample, Woodward comments: “A deeper explanation for the behaviour of the
car would need to appeal to [generalizations and] engineering principles that
are invariant under a much wider range of changes and interventions. Not
coincidentally such a deeper explanation could be used to answer a much
wider range of w-questions”.(Woodward, 2003, [106]:260, my emphasis). I
have stressed the expression ‘Not coincidentally’ because it let us see that,
according to the m-theory, a causal explanation that meets the first two cri-
teria will also meet criterion 3. The following passage also suggest that the
three criteria of explanatory depth come along together: “Some generaliza-
9This makes the m-theory distinct form other manipulability approaches that only
consider one single manipulation for every given counterfactual.
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tions are not invariant under any (testing) interventions at all and hence are
nonexplanatory. Other generalizations are invariant under some testing in-
terventions (and answer some w-questions) and hence are above the threshold
of explanatoriness, although they are less invariant and answer a narrower
range of w-questions than others and hence are less explanatory (Woodward,
2003, [106]:369).
A consequence of a given explanation meeting criteria 1, 2 and 3, accord-
ing to the m-theory, is that the explanation will be relevant to the manipula-
tion and control of the explained event. And this is precisely what the second
explanation of the car’s acceleration achieves. And, from the manipulability
theory, this is what any causal explanation should aim for.
Now that we have made clear what the best scenario is (namely, fulfiling
the three criteria), let us turn to a not-so-good case. Let us see what the
minimum requirement is for an explanation to count as a causal explanation
in the m-theory. From the previous sections we can already infer what this
requirement consists in. The requirement is that, if G is the generalization
figuring in the explanation that relates the event with its alleged cause, G
must be invariant under some intervention. As we already know, this implies
that the intervention fulfils the conditions INi-iv (otherwise it would not
count as an intervention); that the intervention is performed within the valid
range of invariance of G.10; and that G meets the conditions of invariance (in
4.4.1). Woodward integrates all these ideas and expresses them more formally
in the following minimal condition for successful causal explanation.
4.5.3 Minimal condition for successful causal explana-
tion
Suppose that there is an explanandum consisting in the statement that some
variable E takes the particular value e. Then an explanans for that ex-
planandum will consist of (a) a generalization G relating changes in the
values of a variable C and changes in E, and (b) a statement (of initial
or boundary conditions) that the variable C takes the particular value c.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanans to be (minimally)
[causally]explanatory with respect to the explanandum are that:
(i) Both the explanans and the explanandum are true or approximately so;
(ii) According to G, E takes the value e under an intervention I in which
10In the sense explained in section 4.3.2 with the radio example.
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C takes the value c;
(iii) There is some intervention [some testing intervention] that changes the
value of C from c to c∗, where c0 6= c∗ with G correctly describing the value
that E would assume under this intervention, where e 6= e∗ (see Woodward,
2003, [106]:203).
This minimal condition is simply telling us that in order to provide a
causal explanation one must present a generalization G (relating the puta-
tive cause C to the effect E) and show that there is at least one intervention
I under which G is invariant. It would be much better if we show that G
is invariant under many interventions. But showing only one is sufficient for
our explanation to be considered, in the m-theory, as minimally successful.
If a generalization is not invariant under any intervention, then it will fail
to qualify as invariant or explanatory in the m-theory. In that case both
the generalization G and the putative explanation associated to G fall be-
low what Woodward calls ‘the threshold of explanatoriness’ (see Woodward,
2003, [106]:368).
Suppose that we attempt to explain a physical event (for example, the
occurrence of spin-echo signals) but we are not content with our explana-
tion only fulfiling the minimal conditions (4.5.3). What should we do if we
want our explanation to do even better or to be the best? What makes one
causal explanation better than another? One answer may be that ‘better’
means ‘deeper’ in the sense described in the last section 4.5.2. It is de-
sirable that our postulated generalization G remains invariant under more
than one intervention, or even better, under a wide range of interventions
that vary in intensity (in agreement with criterion 1) and kind (in agreement
with criterion 2). Under those circumstances, according to the m-theory, we
will be able to answer a wider range of counterfactual questions also called
w-questions (in agreement with criterion 3).
In sum, the higher the degree of invariance, the better control and ma-
nipulation and thus the deeper explanation is provided. This constitutes a
tool that the m-theory provides for comparing the explanatory relevance of
different explanations.11
11This tool constitutes yet another reason to choose the m-theory as the convenient
philosophical framework for assessing the explanations of the SE experiments. I thank my
internal examiner Federica Russo for driving my attention to this point. For recent alayses
of the advantages of applying Woodward’s m-theory to other cases in social and natural
sciences see Russo (2009, [84]) and Suárez & San Pedro (2011,[93]).
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4.5.4 Change-relating generalizations versus subsuming
generalizations
Generalizations relating changes in the values of a given cause C to changes
in the value of a given effect E (call them change-relating generalizations),
play a prominent explanatory role in the m-theory compared with subsuming
generalizations of the kind: “All A’s have the property B”. Woodward argues
that this is not a mere preference, but it is rather the result we obtain when we
apply his criteria of explanatory depth. It turns out that generalizations like
“All A’s are B’s” are usually invariant under a reduced set of interventions.
This point can be illustrated by means of the following example. Suppose
that somebody asks why the raven in the window is black. The first answer
provided is “Because all ravens are black”, and a second answer is “Because
there is a gene that contains information about the color of the birds’ feathers
and particularly in ravens it corresponds to black color. Should this gene be
modified by genetic engineering, the color of a raven could be different”.
The second explanation not only provides a relation between two variables
(genetic information and color of brids’ feathers), but it additionally provides
us with a variable suitable for intervention. It offers information about the
causes of the explained event and specifies a mechanism (in this case, genetic
manipulation) for changing the value of the variable “color”. The significant
point is that it explains both why the raven is black and the circumstances
under which a raven could be “non-black”.
Changing the gene that defines the color of a raven by genetic modification
is an intervention under which the first explanation fails but the second one
still holds. Therefore the second explanation is deeper than the first one in
the terms of the m-theory.
This explanatory irrelevance of generalizations like “All A’s are B’s” may
come as a shock to those who consider that many recognized laws of nature
can be expressed in that form. More precisely what is shocking is the follow-
ing. First Woodward tell us that laws are to be conceived in his m-theory
as highly invariant generalizations, that is, as generalizations that remain
invariant under a wide set of interventions. If we conceive laws as subsum-
ing statements of the kind “All A’s are B’s”, following Woodward we would
believe that those statements are highly invariant too. However, Woodward
argues that normally subsuming statements of that kind are lowly invariant.
Woodward saves the m-theory of this apparent contradiction by rejecting the
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subsuming conception of lawfulness. In the next (and last) section of this
chapter (4.6) the conception of lawfulness defended in the m-theory will be
clarified.
4.6 Solving old problems
One advantage of the m-theory is that it offers a solution to some old prob-
lems of Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological Model. On the one hand, the DN-
model was criticized for being to permissive in the sense of including expla-
nations that nobody would accept; at the same time, the model was also
indicted for excluding widely accepted explanations that simply do not ap-
peal to laws, implicitly or explicitly.12 Woodward presumes that his m-theory
solves both problems, and the solutions will be separately explained in the
following two sections. The debate about solving DN-model’s weaknesses
has been very prolific in the last decades and it goes beyond the objective of
this thesis to enter its details. Each solution will be simply sketched stress-
ing only the points that will be useful for our purposes in further chapters.
(particularly in chapter 6).
4.6.1 Excluding explanatorily irrelevant factors
The m-theory correctly rejects some unsatisfactory explanations that the
DN-model was not able to rule out. The famous example about Mr. Jones’
pregnancy status serves as an illustration. In that example it is alleged
that the reason why Mr. Jones is not pregnant is that he has been taking
contraceptive pills. This bogus explanation can be expressed in terms of the
m-theory as follows:
V = {CP,MP} where CP=ingestion of contraceptive pills and MP=male
pregnancy; and GP : CP →MP (In other words, the putative generalization
is “Contraceptive pills causally prevent male pregnancy”).
In accordance with the m-theory, if the generalization GP represents a
genuine causal relationship, then changes in the values of the putative cause
CP should be accompanied by changes in the putative effect MP . However,
as we know, changing wether a male takes birth pills does not generate any
12For a detailed discussion about the DN-model see Salmon, 1989, [86]. Some of the
counterexamples to the DN-model presented in Salmon’s book will be discussed here
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change in the value of MP (male pregnancy), which is always null MP = 0.
This means that there is not even one intervention under which the specific
generalization GP is invariant. And therefore, according to the m-theory, one
cannot appeal to GP to provide a causal explanation. In other words, this
explanation about Mr. Jones’ pregnancy is not a good explanation because
does not provide information about how changes in the level of the cause
may lead to changes in the value of the effect (in this case male pregnancy
MP ). This is to be contrasted with the second explanation in the raven’s
example (in section 4.5.4).
4.6.2 Dissolving the dichotomy law versus accident
The m-theory rejects the dichotomy according to which generalizations must
be laws or otherwise they are merely accidental (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:
257). Instead of using this common ‘law vs accident’ dichotomy the m-
theory suggests to talk about generalizations with different degrees of in-
variance. As a consequence, claims usually considered as laws of science in
other approaches, in the m-theory are treated as highly invariant generaliza-
tions. Their high level of invariance is often reflected in the stability that the
functional relations implicated in the generalization show when changing the
values of the variables they relate. Just to mention an example, the univer-
sal law of gravitation remains invariant under a wide range of changes, both
in the distances between the bodies and in the size and mass of the bodies
implicated in the gravitational attraction.
This treatment of laws of science as strongly invariant generalizations, so
the argument goes, enables us to dissolve the classic dichotomy of law versus
accident within the m-theory. Therefore, the relative notion of invariance
defined in the m-theory allows conceiving intermediate possibilities between
laws and accidents (see Woodward [106]: 240). And this, in turn, opens new
possibilities regarding the functions that generalizations play in the explana-
tions. Accordingly, in the m-theory the only feature that ultimately serves to
decide whether a given generalization G is causal and explanatory relevant
is its degree invariance.
All this is compatible with Woodward’s rejection of the traditional criteria
of lawfulness. Among the criteria that he rejects it is worth mentioning the
conception of laws of science as “exceptionless generalizations”; laws of science
as “universal conditional statements”; and laws of science as “statements that
make no reference to particular objects”. Among the traditional criteria, the
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only one that Woodward considers to be appropriate conceives laws of science
as “supporters of counterfactuals”13.
The continuum relative to invariance under interventions is a distinctive
element of the m-theory. Other approaches appeal to notions like robustness
(M. Redhead, 1987, [81]) or stability (S. Mitchell, 1997, [73]) which do not
accommodate degrees of invariance. In Woodward’s view, those approaches
still face the dilemma of tracing a demarcation criterion between lawful and
accidental generalizations; a dilemma that the m-theory resolves satisfacto-
rily.
4.6.3 Does the m-theory account for every single suc-
cessful explanation?
This section would be incomplete if we did not mention that Woodward’s m-
theory could also be criticized for not including explanations that are widely
accepted in actual scientific practices.
For example, explanations about the dimensionality of space-time do not
exhibit patterns susceptible of testing either by real nor hypothetical inter-
ventions. However, they seem to play an explanatorily relevant role. Also
the claim “All bodies travel at velocities lower than light” seems explanatory
but the m-theory classifies it as a generalization over which interventions are
ill defined (see the first example presented in 4.3.2). Hence, this claim does
not even provide a minimally acceptable explanation in the m-theory terms.
Similarly, many claims used in taxonomy, geology or mathematics, like
“Reptiles have no long extremities”; “All volcanic rocks are igneous and in-
trusive” or “Natural numbers are closed under division” fail to reach an ex-
planatory role in terms of providing counterfactual patterns invariant under
interventions.
The way out of this criticism is simple for the m-theory: the claims we
have just mentioned might be explanatory in some sense to be defined, but
they are not causally explanatory.
13For more details see Woodward, 2003, [106]: 240-242, 268, where Woodward argues
that whether a generalization is invariant is independent of whether it satisfies many of
the standard criteria of lawfulness.
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Manipulability Explanations of
the Spin-Echo Experiments
In this chapter the explanations of the irreversible decay of the signal in the
spin-echo experiments reviewed in chapter 2 will be expressed in terms of the
manipulability theory. First, I will briefly recall the conditions for express-
ing a causal explanation in terms of Woodward’s m-theory. Subsequently, I
will identify the set of relevant variables V and the patterns of dependence
connecting the variables in V for each of the explanations of the spin-echo
experiments. This will finally lead us to propose a directed graph1 associ-
ated to each explanation. The aim of this chapter is simply descriptive. Once
the different explanations have been cast in these terms it will be possible
to proceed to a comparative analysis and a critical evaluation(which I have
developed in chapter 6).
5.1 Elements to express explanations in the m-
theory
Offering an explanation in m-theory terms requires us to identify the causal
variables (C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn) and the effect variable (E) associated with the
explanation. The set containing all these causal relata is denoted as V. It is
not a trivial matter at all to determine which variables belong to that set.
For example, sometimes it is unclear whether a variable should figure as a
contributing cause (thus belonging in V ) or as a background condition (thus
staying out of V ).
1Similar to directed graph 1 in section 4.2, where the arrows stand for causal links.
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Suppose we want to represent Hook’s law (F = −kx; where F= force; x=
enlongation; and k= Hook’s constant). There is a certain critical value xc of
the spring elongation at which the spring breaks. This means that the law
(or, more appropriately in Woodward’s terminology, the generalization) only
holds for a certain interval of values of x. Let us call this interval ‘domain of
validity’ and denote it asD = [0, xc]. When expressing the causal dependence
of Hook’s law, we can choose between two different options. We can either
specify D as a background condition and then postulate the following causal
relation: F −→ x. Or, we can alternatively incorporate D as a condition
in the antecedents of the causal relationship as follows: XD −→ F −→ x;
where XD means that x ∈ D.2
There are also other important considerations to take into account when
choosing the variables in V. For example, if we aim to interpret explanations
in the most favourable way, we should consider whether it makes sense to
“change the value” of the variables that we consider as causes, i.e., we should
consider if it make sense to talk about interventions upon those causal vari-
ables C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn.
As explained in section 4.3, interventions are changes in the value of the
cause C that may allow us to determine whether a corresponding change is
produced on the value of the effect E. Woodward’s claim is that performing
interventions one can sometimes obtain some knowledge about the causal re-
lationship between C and E. And the conditions INi-iv (specified in section
4.3.1) must be taken into account in order to guarantee that the manipula-
tions performed upon C count as interventions. Let me recall the necessary
and sufficient conditions for intervention as follows:
(i) The change on the value of C must be caused only by the intervention I
and not by the influence of any other cause of C.
(ii) Causes of I must not be total causes of E.
(iii) I must not directly cause E via a route that doesn’t go through C.
(iv) The values of all other variables Ci in alternative paths form I to E
must be held fixed.3
2Please note that ‘−→’ stands for the causal relation, not material implication
3It seems that a precondition for condition (iv) to hold is that there are no statistical
correlations between I and any variable Ci, Ci 6= C, that causes E.
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From now on we will call “manipulation” to any change in the value of C.
Following the m-theory I will consider that, among all the possible manipula-
tions of C, only those fulfiling the conditions INi-iv count as “interventions”.
And “testing interventions” are interventions that we actually use to asses
whether or not a given causal relationship is robust (see definition of testing
intervention on p.69).
It is worth noting that there might be manipulations that change the
value of C, but do not count as interventions because they fail to meet at
least one of the above-mentioned conditions. Invariance under those manip-
ulations that do not qualify as interventions is not considered relevant for
evaluating the depth of a causal explanation. Only invariance under inter-
ventions is considered relevant in the m-theory. And, in order to claim that
a directed graph is a good representation of a causal explanation, the rela-
tionship between the effect E and its putative causes Ci must be invariant
under at least one intervention.
Another point to consider when a causal explanation is provided in the
m-theory terms is that the very meaning of “performing changes on the vari-
ables” must be clear. Otherwise (as the first example in section 4.3.2 shows),
the notion of intervention on C, and hence the causal relationship itself, will
be ill-defined.
It may also be the case that we do have a causal generalization upon
which well-defined changes can be performed, but there is no unique way
of understanding the causes of those changes (as in the second example in
section 4.3.2). In those cases we should prefer the interpretation that makes
better sense of the variables involved in the causal relationship and the very
meaning of changing their values.
To sum up, in order to offer a causal explanation in terms of the m-
theory, we must carefully choose the set of relevant variablesV ; then identify
the causal relationships between them within a directed graph; and finally
specify the background conditions under which some interventions are at
least hypothetically possible.
In the following sections I will employ the terms of the m-theory to express
the classical interventionist explanation (section 5.2) and the quantum-based
explanations (sections 5.3 and 5.4) of the irreversible decay of the echo-signal
in the spin-echo experiments.
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5.2 The Classical Interventionist Explanation
of the SE Experiments
Let us identify the causal relata postulated by classical interventionism in
the explanation of the spin-echo experiments. According to the explanation
offered by classical interventionists (developed in section 2.3) during the SE
experiments the spin’s system transmits magnetic energy to the environment.
As a consequence of this energetic transmission the frequencies of some spins
are perturbed. The nuclear spins that have been perturbed by their inter-
action with the environment do not contribute to the echo-signal along with
the rest of the spins. This explains the decay of the intensity of the echo
signal. At some point in the system’s evolution, more precisely, after an
interval of time known as relaxation time, the system is unable to generate
the echo-signal. In other words, the initial state of the system of spins, in
which they where all aligned, is no longer recoverable. Therefore, the system
of spins has reached a state of true equilibrium. So the whole process taking
place during an SE experiment is an irreversible process.
In terms of the Olympic race analogy presented in section 2.2, the effect
of the transference of magnetic energy from the spins to the environment
corresponds to runners getting fatigued. As they become tired, they run
slower during the second part of the race. Hence they take a longer time to
run back to the start line. The key issue is that every runner gets fatigued at
its own personal rate. If they were equally fatigued, they would eventually
reach the start line with some delay. The point is that each runner has its
own personal delay and this is the reason why the original alignment becomes
definitively unrecoverable.
A possible way of defining the set of relevant variables V is then:
V = {EP,DS,H}; where EP= environmental perturbations; DS= de-
layed spins; and H= height of the echo-signal.
EP // DS // H
Directed Graph 11. Causal links according to
the classical interventionist explanation.
The causal connections relating the variables in V could then be fairly
expressed by the directed graph 10 (below) which may be expressed as fol-
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lows: The environmental perturbations EP increase the number of delayed
(‘fatigued’) spins DS. This causes a decay in the height of the echo-signal H.
The decay process ends when the echo-signal disappears and thus the value
of H becomes constantly H=0. This means that the initial state of the sys-
tem (in which H = Hmax) is no longer recoverable. Classical interventionists
label this state as “true equilibrium”.4
Once the directed graph is proposed we must specify the values that each
of the variables can take. Perhaps the simplest way of defining EP is as
a two-valued variable whose value is EP=1 if environmental perturbations
occur and EP=0 if they do not occur. However, we may also define EP
as a multi-valued variable that corresponds to the “degree of environmen-
tal perturbation”. Let us take this option and define the interval of values
within which the “degree of environmental perturbation” may vary. The
upper bound of the interval corresponds to a situation in which the environ-
ment is energetically saturated and hence cannot absorb more energy from
the spins. Let us call EPmax the value that the variable EP takes in that
situation, and let us define it as an open upper bound (we cannot include
EPmax in the interval because precisely then the perturbations will cease, but
the values of EP inmediately lower than EPmax correspond to the highest
degrees of environmental perturbation). The lower bound, in turn, corre-
sponds to the situation in which there are no environmental perturbations
at all (EP=0) because the system is completely isolated from its environ-
ment. Since directed graph 11 represents the classical interventionist view,
and total isolation is impossible according to this view, we will define the
lower bound as an open bound too. So the interval of values of EP is ]0,
EPmax[.
The variable DS represents the number of nuclear spins that are delayed
with respect to the others. In other words, we say that a spin is delayed if it
has exported its energy of precession to the environment in such a way that
the spin is not able to go back to phase with the rest of the spins, and thus
it is not able to contribute to the echo-signal. Using Hahn’s terms we would
say that spins in DS have lost their “phase-memory” (Hahn, 1950, [49]:581).
The variable DS represents the number of nuclear spins in the sample that
possess that property. Hence if the system has n spins, the range of values
DS can take is [0,n].
4This sums up the causal structure underlying Hahn’s 1950,[49]; 1953,[49]; 1984,[51]
and Ridderbos & Redhead’s 1998, [82] ideas.
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Lastly, the minimum value of the height of the echo-signal is H=0; and
the maximum value it can take corresponds to the height of the signal that
is generated at the beginning of the experiment. Let us call that height
Hmax.The interval of possible values of the variable H is thus [0, Hmax].
The putative causal relationships are now defined. The next step is to
verify if there is some way (at least one) to change the value of the putative
causal variable, in this case EP . According to classical interventionists, the
environmental perturbations EP are manifested by the transformation of
the spins’ energy into other forms of energy (Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998,
[82]:1257). Let us look for the factors that may affect this transference of
energy from the spins to the environment. Then we will be able to establish
some manipulations (processes that change the value of EP ) that, should
they fulfil conditions INi-iv, will count as putative interventions upon the
variable EP .
Although the specific physical factors affecting EP are not listed in the
classical interventionists’ explanations of the spin-echo experiments, they do
make reference to Hahn’s papers (1950, 1953) from which I have extracted
the relevant factors that may cause the environmental perturbations EP .
According to Hahn’s description of the SE experiments, the transference of
the spins’ magnetic energy of precession to the environment is brought about
by the combination of three processes: The spin-lattice thermal exchange,
the fluctuations of the local magnetic fields, and the Brownian motion of the
glycerine molecules (see Hahn, 1950, [49]:581 and Hahn, 1953, [50]:7). I will
consider them as three putative interventions of the causal variable EP .
The “spin-lattice thermal interaction” is the process in which the energy of
the spins is exported to the lattice structure in which the nuclei are held. The
lattice is normally defined as the three-dimensional arrangement of molecules
in the sample. It is also appropriate to conceive it as a heat reservoir. The
reason is that some of that energy absorbed from the spins is transformed
into thermal energy, and the rest forms a magnetic field known as the lattice
field. Whether this effect is more or less intense depends on the mobility of
the lattice. In medicine, for instance, the spin-echo technique is applied to
different types of tissues (brain, heart, etc. see Hashemi, 2004 [52]) instead of
a sample of glycerine. The mobility in each of those lattices is different and
it has been observed (see Hashemi, 2004 [52]:57) that this affects how much
energy the spins can export to the lattice. Roughly, the higher the mobility
of the lattice, the more likely the transmission of energy. I will define the
putative intervention variable associated with this effect as ‘LatticeMobility ’.
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The variable associated with the second putative intervention upon EP may
be defined as ‘MagneticF ’ meaning ‘magnetic fluctuations’; and the variable
associated with the third and last putative intervention upon EP may be
defined as ‘BrownianDC ’, meaning ‘Brownian Diffusion Coefficient’.
The directed graph 12 (below) illustrates these three putative interven-
tions upon the variable EP .
LatticeMobility
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Directed Graph 12. Putative interventions
upon variable EP (environmental perturbations).
It is worth mentioning that during an SE experiment there is also a ex-
change of magnetic energy between nuclear spins. Hahn calls this effect the
“mutual spin-spin flipping” (Hahn, 1950, [49]:581). Despite the fact that this
magnetic effect also (partially) determines the energy of an individual spin, I
do not consider it appropriate to include the spin-spin interaction as a fourth
possible way of intervention upon EP . The reason is that classical interven-
tionists talk about “the exchange between spin energy and other forms of
energy” (Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998, [82]:1252, my emphasis). Moreover,
they explain the signal decay appealing to the energy ‘exported ’ from the
spin-system to the external environment (Ridderbos & Redhead [82]:1257).
In other words, the spin’s energy is dissipated into a larger system comprising
the environment. The classical perspective is then considering the spin-spin
interaction as a magnetic effect taking place inside the system itself, and not
as a factor contributing to the system-environment energy dissipation.
The description of the classical interventionist explanation would not be
complete without a specification of the background conditions under which
the causal links hold. These conditions include the experimental settings
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which consist of 1) a sample of a great number of spins (≈ 1023), normally
obtained by placing a glycerol solution in a strong magnetic field (0.177
Tesla); 2) an apparatus that generates the magnetic field; and 3) the radio-
frequency pulse generator (see Fig.12).5
Fig.12. Experimental device.6
The experimental setting is treated classically. More precisely, the spin
dynamics are described by a theory based on the dynamics of a classical
gyroscope known as Larmor’s theory of precession (see appendix D).
5Detailed descriptions of the experimental setting can be found at Martin, 2006, [69]
and Duarte, 2008, [29].
6Illustration is taken form Bloembergen et al, 1948, [10].
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5.2.1 General graph for classical interventionism
In this section an alternative and more general directed graph is proposed
for classical interventionist explanations. Instead of focusing on the spins’
frequencies, let us pay attention to the dissipation of correlational informa-
tion. From this point of view, any thermodynamic irreversible process can be
characterized as an evolution towards a state such that the correlational in-
formation about the macroscopic initial order of the initial state is completely
dissipated.
A set of relevant variables V appropriate for expressing this general in-
terventionist idea is V = {EP,CI, TEQS} where EP = Environmental
perturbations; CI = Correlational information; TEQS = True equilibrium
state. And the variables in V are causally related as shown in the directed
graph 10 below.
EP // CI // TEQS
Directed Graph 10. General directed
graph for classical interventionism.
In this case the variable EP is defined as before. And the variable CI
may be associated to the percentage of correlational information that is still
contained in the system. Thus the interval of possible values of CI is [0,100].
To define the possible values of the effect-variable in the directed graph,
TEQS, we must choose between two different options. The fist option is
to associate TEQS to the probability that the system reaches a state of
true equilibrium. In that case the interval of possible values of the variable
is [0,1]. This option may be tricky as it is still a matter of controversy
how probabilities are to be interpreted in statistical mechanics. The second
option is to define TEQS as a two-valued variable whose value is TEQS=1
if the system under study reaches a state of true equilibrium, and TEQS=0
otherwise. If the system is in a state of quasi-equilibrium the value of the
variable is also TEQS=0.
This directed graph embodies the very essence of classical interventionist
explanations of irreversible processes. It is adequate to express the expla-
nation of spin-echo experiments put forward by Ridderbos and Redhead in
(1998,[82]); the explanation of gases evolutions based on molecular interac-
tion due to Blatt, (1959,[9]), and the explanation based on the interaction
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between the particles and the infinite parts of the reservoir in which the gas
is contained (Bergmann and Lebowitz, (1955,[7])).
Particularly, the spin-echo experiments can be explained using this new
directed graph as follows: At the beginning of the experiment the system
contains all the correlational information (CI=100) and the perturbations
from the external environment can be practically disregarded (EP ≈ 0).
However, during the experiment the spin system evolves (alternatively gen-
erating and vanishing the echo-signal) and the environmental perturbations
EP begin causing a lost of correlational information (CI <100). After several
r-f pulses, the spins lose their phase memory due to the energetic exchange
with the environment up to the point that CI = 0. The true equilibrium
state is then reached by the system of spins. This means that the system’s
evolution has been thermodynamically normal, i.e, TDB=1.
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5.3 The GRW-based Explanation of the SE Ex-
periments
As mentioned before7 Albert’s explanation of irreversibility is based upon the
GRW collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. The GRW-dynamics are
genuinely stochastic, thus David Albert’s GRW-based approach is indeter-
ministic. This means that the causal relations represented in the directed
graphs will now link changes in the values of the causes with changes in the
probabilities of the values of the effect (see p.57). A microstate is no longer
represented by a point but by a Gaussian in position. The probability of a
system being in a certain microstate is replaced by the probability that such
a Gaussian is centred on a given point after a real collapse.
From the GRW-based perspective, several GRW-collapses (i.e., real col-
lapses) take place during the approach to equilibrium of any thermodynam-
ical system. The essence of the explanation consists in the fact that every
GRW-collapse directly affects the position of the particles and drives the
system to a state with a Gaussian centred in a thermodynamically normal
state.8
Recall that Albert assumes that the “thermodynamic probabilities are
associated to quantum probabilities” (Albert’s dynamical hypothesis, see
Albert, 2000, [4]: 151-152.) According to the GRW-based explanation, if
this dynamical hypothesis holds, the thermodynamic behaviour of the sys-
tem is guaranteed by the GRW-dynamics, independently of whether or not
the initial state of the system is thermodynamically normal. As shown in
Fig.13(below), although the system may fall into an abnormal state during
its evolution (including the initial state), the GRW collapses will typically
drive the system back to a thermodynamically normal state. As a result,
there is a high probability that the total evolution of the system is thermo-
dynamically normal. In other words, the system evolves in accordance with
the second law of thermodynamics.
7The main argument of this approach is in section 2.4.1.
8We say that a state is thermodynamically normal if it belongs to a trajectory in the
phase space (an evolution) that follows the laws of thermodynamics. Otherwise, the state
is thermodynamically abnormal (see Fig.11 on p.39).
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Fig.13. Every GRW-collapse drives the system into a state whose
Gaussian is centred in a thermodynamically normal state.
Fig.13 represents the thermodynamic trajectory in the usual phase space.
Although GRW collapses take place on the configuration quantum space,
they causally affect the position of the particles. Therefore, they have been
included in the figure.
It is worth mentioning that, in the case of the spin-echo experiments, the
direct effect of GRW-collapses over the position is not enough to cause the
echo signal decay. When GRW-collapses take place in position the wave func-
tion of the system remains almost unaltered. The decay is actually obtained
due to an indirect effect. Given the position-spin coupling, slight changes in
position generated by the GRW-collapses produce, in turn, stronger changes
over the spins. It is this perturbation over the spins that really pushes the
system away from the vicinity of the initial state, finally avoiding the return
to it (see Hemmo & Shenker, 2003, [54]:section 3.2).
Taking all these elements into account, the simplest and more adequate
way to formulate Albert’s explanation of irreversibility in the spin-echo exper-
iments is the following. Let the set of relevant variables be V = {GRWC,PS, TDN};
whereGRWC=GRW-collapses; PS=perturbed spins; and TDN=thermodynamic
normality.
Let us interpret GRWC as “the rate of GRW-collapses per second” and
let GRWCmax be the maximum number of collapses that may occur in one
second. The interval of possible values of the variable GRWC is thus [0,
GRWmax]. The interval of values of the variable PS (perturbed spins) for a
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system of n spins is [0,n]. And finally we may define the range of possible
values of the variable TDN in terms of the evolution of the system. That is,
if the evolution is thermodynamically normal TDN=1 and if the evolution
is thermodynamically abnormal, then TDN=0 (see Fig.11 on p.39). I be-
lieve this is the definition of TDN ’s values that best captures the essence of
Albert’s explanation.9. The directed graph 13 (below) represents the causal
relationship connecting these variables.
GRWC // PS // TDN
Directed Graph 13. GRW-based
explanation of the thermodynamic behaviour.
Alternatively, we may use the variable H (height of the echo-signal) in-
stead of the variable TDN . In that case, the set of relevant variables is de-
fined as V = {GRWC,PS,H}; whereGRWC=GRW-collapses, PS=number
of perturbed spins, and H=height of the echo-signal. And the intervals of
possible values of GRWC, PS and H are [0, GRWmax], [0,n], and [0, Hmax]
respectively. The directed graph 14 represents the causal relationship con-
necting these variables.
GRWC // PS // H
Directed Graph 14. GRW-based
explanation of the spin-echo experiments.
Since we are focusing now upon the spin-echo experiments in the next
chapter I will use directed graph 14 (rather than directed graph 13) to assess
the explanatory import of the GRW-based approach.
Let us now define some putative interventions upon the variable GRWC.
In order to intervene upon this causal variable we would like to find a ma-
nipulation or mechanism that controls its values. However, finding such a
9We have expressed the values of TDN in Boltzmannian terms because that is the
framework in which Albert works. However, we so wished, we could also define the values
of TDN in terms the Gibbsian framework: if the system approaches the microcanonical
distribution TDN=1; otherwise TDN=0.
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mechanism is particularly tricky in this case. The quantum collapses are
genuinely stochastic and we cannot generate them or stop them at our will
or convenience.
In my view, we face one of the problematic cases mentioned in the descrip-
tion of the m-theory (in section 4.3.3). I am referring specifically to the case
in which interventions on the cause are not possible, not only because they
are difficult to carry out in practice, but rather because the variable upon
which we want to perform the interventions has no possible causes. The good
news are that in this kind of cases it is not necessary for an intervention I
to switch off the causal link between the putative cause C and its multiple
causes I1, I2, . . . , In (see directed graph 9 on p.67) because they do not even
exist. The bad news are that, since interventions are causes themselves in
accordance with condition IN-i, it follows from the fact that C has no cause
that there can be no interventions on C that can serve to test the causal
claim.
The way out suggested by Woodward in cases like this is to assess coun-
terfactual claims about what would happen under interventions on C, even
if these interventions are not in fact possible (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:13,
and section 4.3.3 of this thesis).
Fortunately in our particular case, despite the fact that we cannot provoke
the specific occurrence of a collapse, there is a way of increase and decrease
the amount of GRW-collapses and this is the variable that we have adopted
as our main object. The glycerine sample can be diluted reducing the number
of spins whose states are collapsed by the GRW-collapses (see directed graph
15).
DilutingSample
((QQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
GRWC // PS // H
Directed Graph 15. Possible intervention upon the variable GRW
If Albert’s explanation is right, this intervention should decrease the rate
of GRW-collapses per second. As a consequence, a lower number of spins
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would be perturbed and the echo-signal would take longer to disappear. That
is, it would take a longer time for the variable H to take the value H = 0
and remain indefinitely at that value. In other words, the system of spins
would take longer to reach the thermodynamic equilibrium.
Let us finally list the background conditions and background theory.
Again the background conditions are given by the experimental setting il-
lustrated in Fig.12 (on p.88) In this case the background theory is given by
the GRW collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular the
GRW stochastic dynamics in which the Schrödinger equation is replaced by
a stochastic equation; and Albert’s dynamical hypothesis.
It is worth noting that Albert’s approach also adds the past hypothe-
sis (low entropy initial condition defined in section 1.4), which is normally
assumed to define the past-to-future direction. It is important to remark,
though, that the purpose of the past hypothesis in this case is only to make
the past fit with our records, but it plays no role in making the future fit
with the second law of thermodynamics.10
10I thank Meir Hemmo for drawing my attention to this point.
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5.4 Decoherence-based Explanation of the Spin-
Echo Experiments
The decoherence-based explanation of the spin-echo experiments (introduced
in section 2.4.2) is easier to express in terms of the m-theory if we divide
it in three parts. The first part corresponds to the explanation of why the
electromagnetic signal fades away in the early stage of the experiment during
the interval of time [0, τ ] (see Fig.7-9 on p.28). The second part corresponds
to the explanation of why the signal re-appears at t = 2τ (return from Fig.9
to Fig.7 on p.28). And the third part explains why the maximum value of the
signal gradually decreases and eventually disappears (see Fig.10 on p.29)11.
In the early stage of the spin-echo experiments the electromagnetic signal
decreases until, at time t = τ , it completely vanishes. During this interval
of time, the perturbations due to decoherence are ignored. In other words,
according to the decoherence-based approach, the Schrödinger unitary and
deterministic dynamics give us a good description of the system’s behaviour
during this stage.
The fact that the spins get out of phase (bringing about the first fall
in the intensity of the electromagnetic signal) is explained by the action of
two factors: the spin-spin interaction that randomizes the spins’ states; and
the in-homogeneities of the magnetic field that make the spins precess at
different rates. As the system has not been perturbed during the first part of
the experiment, the return to the initial state is still possible (in other words,
“the runners are not yet tired”). This is precisely the return that takes place
when the spins get back in phase producing the first echo-signal. The only
factor responsible for this re-coordination of the spins, according to Hemmo
and Shenker, is the radio-frequency pulse applied by the experimenter.
Finally, in the third part we observe the decay of the echo-signal. The per-
turbations that were ignored in the first two stages of the experiment come
into play in the long-term evolution of the spins’ system. In fact, all the
explanations presented in this chapter assume that the perturbations upon
the spins’ system constitute the very cause of the decay of the echo signal.
11Classical interventionists would refer to the fist part as “the approach to quasi-
equilibrium” and to the third part as “the approach to true equilibrium”. However the
authors of the decoherence-based approach, Hemmo and Shenker, do not adopt this ter-
minology as they do not commit themselves to the distinction between the two kinds of
equilibrium.
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While the classical interventionist approach appeals to external perturba-
tions, the GRW-based approach appeals to internal quantum perturbations.
The decoherence-based approach combines both kinds of perturbations, as-
sociated with the environmental decoherence and with the spin-spin deco-
herence respectively.
In the next chapter I will argue that this combination of external and
internal causal factors may represent an advantage for the decoherence-
based approach. But first we need to express the third and last part of
the decoherence-based explanation in terms of the m-theory. In order to do
so we will study how both the environmental decoherence and the spin-spin
decoherence work, and how the no-collapse interpretations of quantum me-
chanics frame the third and last part of the decoherence-based explanation.
The set of relevant variables can be defined as V={DE,DI,EC,H},
where DE=rate of external decoherence; DI=rate of internal decoherence;
EC=effective collapses, H=height of the echo-signal. And the causal rela-
tionships are given by the directed graph 16.
DE
##F
FF
FF
FF
F
EC // H
DI
;;xxxxxxxx
Directed Graph 16. Decoherence-based explanation of the
long term decay and disappearance of the echo-signal.
The variables DI and DE may be interpreted as the rate of decoherence.
Let [0, DImax] and [0, DEmax] be the respective intervals of possible variables
for these variables. Let us denote as ECmax the maximum number of collapses
that may occur in one second. The rate of effective collapses EC may take
any value of the interval [0,ECmax]. And the range of possible values of the
variable H is again [0, Hmax].
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In order to understand the decoherence-based explanation it will be useful
to keep in mind that this explanation is similar to Albert’s in many respects.
In particular, the assumptions regarding the distribution of normal and ab-
normal states in the phase space remain the same. And the role played by
the GRW-collapses will now be accomplished by the external and the internal
decoherence together with the stochastic dynamics (assumed in no-collapse
interpretations of quantum mechanics).12
When Hemmo and Shenker appeal to environmental decoherence to ex-
plain the decay of the echo-signal (Hemmo & Shenker, 2005, [55]:641), they
are employing the process described by the standard models of decoherence13,
in which “position” is usually considered the pointer basis. This means that
–in analogy with the GRW-based explanation– the spins will be affected in-
directly though the coupling between “spin” and “position”. The internal or
spin-spin decoherence, by contrast, exerts a direct influence upon the spin
states. “The system” is a particular spin and “the environment” is comprised
by the rest of the spins in the sample. In this case the pointer basis is the
“spin”.
As a result of these external and internal decoherences the system jumps
from one Schrödinger trajectory to another (see Hemmo & Shenker, 2003,
[54]:338). This transition from a effective state to another effective state
(effective collapse) may be considered to be stochastic.14 Both external and
internal decoherences ensure that those effective collapses will lead the system
into a normal quantum state15.
The connection between quantum probabilities and thermodynamic prob-
abilities is in this case produced in two steps. Firstly, it is postulated that the
stochastic dynamical laws yield the quantum mechanical probabilities given
12For instance, in modal interpretations, the dynamics are genuinely stochastic. Hemmo
and Shenker refer to Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (1999, [5]) for a detailed discussion on
this.
13The environmental decoherence, in general, is the quantum process due to the interac-
tion between the system and its environment that leads to the suppression of interference.
In other words, it is the process that turns a coherent quantum state into a diagonal
state in a well-defined basis known as pointer basis. For more details see Zurek and Paz,
1994,[109]; Zurek and Paz, 2002, [76]; and Zurek, Paz et al, 2003, [110]. A recent review
of decoherence is presented in Castagnino et al, 2010, [24].
14The collapses are called ‘effective’ in contrast with the ‘real’ collapses. I am following
Hemmo and Shenker on this, for more details see[54]: 338, 349-351.
15Namely, a state whose quantum evolution begins and ends in well-defined states, in
the sense that they collapse onto Gaussians in both position and momentum.
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by the Born rule. And secondly, it is postulated that the quantum mechani-
cal probabilities reproduce the quantitative predictions of classical statistical
mechanics16. As Fig.14 (below) illustrates, if both postulates hold, the evo-
lution of the system will be formed by segments of different trajectories; and
the transition from one trajectory to the next is due to an effective collapse.
Fig.14. Evolution of thermodynamic systems according to the decoherence-based
approach.
It is worth noting that, since the trajectory of the system is perturbed by
the effective collapses, the evolution is independent of its past thermodynamic
history. Precisely for this reason, it is claimed that the system will evolve
in a thermodynamically normal way, regardless of whether its initial state is
thermodynamically normal or not.
In order to analyze decoherence-based interventionist explanation in terms
of the m-theory we need to identify possible interventions on the putative
causes. There are at least two possible interventions that control the values
of the causal variables DI and DE: one is diluting the glycerine sample,
the other is fixing the initial quantum state in such a way that decoherence
does not take place during the entire experiment. If we are able to set the
experiment in such an initial quantum state, decoherence would not affect
16This assumption is analogous to Albert’s dynamical hypothesis.
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the spins’ system and relaxation times should be manifestly longer. This
“no-decoherent states” are theoretically possible, but they have not yet been
experimentally prepared.
As it happened in the classical case, in order to fulfil condition IN-iv it
is important to consider whether it is possible to hold fixed the value of the
variable DE (external decoherence) when interventions on the variable DI
(internal decoherence) are performed, and vice-versa (see directed graphs 17
and 18).
Intervention1 // DE
""F
FF
FF
FF
F
EC // H
DI
Xxxxx
;;xxxx
Directed Graph 17. Intervention on DE while holding DI fixed.
DE
X
FFF
F
##FF
FF
EC // H
Intervention2 // DI
<<yyyyyyyyy
Directed Graph 18. Intervention on DI while holding DE fixed.
The background conditions are given by the experimental setting. And
there are a number of important theoretical assumptions in the background
theory that play a role in this explanation, but it is not necessary to list them
fully here – they appear in the relevant section of appendix C.
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5.4.1 Final remark about the decoherence-based expla-
nation.
A remarkable feature about the decoherence-based approach is that spin-
spin interaction plays a double role because it is considered to be a causal
factor in two different stages of the spin-echo experiments. During the third
part it pushes the system to thermodynamic equilibrium trough internal
decoherence (represented by the causal variable DI), but also during the first
part it contributes to causing the defocus of the signal trough randomization
of the states.
Let us define this early spin-spin interaction as the variable SS and let
us try to propose a new set of relevant variables V’ including SS. As we are
including a causal factor of the first part of the experiment, we should also
include the other, i.e., the magnetic in-homogeneities of the field (call them
MFI). Instead of effective collapses (whose role is irrelevant in the first two
stages of the experiment), let us focus on the alteration of spin frequencies.
Then a possible V’ would be V’={SS,MFI,DE,DI, SF,H}; where SS=
spin-spin interaction, MFI= magnetic field inhomogeneities, DE= external
decoherence, DI= internal decoherence, SF= spins’ frequencies, H= height
of the echo-signal. The causal relations connecting the variables in V’ would
generate the directed graph 19, in which the intermediate variable is not
only affected by the two kinds of decoherences but also by the magnetic field
in-homogeneities and the spin-spin classical exchange of magnetic energy.
MFI
5
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
5
SS
##H
HH
HH
HH
HH
SF // H
DE
;;vvvvvvvvv
DI
DD																
Directed Graph 19. Alternative directed graph for the
decoherence-based explanation of the echo-signal decay.
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A consequence of proposing such a directed graph associated to the set
V’ is that the interventions upon the variable DI would not satisfy the m-
theory conditions (IN i-iv). This is because there is no possible intervention
that is able to bring about changes in the values of of the spin-spin internal
decoherence DI, without affecting the values of SS as well.
However, the directed graph 19 is inappropriate in the sense that it mixes
two kinds of factors that affect the spins’ frequencies. The influence of MFI
and SS upon the spins’ frequencies SF is reversible. And the proof is that,
during the second stage of the experiment, the original state is still recov-
erable. Decoherences DE and DI, on the contrary, exert an irreversible
influence upon the spins, “making them tired” in the race analogy. Taking
this consideration into account would lead us to a more appropriate directed
graph (directed graph 20) where we have marked when the causal influence
is reversible and when it is irreversible.
MFI, SS // (reversible)
&&NN
NNN
NNN
NNN
SF // H
DE,DI // (irreversible)
88ppppppppppp
Directed Graph 20.
As the branch containing SS and MFI is irrelevant for the explanation
of the thermodynamic behaviour of the system, we can ignore it. There-
fore, from now on we will take directed graph 16 (on p.97) as the adequate
expression of the decoherence-based explanation of the echo-signal decay.
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Manipulability test of
Explanatory Depth
In the previous chapter we described the causal patterns postulated by three
different explanations of the spin-echo experiments. The aim of the present
chapter is to examine how deep those explanations are in the Woodwardian
sense of depth (defined in section 4.5.1). The chapter is organized as fol-
lows. In section 7.1 we analyse whether the causal patterns remain invariant
under some interventions. In section 7.2 we compare the capacity of the
explanations for providing answers to the so-called what-if-things-have-been-
different-questions. In other words, we compare the explanations in terms
of their ability to account for counterfactual situations. Finally, in section
7.3, the results of the analysis developed in this chapter are summarized and
discussed.
The analysis here presented constantly refers to experiments that have
been actually performed during the last decades. This provides an interesting
complement for evaluating the empirical adequacy of the explanations while
we discover how deep they are.
6.1 Invariance under testing interventions
In this section we will first propose some actual or hypothetical manipula-
tions to control the values of the cause(s) postulated by each explanation.
Afterwards, we will verify which of them fulfil Woodward’s conditions INi-iv
(defined in section 4.3.1.). This will provide us with a set of interventions
for testing the explanations under study. We will then proceed to analyse if
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the causal links postulated by each explanation remain invariant when such
testing interventions are applied1.
6.1.1 Testing the classical interventionist explanation
Our description of the classical interventionist explanation in m-theory terms
(illustrated in directed graph 12) assumes that the interaction between the
environmental perturbations exerted upon the system of spins (denoted with
the variable EP= “environmental perturbations”) are brought about by the
thermal interactions between the spins and the lattice, the magnetic fluctu-
ations and the Brownian motion. In chapter 6, those factors were simply
mentioned to provide a complete description of the classical explanation. We
examine in greater detail how exactly those factors increase or decrease the
rate of environmental perturbation. Expressed in the m-theory terms, we
turn to study now how these factors can be used for manipulating the value
of the variable EP .
Let us begin with the Brownian diffusion coeficient, which is frequently
recognized in scientific papers as a relevant factor affecting the behaviour of
the spin-echo system2. As Einstein pointed out in one of his annus mirabilis
papers, the Brownian motion depends both on the temperature and viscosity
of the substance in which the particles are immersed (see Einstein, 1905,
[38] or Shaxby, 1914, [88]:544). Thus in the spin-echo experiments the value
of the Brownian diffusion coefficient may be manipulated, for example, by
diluting the glycerine in water; or by warming the sample up.
An experiment comparing the spin-echo signal for different dilutions of
water and glycerine has been recently performed (Martin & Hughes, 2006,
[69]). The results of this experiment show that the relaxation time of the
system actually depends on the water-glycerine proportion in the sample.
More precisely, the higher the glycerine content, the shorter the relaxation
time. These results are consistent with the following results obtained by
1A ”testing” intervention is no more than an intervention used to test how robust is a
given causal relationship, see p.83.
2Widom, for example, begins his article “Fractal Brownian motion and nuclear spin
echoes” as follows: “It has long been known that the microscopic Brownian diffusion co-
efficient D of a ‘particle’ in a fluid can be measured via the amplitude of the magnetic
echo signal from nuclear spins subject to an appropriate sequence of magnetic field pulses”
(Widom, 1995, [105]:1243)
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Bloembergen, Purcell and Pound [10] in a similar experiment (see Fig.15
below).
Fig.15. Relaxation time for protons in water-glycerine solutions.
Classical interventionism would account for this behaviour by arguing
that the Brownian motion increases when the concentration of glycerine is
high. So the perturbations are intensified making the echo-signal disappear
(i.e. bringing the system to a state of true equilibrium) in a shorter relaxation
time.
Suppose now that, instead of manipulating the viscosity by mixing the
glycerine with water, we fix the water-glycerine proportion and vary the
temperature. This situation would affect the whole experiment because,
as we will see in a moment, the evolution of the system is temperature-
dependent. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that warming up the sample
would increase the value of the Brownian diffusion coefficient, and therefore,
shorten the system’s relaxation time. At the same time, however, it would
make the viscosity importantly decrease, and higher viscosity leads to longer
relaxation times.
In scientific practice (at the MIT Junior lab for example)3, in order to
study variations in relaxation time, experimenters use a table that indicates
the viscosity values for different water-glycerine solutions at several tem-
3See [72].
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peratures. The longest relaxation times had been achieved in experiments
developed at very low temperatures.4
In any case, the predictions provided by classical interventionism are com-
patible with the experimental fact that variations in relaxation time have
been seen to depend on the specific Brownian motion rate associated to the
actual viscosity and temperature of the sample. This is the kind of manipu-
lation we are looking for.
Let us now consider manipulations through variations of the magnetic
fluctuations. Perhaps the rate of magnetic fluctuations can be raised during
the experiment by introducing some paramagnetic impurities in the sample
(Blumberg, 1959, [11]) or by moving some extra magnets around the exper-
imental device. This would generate magnetic fields in certain areas of the
sample, additional to the static magnetic field generated by the original de-
vice. In the only experiment I have been able to find performing this kind
of manipulation (Stejskal, 1964, [92]) a technique is employed for generating
magnetic gradients with a couple of coils wound on tapered forms. The effect
on the system is then measured for several different gradients. The output
of this experiment shows that the echo-signal is directly affected by the mag-
netic gradients in such a way that greater magnetic gradients correspond to
echo-signals with weaker intensities.
An alternative would be to prevent (rather than generate) magnetic fluc-
tuations and in-homogeneities. Some experiments have already been per-
formed in order to achieve this. Bloembergen et al, for example, describe
how water samples can be used to detect the field in-homogeneities and find,
in that way, the more homogeneous area in the field (see Bloembergen et
al, 1984, [10]:684). Also, and more recently, a computer model has been de-
veloped to simulate different in-homogeneous magnetic fields and study how
much the behaviour of the spin’s system is affected by these in-homogeneities
(Nyenhusi, 1994, [74]). In order to reduce costs and improve the medical ap-
plication of the spin-echo technique, the computer model aims to find the
range at which the measurements of relaxation times are still reliable with-
out using too expensive magnets. For our purposes, it is enough to realize
that there are some experimental manipulations that effectively test the pu-
tative influence of the internal magnetic fields upon the spin-echo system.
4Bloembergen et al, for example, describe spin-echo experiments developed with glyc-
erine super-cooled down to temperatures far below its freezing point (see Bloembergen et
al, 1984, [10], section XI).
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It is also worth mentioning that immersing the sample in a perfectly ho-
mogeneous magnetic field is also a hypothetically conceivable manipulation;
therefore, it may count (if it fulfils conditions INi-iv) as an intervention for
testing our explanation under study.
Again, classical interventionists would be able to account for the be-
haviour of the system under variations (increases or decreases) of the amount
of magnetic field fluctuations. More precisely, they would predict longer re-
laxation times for the perfectly homogeneous field, and shorter relaxation
times for fields with more in-homogeneities and magnetic fluctuations.
Let us finally imagine how the thermal interactions between the spins
and the lattice can be modified. As Hahn explained already as back as
1950 [49], the spin-lattice thermal interaction brings about transferences in
the spins of some particles (from spin up to spin down). When this occurs
the magnetic energy of the precessing spin is transferred to a molecule of
glycerine in the form of kinetic energy. After many spin transferences the
system experiences a “cooling process” characterized in practice by the so-
called spin-lattice relaxation time.
These random thermal interactions between the spins and the lattice are
present during the whole experiment. They produce the de-phasing of the
spins in the short term (driving the system to the state that classical in-
terventionists called quasi-equilibrium), and the decay of the eco intensity
H in the long term. According to the classical interventionist explanation,
this is the dominant process affecting the spin frequencies. From their point
of view, in the absence of the spin-lattice thermal interaction, the height of
the echo-signal H would simply never decrease (see Ridderbos & Redhead
[82]:1252-1253).
The relevant question for us is whether we can use this spin-lattice interac-
tion to control the values of the putative causal variable EP (environmental
perturbations). Intervening to stop the environmental perturbations would
imply isolating the spins from the molecules to which they belong. Is this
even conceivable?
From the classical interventionist perspective, all the systems in the uni-
verse are open, except the universe as a whole. But this is a contingent
matter of fact, and not a necessary matter of law. Recall that, according
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to the m-theory it is not necessary to actually perform the intervention in
order to consider it valid. When technological limitations are involved, we
invoke hypothetical interventions to analyse the causal relationships. The
only requirement is that such intervention be physically possible (see Wood-
ward, 2003, [106]: section 3.5). If we were studying some other system, a
box full of gas for example, “absolutely isolating the system from its environ-
ment” would imply blocking the interaction between the gas molecules and
the walls of the box. And this, perhaps, would count as a possible hypo-
thetical manipulation. However, in the spin-echo experiments, isolating the
system implies a change in the very capacity of the spins to transfer their
energy to the molecules in the sample. Can we genuinely modify this?
I can hardly imagine such a manipulation, unless we replace the glycerine
with some other substance (or other tissues as a brain or a heart tissue)
whose molecules produce different splits between spin up and spin down.
Changes in the molecular structure of the sample change the capacity of
spins to flip from one state to the other; and hence the spin-lattice thermal
interaction is also affected. In other words, the lattice mobility depends on
the molecular structure of the sample. But, even if we manage to reduce the
spin-lattice interaction, that interaction will never be completely blocked. So
let us assume that there is no way of isolating the spins from the lattice and
continue with our analysis.
Summing up, we have so far proposed four manipulations for controlling
the values of the variable EP , which is the putative cause of irreversibility
according to classical interventionism.
-Reducing the viscosity of the sample (M1).
-Changing the temperature of the sample as (M2).
-Introducing magnetic in-homogeneities (M3); and
-Producing a perfectly homogeneous field (M4) (hypothetical manipulation)
Let us now consider which among them fulfil the conditions INi-iv as
defined in section 4.3.1. If these manipulations fulfil the conditions INi-iv
they will count as testing interventions. If the postulated causal relations by
classical interventionism (in directed graph 11) turn out be invariant under
such testing interventions, we will be able to determine if the classical inter-
ventionist explanation meets criteria 1 and 2 of explanatory depth (see p.73).
108
Invariance under testing interventions
In order to count as a testing intervention the manipulation M1 should
first fulfil the condition IN-i, i.e. M1 should switch off the effect of any
alternative cause(s) of the intervened variable. Directed graph 5 illustrates
what a valid intervention must achieve in order to fulfil condition IN-i. Thus,
in order to fulfil the condition in this particular case, the manipulation M1
(diluting the sample) should switch off the effect of the magnetic fluctuations
upon the spin’s frequencies and, additionally, block the spin-lattice energetic
exchange.
It has been found in practice, however, that both “magnetic fluctuations”
and “spin-lattice thermal interactions” are still acting when the manipulation
M1 is carried out. Moreover, it is impossible to conceive any manipulation
that controls the Brownian motion, and, at the same time, neutralises the
exchange of magnetic energy between spins. Therefore,M1 does not fulfil IN-
i. And thus, despite the fact thatM1 meets other conditions on interventions,
it cannot be considered as a testing intervention.
The second manipulation M2 also fails to meet one condition. The evo-
lution of the spin-system is temperature-dependent. So, cooling or warming
the sample up, violates the condition IN-ii, according to which the inter-
vention cannot be a direct cause of the explained event. In other words,
the intervention must affect the effect only trough the path containing the
postulated cause (directed graph 7 on p.62, illustrates condition IN-ii).
The third and fourth manipulations M3 and M4 fail to meet condition
IN-i. The reason is analogous to the reason why M1 does not fulfil the
condition. But in this case the violation of IN-i is due to the impossibility of
“switching off” the effect of the Brownian motion upon the spins frequencies,
and the spin-lattice thermal interaction, while the magnetic manipulations
are performed.
Our conclusion in this section could be the following: All the processes
taking place during the spin-echo experiments to which classical interven-
tionists assign a causal role (namely, magnetic fluctuations, Brownian mo-
tion and thermal interactions) are closely related to each other. The causal
structure seems to be complex and no intervention is a clean single direct
cause upon the putative cause. As a consequence, all the manipulations (M1
to M4) violate at least one of the conditions INi-iv. So we are left with no
interventions to test the putative causal relationships postulated by classical
interventionism.
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But before arriving at this devastating conclusion, imagine the following
scenario. Suppose we knew nothing about the spin-echo experiments. Some-
one then shows us the spin-echo experiment and informs us that Brownian
motion is the only cause responsible for the echo-signal decay. This person of-
fers us a fictitious explanation according to which the set of relevant variables
isV={BDC,CI,H}; where BDC=Brownian diffusion coefficient, CI= per-
centage of correlational information contained in the system, H=height of
the echo-signal. The following graph (directed graph 21) describes the causal
links between the relevant variables; and illustrates how the manipulationM1
(diluting the sample) serves as a testing intervention upon BDC.
M1 // BDC // CI // H
Directed Graph 21. Application of M1 (diluting the glycerine sample)
to the cause postulated by the fictitious explanation.
Note that the fictitious explanation is false by our lights. For the sake
of the argument (to be developed in section 7.3) we have supposed that
the fictitious explanation ignores on purpose two causal factors, namely, the
magnetic fluctuations and the lattice mobility. Nevertheless, in this case
supposing the fictitious causal structure to be true, the manipulation M1
surprisingly fulfils every single condition INi-iv and hence counts as a testing
intervention.
Condition IN-i is fulfiled because there are no alternative causes of the
intervened variable (BDC) whose influence needs to be blocked. In other
words, as there are no alternative causes of BDC correlated withM1 nothing
prevents this manipulation from fulfiling the condition IN-i.
Condition IN-ii is fulfiled too because the manipulation M1, i.e. diluting
the sample, is not an action capable by itself of driving the system toward
equilibrium. Translating this into the m-theory terms, the manipulation M1
fulfils IN-ii because M1 is not a direct cause of the effect (in this case, H).
The directed graph 7 illustrates the m-theory forbids for interventions to be
direct causes of the effect.
As shown in the directed graph 8, according to condition IN-iii an in-
tervention I must be causally connected with the effect E through alterna-
tive paths. In other words, the intervention I must affect the effect E only
through the path containing the putative cause C. And finally, according to
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condition IN-iv, the values of variables Zi in alternative paths must remain
fixed while the intervention is carried out. In the fictitious explanation (illus-
trated in directed graph 21) both IN-iii and IN-iv are fulfiled because there
are no alternative paths connecting the manipulation M1 and the effect H.
M1 meets all the conditions INi-iv and is therefore an intervention. And
the postulated causal links illustrated in directed graph 21 remain invariant
under such an intervention. Shall we prefer this simpler explanation to the
complex one? Obviously we cannot since the fictitious explanation represents
a fake experiment that is far simpler than the actual spin-echo experiment
we face in reality. But since interventions are mere tests of causal relations,
we would not like to rule out the causal relationships postulated by classical
interventionists just because we do not have the appropriate interventions. I
will leave this question open now, and further discuss it in the last section of
this chapter.
6.1.2 Testing the GRW-explanation
Let us now reconsider David Albert’s explanation (as expressed in section
5.3). Albert postulates the quantum GRW-collapses as the only cause of the
echo-signal decay. Let us now consider some manipulations that change the
rate of the collapses. The GRW-explanation is presumably independent of
the environment perturbations. So all interventions related with the envi-
ronment will also become irrelevant in this case. Besides, as mentioned at
the end of section 5.3, we cannot stop or generate the collapses freely at will.
They are assumed to be absolutely random and there is no way of controlling
them by means of a previous cause. It seems then that, as the directed graph
15 illustrates, the only way of changing the rate of the GRW-collapses is by
diluting the sample. Let us see how this presumed intervention works.
According to the GRW theory, there is a direct dependence between the
frequency of the collapses and the number of particles in a given space: “the
spontaneous localization mechanism [GRW-collapses] is enhanced by increas-
ing the number of particles which are in far apart spatial regions” (see Ghi-
rardi et al, 2007, [46]: sec 5). It then folllows that, increasing the distance
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between the molecules of glycerine, by adding some water to the sample,
should reduce the number of collapses.
The experimental results obtained with different concentrations of wa-
ter and glycerine are plotted in Fig.15 (on p.105). And the GRW-based
explanation is able to account for them because it entails that the rate of
GRW-collapses (real collapses) decreases when the glycerine is diluted in wa-
ter slowing down the system’s approach to equilibrium (see Ghirardi et al,
2007, [46]: sec 5).
Unfortunately in this case, the manipulation consisting on diluting the
sample (defined above as M1) does not fulfil the condition IN-i. According
with this condition, the manipulation M1 should first of all be a cause of the
variable GRWC.5 However, the GRW-collapses are not properly caused by
the dilution of the sample. This manipulation simply decreases the rate of
GRW-collapses.
Following Woodward’s suggestion only for this kind of violations of condi-
tion IN-i, we can nonetheless considerM1 as a testing manipulation, focusing
on the fact that it constitutes a valid way of controlling the frequency of the
collapses, and ignoring the fact that M1 is not a proper cause of the variable
GRWC.
The causal relationships postulated by the GRW-based explanation (illus-
trated in the directed graph 14, on p.93) remain invariant under this unique
testing intervention. Therefore, the outcome of our analysis applying the
m-theory to this case is that the GRW-based explanation is “minimally ex-
planatory” in the sense that it meets the “minimal condition for successful
causal explanations” defined in section 4.5.3.
5Woodward’s methodology may seem circular in appealing to causes in order to test
causal relationships. However, as we mention in section 4.3.1, Woodward argues that this
is not “vicious cirularity” in the sense that no causal information is required about the
relata under study.
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6.1.3 Testing the decoherence-explanation
Our third and last explanation under study, the decoherence-based expla-
nation, is illustrated in directed graph 16 (on p.97). In order to analyze
it in terms of the m-theory, let us propose some manipulations designed to
change the values of the internal and the external decoherence (represented
by variables DI and DE respectively).
The manipulation M1, consisting in diluting the glycerine in water, is
again a good candidate. If we add water to the sample, the distance between
the glycerine molecules increases and each spin gets away from the others.
Hence, if the decoherence approach is correct, the decoherence rate decreases,
thus slowing down the system’s approach to equilibrium.
The experimental results (plotted in Fig.15 on p.105) are once again com-
patible with the explanation. It is remarkable, though, that the delay in
the relaxation time predicted by the decoherence approach would be more
significant than the delay predicted by the GRW approach (see Hemmo &
Shenker, 2005, [55]:643). The reason is that from the decoherence perspec-
tive separating the spins produces a double effect: it decreases both spin-spin
decoherence and decoherence between the spins and the environment.
Is there any other method for reducing decoherence? And furthermore, is
it possible to completely avoid it? Answering these questions has become one
of the main goals of researchers in quantum information (Uhring, 2009, [97]).
Reducing decoherence enables us to keep quantum information for longer
times. And completely avoiding decoherence would be idyllic for building
the so-called quantum computer. For these reasons, and independently of its
philosophical relevance for the foundations of statistical mechanics, suppress-
ing decoherence in the spin-echo experiments has recently become a research
field of great interest. As a result, during the last few years, several different
sequences of radio-frequency pulses have been put forward seeking to reduce
decoherence as much as possible or for as long as possible (see for example
Viola, 1998, [99]; Khodjasteh, 2005, [62]; Capellaro, 2006, [20]; Uhring, 2007,
[96] and 2009, [97]).
Similar multi-pulse techniques had been proposed much earlier (1950’s)
by Carr and Purcell [21] and soon after improved by Meiboom and Gill [70].
However, these techniques were interpreted in previous decades as ways of
improving the resolution and precision of the experiments. And they were
focused on getting better information about the chemical composition of a
113
Chapter 6. Manipulability test of Explanatory Depth
given sample. In fact, the so-called Carr-Purcell-Meiboon-Gill sequence of
pulses has been widely applied in medicine for producing images of body
structures in order to detect brain tumours, osteoporosis, heart diseases, etc.
The novelty of more recent work (for example Uhring, 2007, [96] and 2009
[97]) is that the improved technique for “dynamic decoupling” is explicitly
proposed as a way of suppressing decoherence.
In terms of the runner’s metaphor (explained in section 2.2), the essence
of the multi-pulse techniques consists in “not letting the racers run too far”.
Imagine that all the runners are placed in the starting line. The racers begin
to run at different velocities but before they lose the alignment (perhaps just
an instant after the race begins) we stop them and ask them to run back.
Again we allow them to run only a small distance. And soon multiple races
are conducted. As a consequence, the original distribution remains almost
unchanged.
This situation has been experimentally developed with spins obtaining
successful results. As illustrated in Fig.16 and Fig.17, the improved sequences
of r-f pulses bring about less diffused spin-echo patterns in which the spins’
system reaches the equilibrium in a longer relaxation time. In other words,
the decay of the signal is softer, the diffusion is largely circumvented and the
spins are able to keep the phase-memory for much longer (2 seconds instead
of 0.2 seconds in these figures).
Fig.16.Original experiment. Fig.17. Modified experiment.6
In the latest models (Uhring, 2007, [96] and 2009 [97]). ) the optimized
sequence of pulses is said to suppress decoherence even more efficiently than
the so far known sequences of equidistant pulses. Two additional advantages
have been supposedly achieved. First, the results are less sensitive to ther-
mal effects. And, second, the number of pulses required to get a certain
prolongation of the relaxation time can be much smaller (see Uhring, 2009,
6Images taken from Carr & Purcell, 1954, [21].
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[97]:100504-4).
As mentioned above, researchers in quantum information aim to find the
way to avoid decoherence for longer times. In fact it would be ideal for them
to completely avoid it. For our analysis in terms of the m-thoery it would
be also very convenient to find a manipulation such that decoherence does
not take place during the whole experiment. In such a situation, according
to Hemmo and Shenker’s decoherence-based explanation, the system should
never approach equilibrium. One way of doing so is setting up the system in a
“no-decoherent quantum state”. This kind of state has not been prepared and,
as at present, it is not considered an experimental possibility yet. However,
it remains a theoreticaly conceivable quantum state, and thus counts as a
manipulation in our analysis.
In sum, we have proposed the following prima facie possible manipulations
for testing the decoherence-based explanation:
- Reducing the viscosity of the sample (already labelled as M1);
- Reducing decoherence through multi-pulse sequences (M5);
-The “no-decoherent” quantum state (M6) (hypothetical manipulation).
Let us now run through the list and check if they fulfil the m-theory
conditions for intervention.
According to INi-iv the values of all the variables Ci causally connected
with the effect E must be fixed when an intervention is performed. This
means that in order to fulfil INi-iv every time we vary the value of the
external decoherence DE the value of the internal decoherence DI should
remain fixed. This is however impossible. Due to the coupling between the
spin and the position, the internal and the external decoherence, and thus
the variables DI and DE associated to them, are not independent from each
other. This means that it is impossible to block one kind of decoherence in
order to effectively intervene in the other one.
Thus, as a consequence of the correlation between DI and DE, all the
above suggested manipulations for testing this approach face a problem meet-
ing the condition IN-iv.7 It is notable, though, that this difficulty can be
7The intervention I must be performed in such a way that the other variables Ci in
alternative paths, causally connected to the effect E, remain fixed.
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overcome by replacing the variables DI and DE by a single variable DH
including both of kinds of decoherence. In that case, the set of relevant
variables would be V ’= {DH,H}; where DH=degree of decoherence and
H=height of the echo-signal. And the causal links would be represented by
the directed graph 22.
DH // H
Directed Graph 22. New and simpler graph for decoherence approach.
Representing the decoherence-based approach by means of this new and
simpler directed graph, the manipulations M1, M5 and M6 fulfil all the con-
ditions INi-iv. Let us see this in detail.
The manipulations no longer violate condition IN-iv because now there
are no variables connected with H through alternative paths whose value
needs to be fixed. In other words, there is no correlation between DH and
any other putative causes of H.
Conditions IN-i and IN-iii are fulfiled, because there are neither alterna-
tive causes of DH whose influence needs to be blocked (condition IN-i) nor
alternative paths through which the cause DH may be affecting the effect H
when the manipulations are performed (condition IN-iii).
And condition IN-ii is fulfiled if we accept that diluting the sample
(M1), changing the sequences of pulses (M5) or setting the system in a non-
decoherent quantum state (M6) are not direct causes of H, i.e, the condition
is fulfiled if we accept that the manipulations only affect H trough their
influence upon decoherence.
Once manipulations M1, M5 and M6 have met the four conditions they
count as testing interventions under which the causal relationship postulated
in the directed graph 22 remains invariant.
The conclusion of this section is the following. The decoherence based ap-
proach provides a causal explanation of the spin-echo experiments (expressed
in the directed graph 16) but we cannot test this explanation by means of
any of the manipulations presently available. Internal and external decoher-
ences are so intricately related that every attempt to manipulate one of them
will necessarily affect the other. However, in analogy with the case of the
new interventionist classical explanation (ilustrated in the directed graph 20)
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we found out that by simplifying and idealizing the underlying causal struc-
ture, we come up with theoretical manipulations that fulfil the conditions on
interventions laid down by the m-theory.
6.2 Answering what-if-questions
The m-theory provides us with three criteria to assess the explanatory depth
of causal relationships (see section 4.5.2, p.73-74). The first two criteria re-
quire the causal relationship to be invariant under a wide and diverse range
of interventions. Our analysis has been so far focused on whether the expla-
nations of the spin-echo experiments meet these two criteria. Now we turn
to assessment of whether the explanations fulfil criterion 3. In other words,
we analyze if the explanations are able to answer what-if-things-had-been-
different-questions (w-questions).
All the above proposed manipulations can be associated with a corre-
sponding counterfactual question (or w-question). For example, M1 is asso-
ciated to the w-question: what would happen to the height of the consecutive
echo-signals if we dilute the sample? M5 is associated to the w-question: what
would happen to the height of the echo-signals if the initial quantum state
is no-decoherent? And so on. This means that, in the previous sections, we
already obtained much valuable information about whether or not the differ-
ent explanations of the spin-echo experiments are capable of responding to
several w-questions.
In addition to these w-questions associated to our proposed manipula-
tions, there is a w-question that deserves special attention. The question I
am referring to is related to the explanation of how Mr. Jones did not get
pregnant because he took contraceptive pills (for more details see section
4.6.1). The moral of this example is the following. In order to avoid false
explanations, it is always convenient to examine whether a given explanation
under study is able to tell us what would happen if the postulated causes
were absent.
This question (let us call it “the full absence w-question”) has been rele-
vant in the philosophical debate about statistical mechanical interventionism.
More precisely, interventionism has been criticized for not been able to show
that the thermodynamic behaviour would disappear in absence of the inter-
ventionist causal mechanism. For example, Bricmont rejects interventionism
with the following claim: “imagine a system being more and more isolated.
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Is irreversibility going to disappear at some point? I cannot think of any
example where this could be argued.” (Bricmont, 1996, [13]:147 quoted in
Shenker [89]:7).
Certainly, classical interventionists have no proof that the system will
stop behaving in a thermodynamically normal way in the absence of envi-
ronmental perturbations. Nevertheless, as long as the hypothetical perfect
isolation is not against the laws of physics, the full absence w-question is
genuine and, classical interventionists do provide an answer. Namely, they
predict that the system will not approach equilibrium (see Ridderbos & Red-
head [82]:1252-1253).
Classical interventionists could argue, for instance, that as soon as there
is matter, there are perturbations. In Blatt’s model, for example, perturba-
tions arrive from intermolecular interaction and this interaction only disap-
pears when there are no molecules, or when they are so few that they do
not constitute a thermodynamic system anymore. So interventionists could
argue that the reason why Bricmont cannot imagine a system without per-
turbations is that such a system does not exist in actual fact.
It is worth emphasizing that the decoherence approach would provide a
different answer to this question. Let us imagine, as Bricmont suggests, a
system becoming isolated. Hemmo and Shenker could argue that the sys-
tem continues to behave thermodynamically due to the fact that internal
decoherence (DI) is still acting within the system itself. So, even though the
relaxation time would be significantly longer, the system would still approach
equilibrium.8
For this reason the full absence w-question directed to the decoherence
approach should be rather formulated as follows: What would happen if
both internal and external decoherences are simultaneously blocked? The
hypothetical manipulation M6 (setting the sample in a no-decoherent ini-
tial quantum state) would lead precisely to this kind of situation. And the
defenders of the decoherence approach would expect the system of spins to
behave in a thermodynamically abnormal way under such circumstances.
In sum, the explanations here analyzed successfully meet criterion 3 be-
8As mentioned in section 3.1.1, this feature allows the decoherence approach to account
for the behaviour of the universe as a whole in a more appropriate manner than classical
interventionism.
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cause they provide answers to several w-questions. In particular, it seems
that both classical and quantum interventionist approaches do provide an-
swers to the full absence w-question. It is worth mentioning though, that
among all the manipulations proposed in this chapter, only those that are
entirely hypothetical would be able to prevent the thermodynamic behaviour.
And certainly none of them would be capable of reversing it (in the sense of
getting the initial intensities of the echo-signal after the decay). This may
seem fairly suspicious to the detractors of interventionism.
The GRW approach does not fare any better. For the dissolving sam-
ple (via manipulation M1) actually helps to decrease the GRW-collapses
frequency. However, none of the proposed interventions so far is able to
completely prevent the collapses.
Huw Price has also rejected interventionism, and his argument is related
to the full absence w-question:
“To say that some asymmetric mechanism causes entropy to in-
crease is to say that in the absence of that mechanism, entropy
would not increase. Yet Boltzmann claims to have shown that
for most possible initial microstates, entropy would increase any-
way, without any such asymmetric mechanism. So friends of such
mechanisms [namely, interventionists] need to say that Boltz-
mann is wrong –that the universe (probably) starts in a mi-
crostate such that without the mechanism, entropy would not in-
crease. It’s hard to see what could justify such a claim.” (Price,
2004, [80]:228, my emphasis)
I believe that the “no decoherent initial quantum state” described above
(manipulationM6) corresponds to the kind of microstate that Price is asking
for. Namely, a initial state such that the putative causal mechanism (deco-
herence) is absent and hence avoids the system’s approach to equilibrium.
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6.3 Summary of Results
The following table (Fig.18) summarizes the results that we have obtained
in analyzing explanations of the spin-echo experiments by means of the m-
theory.
Classical Classical GRW Decoherence Decoherence
Simplified Simplified
? ?
M1: W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer
Diluting IN-i failed Invariance Minimal IN-iv failed Invariance
M2: IN-ii failed Irrelevant
Warming up
M3: W-answer Irrelevant
Inhomo-Field IN-i failed
M4: W-answer Irrelevant
Homog-Field IN-i failed
? ?
M5: W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer
Multi-pulses IN-i failed Invariance Minimal IN-iv failed Invariance
?
M6: Irrelevant W-answer W-answer
No-decohere IN-iv failed Invariance
Fig.18. Results Table.
The star symbol ? stands for “being invariant under the manipulation in turn”.
And “Minimal” stands for meeting the minimal condition for successful explanation.
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In the row corresponding to manipulation M1 the term “w-answer” is
written in every column. This indicates that all the approaches analyzed
in this thesis account for the counterfactual situation in which the glycerine
sample is diluted in water. Hence, they offer an answer to the w-question
associated with manipulation M1. More precisely, all the approaches predict
that the echo signal decays in a longer relaxation time if the experiments are
performed with diluted samples. This prediction is in accordance with the
experimental results (plotted in Fig. 15 on p.105).
If besides this qualitative prediction some quantitative predictions were
provided, a crucial experiment could be performed to investigate which among
all the explanations describes the behaviour of the spins’ system more ad-
equately. As the putative causes are supposed to affect the system in dif-
ferent ways, each approach should predict different relaxation times; thus
comparing them experimentally will be possible. Unfortunately, none of the
approaches here analyzed has provided data about the exact values of the
relaxation times that should be expected for different dilutions.9
Despite the fact that the explanations provide satisfactory qualitative “w-
answers”, in fulfilment of criterion 3 for explanatory depth, the explanations
fail to met criteria 1 and 2. The reason is that it was not possible to con-
sider M1 as an intervention, neither for the classical explanation nor for the
quantum-based ones: in every case at least one condition among INi-iv (but
a different one in each case) was violated.
We discovered that this difficulty can be overcome, in both the classical
and the quantum cases, by replacing the correlated causes for a single cause10.
Once we do so, M1 fulfils all the conditions INi-iv and hence counts as a
testing intervention. Furthermore, the causal patterns postulated by the
explanation under study turn to be invariant under this testing intervention.
This desirable result (highlighted in the table with a star symbol ?) is what
any explanation would wish to obtain after being evaluated with the m-
theory.
Regarding the second manipulation M2 (increasing the temperature of the
sample) we found out that it is not an adequate intervention for analyzing
9Hemmo and Shenker commented, in a conversation, that formally deriving this kind
of specific values of relaxation times is difficult given the current theories of decoherence.
However, they think that making such computations will become possible in the future.
10For example, in the decoherence case, if external and internal decoherences (DE and
DI respectively) are replaced by a single variable DH such that DH = DE +DI.
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the explanations of the spin-echo experiments. The reason is that changes in
the temperature affect the whole evolution of the system. And this means,
according to the m-theory, that M2 violates condition IN-ii. More precisely,
the condition is violated because the manipulation is a direct cause of the
decay of the echo-signal, which is the event that we want to explain (see
directed graph 7 on p.62 which illustrates condition IN-ii).
In fact, as Martin [69] and Hughes [58] comment, when the system is
manipulated (for example, by diluting the glycerine sample in water), care
must be taken that all the measurements of relaxation times are carried out
inside a laboratory with exactly the same temperature, and checking that
the initial temperature of the sample is always the same. Ignoring the fact
that the results are temperature sensitive may lead to inconclusive data.
The third and fourth manipulations are only relevant to the classical case.
Both violate condition IN-i for not being able to block Brownian motion and
thermal interactions while intervening upon the spins’ system. If manipula-
tionsM3 andM4 had fulfiled IN-i, they would have counted as interventions.
And if the causal relationships postulated by the classical approach would
have remained invariant under those interventions, the classical intervention-
ist explanation of the spin-echo experiments would had met criteria 1 and 2
of explanatory depth.
Nevertheless, since the classical approach provides “w-answers” to the
counterfactual situations posted by these magnetic manipulations (M3 and
M4), it successfully meets criterion 3 of explanatory depth.
Let us turn now to the fifth manipulation. Both classical and quantum
approaches are able to provide “w-answers” to the counterfactual situation
obtained by applying multi-pulsed sequences in the spin-echo experiments
(manipulation M5). As mentioned before, the decoherence rate is said to
decrease under such manipulation. We have not mentioned, though, that
the classical approach could also provide an account of the experimental
results obtained through manipulation M5 (illustrated in Fig.17 on p.114).
It could be argued, for example, that shortening the time between the pulses
also reduces the time during which the diffusion factors are acting act upon
the system. The effects of the Brownian motion, the magnetic fluctuation
and the thermal interactions are restrained, and the system’s approach to
equilibrium is slower and softer.
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The fifth manipulation is probably the most interesting one, together with
M1, in the sense that they both are applicable to all explanations. Unfortu-
nately, due to the lack of qualitative predictions,M5 does not genuinely count
as an intervention either except in a purely qualitative sense, where only the
hypothesis of an indeterminate causal relation between EP and H remains
invariant. If the corresponding quantitative predictions were provided, M5
would be useful for comparing the empirical adequacy of the explanations.
Additionally, M5 is related to the following philosophically relevant ques-
tion: Shall we consider the pulses as a part of the system, as a part of the
environment, or as a simple background condition?
All throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the system consists in
a collection of nuclei with their spins. The radio frequency pulses have been
included in the background conditions, as a part of the experimental device
(see Fig. 12 on p.88), and we have taken those pulses as a way of intervening
upon the system of spins.
However, if we define a new system of study as S’= spins+magneticfield+
rfpulses, the system seems to evolve without the help of any environmen-
tal perturbation. We could even define a system S” including the electricity
consumed on generating the rf pulses, or moreover a S” ’ including the labo-
ratory, which is warmer after the experiments. A typical argument against
interventionism consists in pointing at this regress in defining the relevant
system, which only ends with a system consisting of the universe as a whole
(see 3.1.1; Shenker, 2001, [89]:16; or Frigg, 2007, [41]:161).
The last manipulationM6 (preparing the system in a no-decoherent initial
state) turned out to be relevant for analyzing the simplest version of the
decoherence-based explanation. It is worth mentioning though, that M6 is
not applicable to the GRW-based explanation because the GRW-collapses are
supposed to drive the system to equilibrium independently of the quantum
initial state. And, in the classical case, M6 is not even relevant –because it
is conceived in a framework where decoherence is not taken into account at
all.
In terms of the m-theory this is an advantage of the simplified decoherence
explanation over the rest of the explanations because it provides us with an
additional way (namely, manipulation M6) of controlling its proposed cause
DH. Consequently, it is capable of answering a what-if-things-have-been-
different-question about which the other explanations have nothing to say.
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6.3.1 Dilemma regarding the criteria of explanatory depth
Finally, I would like to focus on a dilemma that follows from the analysis de-
veloped in this chapter. The analyzed explanations answer a good number of
w-questions, and yet it seems that, it is not easy to find testing interventions
to prove their explanatory depth. This means that the explanations success-
fully meet criterion 3 required by the m-theory to qualify as explanatorily
deep, but fail to meet criteria 1 and 2 (see p.73-74).
All the explanations that we have analyzed in this thesis have valuable
qualities from the manipulability perspective. For example, both classical
and quantum interventionism offer mechanisms to control and study the spin-
echo system; and this is precisely the kind of explanation the m-theory is
looking for (see the raven’s example in section 4.5.4). Besides, as shown in the
table of results, all the explanations predict what would happen under several
counterfactual variations (or manipulations) of the spin-echo experiments
(see the term ‘W-answer’ in Fig.18 on p.120). Hence, they provide answers
to several w-questions. Intuitively, the m-theory should then evaluate them
as reasonably deep explanations of the spin-echo experiments in fulfilment of
criterion 3.
Nevertheless, we have found several difficulties in proposing manipula-
tions that control (either actually of hypothetically) the values of the pos-
tulated causes and, at the same time, fulfil the conditions for interventions
INi-vi. Despite the fact that many manipulations have already been per-
formed in the best laboratories of the world, they turn out not to comply
with the conditions of the m-theory. Even M1 and M5, which have been
proposed as mechanisms to contrast the empirical adequacy of the different
explanations, they are not considered interventions within the m-theory, at
least not for the interventionist explanations as we have expressed them in
chapter 6.
We have discovered, though, that these violations of the conditions INi-
iv can be defeated by simplifying and idealizing the explanations, i.e. by
replacing correlated causes with a single cause. Actually, the versions of
the explanations so simplified obtained the best results after being evaluated
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with the m-theory. The reason is that, in addition to meet criterion 3 for
explanatory depth, they also meet criteria 1 and 2.
Why is this? Why are these simplified explanations deeper than the orig-
inal ones? My conjecture is that the original interventionist explanations
postulate causes that are problematic in the light of the manipulability the-
ory. Classical interventionism postulates causes whose possible interventions
are correlated with each other. And quantum-based interventionism postu-
lates causes that are correlated with each other.
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Conclusions
One could have at least four different reactions to the results in the previous
chapter and the discussion so far. They differ in the attitude they take regard-
ing the defining conditions on interventions INi-iv (on p.63). They cannot
be precisely summarized as philosophical claims, and are best understood as
attitudes, or stances towards these conditions, and concomitantly, towards
the criteria of explanatory depth proposed in the manipulability theory. I
call them the strict, flexible, simplifying, and critical attitudes.
7.1 The strict attitude
The first reaction would adopt a very strict attitude towards the condi-
tions INi-iv. Only those manipulations fulfiling the whole set of conditions
will be considered to be interventions. And only those explanations provid-
ing causal relationships which are invariant under such interventions will be
considered appropriate.
An equally strict attitude would be adopted towards the criteria for ex-
planatory depth. If there is not even one intervention under which a puta-
tive causal relationship holds, that relationship does not fulfil the minimal
condition for successful causal explanation (see p.75). In other words, the
relationship falls below “the threshold of explanatoriness” (see p.76). This
means, in turn, that such a relationship is unable to meet criterion 1 and
criterion 2 for explanatory depth (on p.73) for those criteria require invari-
ance under a wide set of interventions (see p.73). According to this strict
attitude, the larger the range of invariance, the deeper the explanation is. If
there is no invariance, there is no explanatory depth. Full stop.
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Adopting this attitude one would conclude that the explanations of the
irreversible behaviour of the spin-echo system, as expressed in chapter 6 and
given the results of chapter 7, are not even minimally explanatory 1. This con-
clusion would be welcomed by critics of interventionism. They could argue,
for example, that interventionist explanations are unable to show adequate
interventions of the spin-echo system since interventionism approaches the
irreversibility problem the wrong way. And, as the case of the multi-pulse
sequences shows, interventionists still need to solve the difficulty of defining
the system and the environment unambiguously.
7.2 The flexible attitude
Alternatively, one may adopt a more permissive attitude about the conditions
INi-iv. Something like the following could then be argued: If we dismiss any
manipulation failing to meet a single condition (like in the previous section)
we are not acting in harmony with Woodward’s suggestion of considering the
conditions INi-iv only as regulative ideals (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:114)
It should be recall that if one tries to represent the GRW-based approach
to irreversibility in terms of the m-theory, one faces the problem that the
putative cause –namely the GRW-collapses– can not be manipulated. The
reason is that GRW-collapses occur in a properly stochastic way. As a con-
sequence, any putative intervention I fails to meet condition IN-i (according
to which I must be a direct cause of the putative cause C). One may simply
conclude that there is no way of testing this specific causal relationship. Or
one may follow Woodward’s suggestion (see p.68) and solve the difficulty by
identifying the appropriate causal relata and interventions. In this particular
case, we decided to define the variable GRWC (on p.93) as representing “the
rate of GRW-collapses”. Changing the viscosity of the sample directly causes
changes in the rate of GRW-collapses. Therefore, the variable GRWC can
be manipulated, for example, by diluting the glycerine sample (M1). And,
thus, the problem of finding interventions for this case is solved.
There are three aspects of this case that I want to stress. First, if a
1See the Minimal Condition for Successful Causal Explanation on p.75.
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manipulation fails to meet any one condition, this does not mean that such
manipulation is completely useless to test a specific causal relationship under
study. Second, from the fact that a manipulation fails to meet a condition
it neither follows that the examined causal relationship is false nor that the
explanation appealing to that relationship is not reliable. And third, if one
believes that a causal relationship is genuine, but it turns out that all the
possible manipulations fail to meet one of the conditions INi-iv, then one
should try to redefine the causal relata and propose new manipulations to
do justice to the causal relationship.
Someone adopting the strict attitude would still agree with all these con-
siderations. The novelty is that, in accordance with the flexible attitude, this
process of redefining the variables and the manipulations, could also imply
re-interpreting or relaxing the conditions INi-iv. Let me illustrate this by
means of the following example (taken from Woodward, 2003, [106]:323).
Suppose that a biologist studies the growth of a plant and finds a causal
relationship between the height of the plant and the amount of water and fer-
tilizer that the plant receives. Let X1=the amount of water, X2 the amount
of fertilizer and Y=the height of a plant. According to the biologist the func-
tional relation Y = aX1 + bX2 and the directed graph 23 (below) represent
the causal relation between these variables.
X1
  A
AA
AA
AA
A
Y
X2
>>}}}}}}}}
Directed Graph 23. Causal relationships between the amount of water X1, the
amount of fertilizer X2 and the height of the plant Y .
And suppose that the only way of adding fertilizer to the plant implies adding
some water too, because most of the available fertilizers are diluted in water;
and even if we get some solid fertilizer and place it inside the flowerpot,
the plant does not absorb it unless we add some water. This means that
129
Chapter 7. Conclusions
manipulations of the variable X2 unavoidably yield changes in the value of
X1 in violation of requirement IN-iv.2Therefore, there are no possible testing
interventions upon the variable X2.
The biologist, however, insists that the fertilizer is a contributing cause
of the plant’s growth and argues that, even though it is not possible to
intervene upon X2, the causal relation between X2 and Y is genuine because
it is invariant under a range of “controlled changes” in both X1 and X2.
By measuring the amounts of water and fertilizer added to the plant, it is
possible to know both the change in the variable X1 (call it ∆X1) and the
change in the variable X2 (call it ∆X2). And the biologist argues that the
functional relation is invariant under manipulation because the total change
in the variable Y is exactly what the functional relation says it is, namely
∆Y = a∆X1 + b∆X2 (see Woodward, 2003, [106]:324).
Following the m-theory we must specify the background conditions and
the intervals of values for the variables in our example. Let us say that the
amount of water X1 varies within an interval of [1,3] liters and the amount
of fertilizer varies within the interval [0.5,1] kg. per month. And suppose
that, under these background conditions, the functional relation is invariant
under changes in the variables X1 and X2. Someone adopting the flexible
attitude would say that an explanation of the plant’s growth appealing to this
functional relationship fulfils criterion 1 of explanatory depth –or a flexible
version of criterion 1 that admits invariance under the changes explained
above, even though they are not interventions stricto sensu.
If, by an analogous argument, we flexibly applied conditions IN-i and
IN-iv to both the classical and the quantum interventionist explanations
of the spin-echo experiments, they would be evaluated as possessing some
explanatory depth. The causal relationships postulated by interventionists
are as if the variables X1 and X2 in the plant’s example were intertwined in
such a way that changing the value of X1 leads to changes in the value of X2
and vice-versa. In the classical interventionist explanation this is due to the
fact that putative interventions are correlated with each other in violation
of requirement INi3 And in the decoherence-based approach this is due to
2According to INiv an intervention I upon one cause C should be performed keeping
fixed the values of all the alternative causes of the effect E, should they exist.
3The requirement IN-i is not only violated when the manipulation is not a proper
cause of the variable C, but also when the manipulation is performed in such a way that
alternative causes of C are not switched off (see directed graph 5 on p.61).
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the fact that the two putative causes are correlated to each other in a causal
structure that is precisely as the causal structure of the plant’s explanation
(see directed graph 23).
This means that, in order to produce an argument analogous to the bi-
ologist’s argument, interventionists should provide us with quantitative pre-
dictions and functional relations of the kind H=f(EP ) and H=f(DI,DE).
They should also provide the specific intervals of values that the putative
causes may take (in other words, we need the numerical values of BDCmax,
DEmax, DImax, etc.). This would enable us to assess if the functional re-
lations correctly describe the values of the height of the echo (H) under
different changes in the putative causes (although those changes are not in-
terventions strictly speaking). And, concomitantly, this would enable us to
show to what extent the explanations meet criteria 1 and 2 for explanatory
depth. Unfortunately, having reached this point, interventionists have not
provided those functional relations. We only count on the qualitative directed
graphs in order to assess the explanations. Therefore we can only show that
the interventionist explanations are able to answer counterfactual questions
meeting criteria 3 of explanatory depth. Nevertheless, the flexible attitude
described in this section would allow us to argue that interventionists have
offered a genuine causal account of the spin-echo experiments.
As we have just seen, according to the flexible attitude, in very partic-
ular cases some manipulations may be useful to assess the import of causal
relationships despite the fact that those manipulations are not interventions
in the strict sense. The disadvantage of adopting this flexible attitude is the
ambiguity in deciding when the conditions for intervention (INi-iv) must be
respected and when they can be relaxed or re-interpreted. Some judgments
will need to be made. For example, it seems that we could be permissive
with the magnetic manipulations M3 and M4 which are not able to switch
off the influence of alternative causes. By contrast, it seems that the ma-
nipulation of the spin-echo experiments that consists on raising the sample’s
temperature (M2) should be dismissed straightaway due to the fact that it is
a direct cause of the whole system’s evolution. In other words, it seems that
not all violations of the conditions INi-iv are equally serious.
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As the following table shows (see Fig.19 below), a flexible attitude towards
both the classical and the quantum-based explanations of the spin-echo ex-
periments would restore some explanatory depth.
Classical Classical GRW Decoherence Decoherence
Simplified Simplified
? ? ? ?
M1 W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer
Diluting (IN-i)’ Invariance Minimal (IN-iv)’ Invariance
M2
Dismissed
?
M3 W-answer Irrelevant
Inhomo-Field (IN-i)’
?
M4 W-answer Irrelevant
Homog-Field (IN-i)’
? ? ? ?
M5 W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer W-answer
Multi-pulses (IN-i)’ Invariance Minimal (IN-i)’ Invariance
? ?
M6 Irrelevant W-answer W-answer
No-decohere (IN-iv)’ Invariance
Fig.19. Flexible Results. The symbol ? stands for invariance and
(IN)’ stands for the flexible version of the condition in turn
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7.3 The simplifying attitude
A third attitude would insist on the use of the simplified versions of the in-
terventionist explanations. The reason being that, according to the results
obtained in chapter 7 (see Fig.18 on p.120), the simplified decoherence-based
explanation postulates causal relationships that turn out to be invariant un-
der a wide set of interventions –understood strictly as those that satisfy the
conditions INi-iv.
This means, in turn, that the decoherence-based explanation of the spin-
echo experiments meets all the criteria of explanatory depth. It fulfils cri-
terion 1 because it appeals to a causal relationship that remains invariant
under interventions for different values of the putative cause DH (decoher-
ence rate). It fulfils criterion 2 because it provides several different ways
of intervening on that putative cause: changing the viscosity of the sample,
changing the frequency of the radio-frequency pulses, and setting the system
in a no-decoherent initial state. And finally, it fulfils criterion 3 because it is
able to explain what would happen if things had been different. Therefore,
the decoherence approach in its simplified version offers the deepest expla-
nation of the irreversible behaviour of the spin-echo system among all the
explanations analyzed in this thesis.
Adopting this attitude one may argue that the fact that the simplified
versions of the explanations turned out to be deeper than the complex ones in
this analysis, is to be interpreted as an advantage of the m-theory. Simplicity
is often considered to be an epistemic value of good explanations, and the
m-theory seems to classify the simplest explanations as the deepest ones.
Although this attitude could be applicable in the case of the simplifica-
tion suggested for the decoherence-based explanation, it would be mistaken
in the classical case. It should be recalled that the simplified classical ver-
sion (in directed graph 21 on p.110) has been deliberately constructed in an
idealized fashion since it ignores two relevant causal factors and keeps only
a single cause. More precisely, two causes of environmental interaction have
been ignored (magnetic fluctuations, and thermal interactions). It assumes
that the only cause of the echo-signal decay is the Brownian motion. It is
worth noting though that the ignored causes have already experimentally
proved to be relevant, and both are considered as main causes of dissipation
in the scientific literature from the 1950’s to the 1990’s (see, for instance,
Bloembergen, 1984, [10], Hahn [50] and Nyenhus [74]). Yet, we find that, by
simply pretending that they do not exist, we obtain what looks like a deeper
explanation.
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7.4 The critical attitude
The fourth and last option is to conclude that the analysis presented in this
thesis has revealed some weak points in Woodward’s m-theory.
According to the m-theory’s criterion 3 of explanatory depth, both the
classical and the quantum-based interventionist explanations of the echo-
signal decay are deep explanations given the wide set of counterfactual sit-
uations they account for. However if we apply the m-theory to analyze
these explanations, they rather turn out to be quite superficial or not even
minimally explanatory. Both explanations fail to meet criteria 1 and 2 for
explanatory depth because they are not invariant under intervention. Why
are explanations capable of answering to a wide set of w-questions, and hence
good, in terms of one criterion, so lowly rated in terms of the other two cri-
teria of explanatory depth? Would it not be desirable that the three criteria
worked in harmony?
Similarly, even though according to the m-theory we would expect the
original classical explanation to be deeper than the simplified and false one
(because it answers more w-questions), our results do not allow us to choose
the original explanation as the deeper one. Let me explain this with an
example.
The original classical interventionist explanation of the echo-signal decay
(as expressed in the directed graph 12 on p.87) is more detailed and takes
into account more control factors than the simplified one (expressed in the
directed graph 21 on p.110). In this sense, comparing these two classical
explanations is analogous to comparing the two explanations of the car’s ac-
celeration. The first and simple explanation says that the acceleration of the
car depends on the angle of the gas pedal. The second and complex expla-
nation appeals to the whole internal mechanical system of the car, giving
details about how the motor burns the petrol, the carburetor mixes liquid
fuel with air, how the gas pedal pushed by the conductor’s foot is connected
with all the mechanical parts, etc.4 According to the m-theory, the second
explanation of the car’s acceleration is deeper than the first one, because it
allows us to control and manipulate the explained event in several different
ways. And, as far as I can see, this is exactly what the original and com-
4This example was taken from Haavelmo, 1944, [47]:24, and quoted by Woodward in
[106]: 258-259.
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plex classical interventionist explanation, unlike the simplified explanation,
is doing.
So why, then, did our analysis not arrive at the conclusion that there
is a wide range of interventions (criterion 1), a diverse set of interventions
(criterion 2), and at the same time, a wide set of w-questions answered (crite-
rion 3) by the original classical interventionist explanation? This agreement
between the three criteria of explanatory depth occurs in the car’s example,
but once more, it does not occur in the results of our analysis. Quite the
contrary: the simpler explanations, which deliberately ignore factors that
have been already recognized relevant by the scientific practice, turn out to
be deeper according to the m-theory than the detailed ones. In this thesis
we have found that, in fulfilment of criteria 3, the original classical inter-
ventionist explanation enables to answer a wider set of w-questions than the
simpler version of it. The original explanation, for example, accounts for
what would happen under magnetic interventions. A situation about which
the new and simpler explanation has nothing to say. Indeed, the simpler ex-
planation is only able to answer w-questions about counterfactual situations
produced by variations of the Brownian motion rates. Nevertheless, the fic-
titious simple explanation turns out to be deeper than the complex classical
explanation in the analysis. And this fact, from a manipulabilitst perspec-
tive, is at least counterintuitive because (as the car’s example illustrates), an
explanation that accounts for a wider set of counterfactual questions, should
be preferable and deeper.
From the analysis developed in this thesis we have concluded that the
reason why the original interventionist explanations fail to meet conditions
INi or INiv and concomitantly criteria 1 and 2 of explanatory depth, is the
following: In order to explain a phenomenon, interventionist explanations
postulate two (or more) causes that are correlated with each other. And if
the causes are correlated we cannot intervene upon them in the way that the
m-theory considers valid.
This conclusion provides a possible answer to the questions raised in the
previous paragraphs. Woodward could argue, for example, that no matter
how many w-answers an explanation provides, never mind how simple or
how complex it is if the postulated causes are correlated, it will be impossible
to provide testing interventions for the explanation in question, and hence it
will be impossible to meet cirteria 1 and 2 of explanatory depth.
The question is if from this position we shall conclude that explanations
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that postulate correlated causes are not even minimally explanatory; or if we
shall rather conclude that it is simply impossible to test those explanations
by means of the m-theory.
The m-theory provides us with a definition of ‘deep’ explanation, but it
does not define ‘shallow’ explanation. Is an explanation ‘shallow’ if it violates
all the criteria for explanatory depth? Or just one, and if so which one?
More precisely, are shallow explanations those that are unable to provide
interventions under which the postulated causes remain invariant? Or are
shallow explanations those whose causal relationships are not invariant under
many interventions? Let us analyze the two possibilities in turn.
(A) Suppose that shallow explanations are those that are not able to pro-
vide even one intervention under which the causal relationship they postulate
remains invariant. Then, we can say that the m-theory has been useful to
analyze the interventionist explanations; and that far from being deep expla-
nations, they turned out to be not even minimally explanatory.
(B) Now suppose, instead, that shallow explanations are those whose
causal relationships are shown to be non-invariant under interventions.5 Then,
we are forced to accept that the m-theory has not adequately analyzed inter-
ventionist explanations in general. For we have not been able to propose any
testing intervention that could serve for evaluating whether the postulated
causal relationships were invariant or not. As every explanation with corre-
lated causes will be in the same situation, we can conclude that the m-theory
is not useful to evaluate a specific set of causal explanations, namely, the set
of causal explanations with correlated causes.
My conjecture is that, either choosing (A) or (B), rejecting explanations
that postulate correlated causes leads to some kind of skepticism. Suppose
we understand shallow explanations in the sense (A) and an explanation has
already been evaluated as deep because it is invariant under several interven-
tions. This explanation is always at risk of becoming unsatisfactory if a new
causal factor, correlated with the originally proposed cause, is discovered.
Even if the new factor is genuine and provides more information for control-
ling the explained event, it will automatically render invalid all the testing
interventions that were previously considered appropriate. Therefore, the
explanation will fail to meet criteria 1 and 2 of explanatory depth, and hence
will lose its depth. A skeptic would thus claim that we should always shed
5As happens, for example, with Mr. Jones’ explanation. Details in section 4.6.1.
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doubts on the depth of the explanation because we never know whether there
is an unknown correlated cause.
Similarly if we understand shallow explanations in the sense (B) there is
always some probability that an unknown causal factor is correlated with the
causes postulated by a given explanation. But we said that, according to (B),
the m-theory is not useful to test explanations with correlated causes. The
skeptic would claim that we never know if the explanation to be analyzed
belongs to the set of explanations that can be assessed by means of the
m-theory.
In other words, diagnostics of explanations obtained through the appli-
cation of the m-theory are as lucky as scientific theories. They may be
amended or abandoned. This would be acceptable if the arrival of new causal
information would produce stronger and deeper explanations. However, in
diagnostics obtained via the m-theory, the new causal information far from
strengthening the explanations, seems to render vulnerable explanations that
were already considered to be explanatorily deep.
Last, but no least, the analysis developed in this thesis shows that the
depth of an explanation, more precisely, whether a manipulation counts as
an intervention, depends on how the causal relationship invoked by the ex-
planation is represented in the directed graph. And, as we saw when we
proposed the directed graphs for the putative causal relationships postulated
by the statistical mechanical interventionist (in chapter 5), and later consid-
ering the rf pulses as possible manipulations (in section 6.3), it is not always
easy to decide whether a factor should be considered as a direct cause, as
a contributing cause, as a possible intervention, or as a background condi-
tion. This decision leads to different directed graphs, and thus to different
diagnostics according to the m-theory.
In sum, the critical attitude, which is my own attitude, points at the fol-
lowing four weaknesses of the m-theory. 1) The criteria of explanatory depth
do not work harmonically. 2) The m-theory does not specify how “shallow
explanations” are to be understood. 3) The rejection of explanations that
postulate correlated causes leads to skepticism about the diagnostics obtained
by the m-theory. And, 4) the diagnostics obtained by the application of the
m-theory are dependent on the election of the causal relata and the directed
graphs, which are not always univocally identifiable in the putative causal
explanations.
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I would finally like to stress that this is a critical but constructive atti-
tude. It is never suggested the m-theory has not served us to analyze the
explanations of the spin-echo experiments. On the contrary, the m-theory
has helped us to visualize the advantages and disadvantages of those ex-
planations from a new perspective, and has provided us with some specific
proposals to improve the interventionist explanations of irreversibility. The
critical attitude towards the m-theory is constructive in the sense that it is
requesting clarification of specific aspects of the m-theory. It would be illu-
minating if Woodward (or another manipulationist) could tell us how exactly
a “shallow explanation” is to be understood in the m-theory.
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Liouville’s equation and
Liouville’s theorem
The Liouville equation describes the time evolution of phase space distribu-
tion function. Consider a dynamical system with canonical coordinates qi
and conjugate momenta pi, where i = 1,...,n. Then the phase space distribu-
tion ρ(p, q) determines the probability that the system will be found in the
phase space volume dnq dnp. The Liouville equation governs the evolution
of ρ(p, q; t) in time t:
dρ
dt
=
∂ρ
∂t
+
n∑
i=1
(
∂ρ
∂qi
q˙i +
∂ρ
∂pi
p˙i
)
= 0
Where time derivatives are denoted by dots, and are evaluated according
to Hamilton’s equations for the system. This equation demonstrates ‘the
conservation of density in phase space’ (which was Gibbs’s name for the
theorem).
Liouville’s theorem states that the distribution function ρ is constant
along any trajectory in phase space, i.e. that:
dρ
dt
= 0
The theorem is often restated in terms of the Poisson bracket as:
dρ
dt
= −{ρ,H}
Where H is the Hamiltonian governing the system’s dynamics.
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Ergodic Theory
There are several definitions of full ergodicity. In this appendix three of them
are presented. The ergodic problem and the difference between the “ergodic
hypothesis” and the “ergodic theorem” will also be explained.
Intuitively, a system is ergodic if a representative point crosses the entire
region in Γ that is available to the system. Let us suppose, for example,
that we have a container with gas and we leave it to evolve freely. It is
reasonable to believe that, after enough time, the system will pass through
all its possible microstates, i.e., it will cross over all the regions of the phase
space compatible with its macro constraints given its initial condition. If
time tends to infinity, we can even affirm that the system will eventually
pass through any compatible state. This is the essence of Boltzmann’s idea1
later on denominated ergodic hypothesis 2.
Also, a quasi-ergodic hypothesis was posited attempting to offer an ade-
quate account of the relevant features of statistical mechanical systems. This
new ergodic-like hypothesis asserted that “a trajectory, started at any point
would, in the fullness of time, come arbitrarily close to every point in the al-
lowed phase space” (Sklar, 1993, [91]:161, original emphasis). But it was not
completely satisfactory and, as a result, ergodic theory lost some recognition
for several years.
1Published in 1884 in a Boltzmann’s paper where the term “ergodic” appeared for the
first time.
2Reconstructions of the role of ergodic hypothesis in Statistical Mechanics can be
founded in von Plato, 1994, [102] and Brush, 1976, [15]; To find information about the
original meaning and the etymology of the term ‘ergodic’ see Gallavotti, 1999, [42].
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The ergodic theory recovered attention when John von Neumann and
G. Birkhoff obtained new mathematical results. Von Neumann investigated
which conditions of the dynamical structure of the system were sufficient to
prove the identity of infinite time average and phase average for any function
of the microscopic state of a system. The aim was to find such condition
without using the Ergodic or the quasi-ergodic hypotheses. According to von
Neumann’s results, the condition to be satisfied by the dynamical system is
that the state of the system not be “entrapped” in some sub-region of the
phase space, i.e., that the phase space is not decomposable (indecomposable).
Definition of decomposability3 : a system is decomposable iff there exist
two (or more) regions A and B of non-zero measure such that A∩B = ∅ and
A∪B = Γ, which are invariant under the dynamics of the system: φt(A) = A
and φt(B) = B for all t.
This means that, if the initial microstate of the system is in the non-zero
region A, the representative point will remain inside the sub-region A during
the whole evolution of the system.
A mathematical theorem that strengths von Neumann’s results was later
proposed by Birkhoff. The Birkhoff theorem (sometimes called The Er-
godic Theorem) states: “Let a system be started in some micro-state a.
Let R be any region of micro-states possible for the system given the sys-
tem’s constraints. Let R have a non-zero size in the phase space. Then,
when the system is ergodic it will be the case that, except possibly for a set
of initial micro-states of size zero, the trajectory form the initial microstate
a will eventually pass through the region” (Sklar, 1993, [91]:167).
The condition that “given any set of positive measure in the phase space,
the trajectories from all but perhaps a set of measure zero of phase points
intersect that set” is equivalent to idecomposability. Therefore, after von
Neumann’s and Birkhoff’s contributions, (metric) idecomposability is neces-
sary and sufficient to assure that both the phase average of any function of
the dynamical variables and the infinite-time average of the same function
exist and, that they are equal for almost every phase trajectory (except for
a set of trajectories whose initial condition belongs to a measure-zero set)4.
3Also referred sometimes as metric decomposability or metric transitive
4This theorem may also be regarded in topological terms. That is to say, as the topo-
logical properties that the phase space must fulfil under the transformations represented
by Hamiltonians. For more details see Quay (1978, p.50-60)
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Definition of (full) ergodicity: The dynamical system (Γ, φt, µ) is
ergodic by definition if any of the following equivalent conditions are satisfied:
1. It is indecomposable
2. For any measurable set A ⊆ Γ such that µ(A) 6= 0 and for almost
every5 ∈ Γ, the flow φt intersects A at some time t, i.e.it holds that
{φt(x)} ∩ A 6= 0
3. Given an integrable function f , the left hand side (“time average”) of
the following equality is equal to the right hand side (“space average”)
for almost every6 x ∈ Γ
f ∗(x) =< f(x) >
that is to say
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ t0+T
t0
f(φ(x))dt =
∫
Γ
f(x)dµ(x)
4. For almost every x ∈ Γ, the limit of the relative time that the flow
φt(x) spends in a measurable set A ⊆ Γ is proportional to µ(A)7
Definition of absolute continuity: The invariant measure µ’ is abso-
lutely continuous with respect to µ iff for any measurable region A ⊆ Γ it is
the case that µ(A) = 0 then µ’(A) = 0
Uniqueness Theorem: assume that (Γ, φt, µ) is ergodic and µ is nor-
malized. Let there be another measure µ’ on Γ which is normalised, invariant
under φt, and absolutely continuous with respect to µ then µ = µ’.
Definition of (full) Mixing property: We say that the system (Γ, φt, µ)
is mixing if and only if for any measurable sets A,B ∈ Γ it holds that
5almost every x ∈ Γ, except for a set of measure 0.
6Except a set of measure zero.
7Another way to define ergodicity is known as Koopanism. Koopman, who realized a
study of ergodic systems using functional analysis. This approach focuses on the stochastic
properties of dynamical systems in terms of the unitary operator. By studying the spectral
properties of said linear operator, it becomes possible to classify the ergodic properties of
the flow φt. (Taken from Rédei, M. “Koopanism”, unpublished manuscript written for a
course in Pittsburgh, 1994-1995)
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lim
|t|→∞
φt(A ∩B) = µ(A)µ(B)
Intuitively, if the phase space is a surface with fluorescent properties and
we illuminate a region of it, in such a way that only that region becomes
green and the rest remains white, then “mixin” will be fulfiled if, as a result
of the system evolution, the green region initially concentrated is spread over
the whole phase space when time tends to infinite8
Implication Theorem: Every dynamical system that is full mixing is
also full ergodic, but not vice versa.
Convergence theorem: Let (Γ, φt, µ) be a dynamical system and let µ
be a measure on that is absolutely continuous with respect to the normalized
measure µ. Define ρt(A) = ρ(φt(A)) for all measurable A ⊆ Γ. Let f(x) be
a bounded measurable function on. If the system is mixing, then ρt → µ as
t→∞ in the sense that:
lim
t→∞
∫
f(x)dρt =
∫
f(x)dµ
A sharp critical analysis of the ergodic program has been developed by
John Earman and Miklos Rédei in reference (1996, [34]).
8For another intuitive explanation of “mixing” see Frigg, 2007, [41]:119
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Appendix C
Graphs in chapter 6
A) Classical interventionist explanation of the SE experiments
Set of relevant variables
V= {EP,DS,H}; where
EP= environmental perturbations;
DS= delayed spins;
H= height of the echo-signal
Possible interventions
I1=Magnetic field fluctuations
I2= Brownian motion (Brownian diffusion coefficient);
I3= Lattice Mobility.
Graph
MagneticF luctiations
""F
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
F
BrownianMotion
))RRR
RRR
RRR
RRR
RRR
EP // DS // H
LatticeMobility
55llllllllllllll
Directed Graph 12.
Background conditions
- Experimental settings: spin’s sample, magnet and rf pulse generator;
Background theory
- Classical Mechanics; Larmor’s theory of precession.
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B) GRW-based Explanation of the spin-echo experiments
Set of relevant variables
V={GRW,PS,H}; where
GRWC= rate of GRW collapses per second;
PS = perturbed spins;
H= height of the echo-signal.
Possible interventions
I4=Diluting the glycerine sample.
Graph
DilutingSample
((QQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
GRWC // PS // H
Directed Graph 15. Directed Graph for GRW-based approach.
Background conditions
- Experimental settings: spin’s sample, magnet and rf pulse generator.
Background theory
- GRW collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics,
in particular the GRW stochastic dynamics;
- The dynamical hypothesis
-Assumption (a): Among the quantum mechanically normal evolutions
the set of the thermodynamic abnormal evolutions has measure zero.
-Assumption (b): The thermodynamically abnormal states are uniformly
distributed, in every microscopic neighborhood, among the thermodynami-
cally normal ones.
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C) Decoherence-based explanation of the spin-echo experiments
Set of relevant variables
V={DE,DI,EC, TDB}, where
DE=external decoherence;
DI=internal decoherence;
EC=effective collapses; and
H=height of the echo-signal.
Possible interventions
- Diluting sample
- Setting the initial quantum state in such a way that decoherence does
not take place during the entire experiment.
Graphs
Intervention1 // DE
""F
FF
FF
FF
F
EC // H
DI
Xxxxx
;;xxxx
Directed Graph 17. First intervention for the decoherence-based explanation.
DE
X
FFF
F
##FF
FF
EC // H
Intervention2 // DI
<<yyyyyyyyy
Directed Graph 18. Second intervention for the decoherence-based explanation.
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Background conditions
- Spin- echo experiment settings
Background theory
-Non-collapse interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (see for example,
Dieks and Vermaas (eds.), 1998, [28]).
- Schrödinger Quantum Dynamics (governing the system alone)
-Stochastic dynamics (governing the system plus the environment), for
instance, the dynamics for modal interpretations proposed by Bacciagaluppi
and Dickson, 1999, [5].
- It is assumed that these interpretations satisfactorily solve the mea-
surement problem. As a consequence, effective collapses end up in quantum
mechanically normal states, namely, states whose evolution begins and ends
in states given by Gaussians in position and momentum.
- The initial quantum state must be such that decoherence is guaranteed
for long enough to cover the whole evolution of the system.
-Although there is dependence of the initial quantum state, the evolution
is still independent of whether the initial state is thermodynamically normal
or not.
-Assumption (a): Among the quantum mechanically normal evolutions
the set of the thermodynamic abnormal evolutions has measure zero.
-Assumption (b): The thermodynamically abnormal states are uniformly
distributed, in every microscopic neighborhood, among the thermodynami-
cally normal ones.
-Assumption (c): The stochastic dynamical laws produce the quantum
mechanical probabilities given by the Born rule.
-Assumption (d): The quantum mechanical probabilities reproduce the
quantitative predictions of classical statistical mechanics.
- In this case the past-to-future direction is entirely determined by the
past hypothesis .
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Appendix D
Larmor Precession
When a magnetic moment is placed in a magnetic field it will tend to align
with the field. Classically, a magnetic moment can be visualized as a current
loop and the influence toward alignment can be described as the torque on the
current loop exerted by the magnetic field. The idea of the magnetic moment
as a current loop can be extended to describe the magnetic moments of
orbital electrons, electron spins and nuclear spins. In each case the magnetic
moment is associated with the angular momentum, and a torque can be
identified which tends to align the magnetic moment with the magnetic field.
In the nuclear case, the angular momentum involved is the intrinsic angular
momentum I associated with the nuclear spin.
When you have a magnetic moment directed at some finite angle with
respect to the magnetic field direction, the field will exert a torque on the
magnetic moment. This causes it to precess about the magnetic field direc-
tion (see Fig. 20). This is analogous to the precession of a spinning top
around the gravity field. The torque can be expressed as the rate of change
of the nuclear spin angular momentum I and equated to the expression for
the magnetic torque on the magnetic moment; which when put in derivative
form gives a precession angular velocity w.
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Fig.20. Larmor precession.
Sources:
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/magnetic/larmor.html
http:// teaching.shu.ac.uk/hwb/chemistry/tutorials/molspec/nmr1.htm
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